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Executive Summary 
   
 
  Not more than 50 years of its modern history, Tanzania has undergone an arduous path of 
national independence and foundation. Experienced one of the most outstanding socio-
political integrations in the world, more recently the nation have gone through a profound 
transition from an extremely experimental socialist country to a market-oriented capitalist 
economy and made substantial progress in economic reform and liberalization. No other 
single country in the African continent has achieved so much progress in consolidating the 
social solidarity and projecting the national identity than the United Republic of Tanzania 
since her independence. Particularly the nation’s leadership succeeded in providing the socio-
political stability and national confidence through the promotion of human rights, freedom 
and democracy.  
 
Entering the new millennium the Mainland Tanzania disclosed the national development 
vision respectively which aims at transforming the nation’s low productivity economy into a 
semi-industrialized one led by modernized and highly productive agricultural activities. With 
her quite different historical background and socio-economic endowments from the mainland, 
the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar projected her own development vision and the 
strategy of growth and poverty reduction. And the recent performance of their economies is 
encouraging sustaining high rate of economic growth and reducing the incidence of poverty.  
 
Tanzania is yet to materialize her potential for an accelerated growth and sustainable socio-
economic development. Despite the rehabilitation and revival of her economy in recent years 
poverty is still widespread many parts of the country and the nation is suffering from lack of 
development resources and infrastructure: financial; human and entrepreneurial; techno- 
logical; and physical. Blessed with abundance in natural resources and cultural and bio-
ecological diversities, Tanzania enjoys the nation’s geo-political location exercising a 
strategic role in the East African region and her neighbors. By consolidating a highly multi-
racial society into a unified national identity, Tanzania built a sound and strong foundation 
for further accelerated advancement of social progress and economic development. 
 
Korea, once a heavily agrarian poor nation with scarce natural resources and scant base of 
industry, transformed herself into a highly industrialized country climbed out of poverty and 
rapidly joined the group of developed nations. Setting out the nation’s development strategy 
toward modernization and industrialization in the early 1960s as Tanzania launched her own 
development strategy of socialist policy emphasizing self-reliance and social equity, Korea 
adopted a market-oriented and outward-looking strategy focusing on economic growth based 
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on comparative advantages. The growth-first, en-even development strategy by which 
priorities were given to some strategic productive industries was implemented under a 
authoritative but visionary leadership. After gaining a substantial edge of economic 
competence, a policy for gradual expansion of social services such as education and health 
has followed, accumulating a unique and intriguing development experiences.  
 
The Tanzania’s development vision has projected lofty and high goals of economic and 
social aspirations, however, it seems to be void of practical and feasible policy measures of 
preference and concentration making full use of comparative advantages and optimizing 
scarce development resources. Still mired by the socialist legacies of emphasis on public 
social services, the main objectives of the nation’s development strategy are directed to 
broad-based equitable growth and social welfare. The internationally agreed Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) mistakenly mitigated the growth-oriented national vision and 
development targets of Tanzania toward result-driven outcomes of poverty reduction and 
social development. The immediate goals of Tanzania’s national development are to promote 
pro-poor growth for poverty reduction and to preferably expand public educational and health 
services over the industrial promotion. 
 
Korea’s development experiences clearly shows that the virtuous circle of growth and 
development under which productive sector development generates industrial production and 
national incomes, then create the demand of social services and this exponential circulation 
enables the young economy to engineer and continue the perpetual path of accelerated 
economic growth and sustainable development. ‘Growth-first’ and ‘Make the pie bigger’, 
then ‘Distribute’ and ‘Share the fruit of the growth’. A succession of small cases of success 
and excellence detonated the industrial production and created a chain of exponential 
expansion of the economy generating incomes, increasing both consumption and savings 
which led to increased investment both in productive and service sectors. The creation of 
employment contributed to higher income and poverty reduction much more than the social 
policy of redistribution and pro-poor spending in health and education. 
 
The history of the developed countries tells us that they took a similar step toward the 
nations’ modernization by adopting policies and strategies in which they share in some 
essential ingredients in common and those are just what Korea learned and followed. It is 
time for the Tanzania’s national leadership to assess the overall situation regarding the 
national development vision, policies and strategies in view to the alternative development 
experiences of Korea and other outstanding developing economies taking the similar 
development path. It is recommended that the Tanzanian leadership make an extensive and 
intensive review on the paradigm of the current development policy and strategy both in 
historical and international context. And it is strongly advised to reorient its policy direction 
toward strategic growth promotion in the productive sectors from broad-based equitable 
growth and social equity.  
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The shift of policy paradigm does not mean the withdrawal of support for poverty 
reduction and social development. It means the adjustment of investment priority in terms of 
igniting the virtuous circle of growth and development away from the consumptive repetition 
of recurrent expenditures focused on public social services. A bigger proportion of increasing 
financial and human resources should be allocated to the promotion of strategic productive 
industries including agriculture, manufacturing and tourism. While an absolute level of 
investment in social sector are to be maintained in a modest rate of expansion, the investment 
in the productive sectors should be expanded in a considerable extent. Instead of 
compensating the basic needs of the poor, the purchasing power of the poor is to be 
strengthened by job creation and income generation in the productive sectors. The people’s 
high expectations for social welfare and protection spawn by the government should be 
replaced by the aspirations for economic well-being they are creating and achieving by 
themselves. 
 
To attain these Tanzania’s futuristic development leadership should be reengineered. 
Beyond national unity and social solidarity, a renewed visionary leadership should take a 
innovative and decisive role for shifting the development paradigm and the subsequent 
reorientation of national policies and strategies: From equity and growth to growth and 
equity; from broad-based even growth to un-even strategic growth; Strengthening outward-
looking mindset away from the lagging inward-looking inertia; from public social welfare to 
privatization and economic well-being; and balancing the local autonomy and participation of 
decentralization by devolution with the responsible development stewardship led by the 
government leadership.   
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It is the recent phenomenon that Korea as one of the emerging donors renewed the 
willingness and commitment to international development cooperation through which Korea 
could share her development experiences and expand the volume and area of assistance 
programs. Tanzania is one of the core development partners of Korea’s international 
cooperation and the Korean government plans to expand the cooperative programs. In 
particular, since the Korean government launched ‘Korea’s Initiative for Africa’s 
Development’ in 2006 which projected to triple Korea’s aid to Africa by 2008, the 
cooperative relationship between the two countries has been strengthened. 
 
For the time being the Korea’s commitment to Tanzanian development efforts is quite 
limited in its volume and areas of intervention. But the potential for future engagement and 
intervention is unlimited considering the huge demand for development investment in all the 
spheres and the applicability of Korea’s development experience and know-how into 
Tanzania’s development policies, strategies and programs in various fields. There is need for 
Korea to increase the volume of support and concentrate her intervention in some strategic 
areas or themes. The areas or themes of focused intervention should be in which Korea has 
comparative and competitive advantages based on her accumulated development experiences 
and contemporary competence, and the elements of advantages should be those which could 
be utilized in full extent.  
 
Most of all, the new programs to be implemented could be most fruitful in case they are 
consulted and identified in the context of Tanzania’s paradigm shift and reorientation of her 
development policy and strategy toward productive sector promotion.  
 
Based on the inborn characters of Tanzanians and the endowments the nation inherited 
more than abundant, the nation could build a nation of lofty pride and highly advanced 
economy. With the renewal of the nation’s pride and cultural identity, Tanzania could be a 
nation of dignity and affluence escaping from the plight of poverty and laggardness. The 
nation’s leadership and the people’s willingness will sure to make it. And Korea could be 
able to contribute to it through mutually beneficial international cooperation programs in the 
future. 
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National Development Strategy of Tanzania 
In View to Korea’s Development Experience1 
 
I. Introduction: An Inside Story of an Outsider 
 
1. For Japanese study, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword is considered as a must reading. 
Written by Ruth Benedict, a well-known American anthropologist, the book depicted the 
Japanese society and culture on the whole accurate and incisive enough to support the 
formulation of a nation’s war-ending strategy.2 I was astonished to find out that the writer 
never travelled Japan unable to visit the nation in a war with her own country. She 
produced the study at a distance, making use of the secondhand information and materials. 
And I am here in person, in the place of Dar es Salaam for a certain kind of study and 
consultation on national development strategy of Tanzania and was wondering whether I 
could make some valuable observations and recommendation worth of reference, apart 
from producing a prominent study which is lucid and insightful. 
 
2. Being an expatriate in Tanzania came most for the first time far away from the continent, it 
is true that I was not able to escape from experiencing the culture shock. Approaching half 
an year in Dar es Salaam at the end of this month, I am going to enter the third phase of 
‘Adjustment’ after the first ‘Honeymoon’ phase and the second ‘Negotiation’.3 It seemed 
that I might have grown accustomed to the newness of Tanzania and developed routines. 
And as have been told that most of the culture shocks are being felt for the first three 
months or more, I could have been able to see the most impressed things and some 
interesting differences between the two countries, Tanzania and Korea, in terms of socio-
economic features as well as cultural characteristics. Therefore, the followings could be an 
inside story told by an outsider with a different but fresh view which is somewhat naïve 
and straightforward.  
 
3. The purpose of this consultation project is the exploration of possible alternative ways for 
improving Tanzanian national development strategy in view to Korea’s development 
experience which is unique but quite unfamiliar to Tanzanians. In addition to the review 
on the development policy and strategy an observation is made on the development 
cooperation between Tanzania and the international community. And this report is the 
results of the major findings and observations my colleague and I made during the past 
                                            
1
 It is the thinking and opinion of the advisor, neither those of the host ministry PO-PSM(President’s 
Office-Public Service Management) of the United Republic of Tanzania nor the sponsored agency 
Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) of the Republic of Korea.  
2
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruth_Benedict 
3
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture_shock 
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five months and more.4 It was an intriguing and meaningful process of working through 
which we had not only a series of numerous facts finding visits to and serious discussions 
with quite a number of ministries, public and private organizations, and several 
international development organizations, but also several field trips to the regional and 
rural areas.5 Distinctive dissimilarities and differences rather than similarities are being 
observed in both the endowments and the accomplishments of the two nations. Apparent 
differentiation and generalization was possible in their development backgrounds, the 
pursuit of their own policy objectives and the exercise of each one’s development 
strategies.   
 
4. Due to the striking contrast and distinction in their policies and strategies as well as the 
development paths, it was indispensable for us to make some recommendations including 
the reorientation of the development policy and strategic approaches to socio-economic 
advancement and national modernization which might be considered as provocative and 
highly controversial. However, those observations and recommendations are not derived 
from an exquisite theory of economic development, but from the particular standpoint of a 
rather conspicuous case of economic transformation Korea has experienced during the last 
several decades. Therefore, I want to make it clear that they are neither orthodox nor 
imperative in their application and they are subject to further debate and deliberation. It is 
my sincere hope that they could be able to contribute to deepening the understanding on 
the complexity of socio-economic development as well as broadening the perspective of 
development policy and strategy.  
 
5. Both the time constraint and the physical distance to Zanzibar made difficult for us to 
engage in reviewing and discussing on the development issues and agendas of the Unguja 
Islands. As the economic affairs are not included in the union matters, they are handled by 
their respective authorities of the Tanzania mainland and the Revolutionary Government 
of Zanzibar. And as much as different are their socio-economic endowments as well as 
their cultural and historical backgrounds each other, the development policy and strategy 
of Zanzibar could not be reviewed or consulted in the same context of those of the 
Tanzania Mainland.  
 
6. Only a few visitations were made to international development partners including the 
World Bank, the United Nations Tanzania, DFID, JICA, and BTC. However, I found that 
the mechanism of aid coordination and harmonization among DPs as well as between the 
                                            
4
 Mr. Elias Nicodemu Luvanda worked for me from the onset of my assignment at PO-PSM early 
June this year. As an economist, Policy Development Division, he assists me by getting 
information, arranging visits and meetings, providing lots of advice, and doing many chores.     
5
 In addition to several field trips to local and rural regions, there were more than 30 facts finding and 
discussion visits to various ministries, agencies, institutes and international development 
organizations.  
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GoT and DPs was well organized and operating under the framework of the Joint 
Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST).       
 
7. During my assignment in the President’s Office - Public Service Management(PO-PSM), 
Mr. Mathias Kabundugulu, Director of Policy Development, supported me in his full 
capacity as well as encouraged every time and therefore my first thanks go to him. Dr. 
Faisal Issa, Director of Human Resources Development, rendered me valuable advice 
from time to time which helped me a lot. Mr. Ngosha Magonya, Commissioner for 
External Finance of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, and Mr. Abihudi 
Baruti, Director of International Relations Cluster, the Planning Commission, were the 
two of the few most frequently visited persons for our discussions during my assignment 
and contributed much by supplying me with various policy ideas and information. Dr. 
Bohela Lunogelo and Dr. Oswald Mashindano of the Economic and Social Research 
Foundation(ESRF) helped us by giving me their insightful thinking and constructive 
comments in a fresh point of view. I was able to expand my view on development issues 
of Tanzania owing to an extensive discussion with Mr. Oscar Fernandes-Taranco, UN 
Resident coordinator, who possesses a comprehensive and lucid understanding on various 
issues of developing economies. And other numerous people from different DPAs and 
organizations contributed by supporting my work of facts finding and review on specific 
issues and subjects. Most of all I indebted to Mr. Nam Kwon-Hyoung, KOICA Resident 
Representative, who took the initiative for progression of this project and provided me 
with all the assistance during the time. Through a series of intensive discussion with him 
once every couple of weeks or so, we could be able to reach on the much similar 
understanding on Tanzania’s development context, current situation and future policy 
agenda to be addressed. And most of the observations and recommendations made here go 
with the same track Mr. Nam has developed for the last one year and half here in Dar es 
Salaam. During my inception here in PO-PSM and Dar es Salaam Mr. Ngunda William 
advised me so as to become familiar easily with Tanzanian culture and customs which 
were much new to me. Mr. Luvana, my assistant and co-worker of this consulting project, 
shared the office and helped me all the time. I thank them all very much indeed.  
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II. Tanzania’s National Development Strategy 
 
1. Context of Tanzania’s Development 
 
1.1. Historical Background6  
 
1.1.1. Tanzania has a history of overcoming obstacles. Mainland Tanzania, then known as 
Tanganyika, came under German colonial rule in the late nineteenth century. At the same 
time, the island of Zanzibar became a British protectorate. Resistance to foreign rule came 
to a head in 1905, when the Maji-Maji rebellion broke out; lasting for two years, the 
uprising resulted in the deaths of an estimated 120,000 Africans. A League of Nations 
mandate gave control of Tanganyika to Britain after the First World War, and after the 
Second World War, the territory became a UN trusteeship still administered by Britain.  
 
1.1.2. Since the UN trusteeship in 1946, Tanganyika moved toward self rule and in 1954 
Julius Nyerere, a school teacher educated abroad, founded the Tanganyika African 
National Union (TANU). That set off a chain of key events. In 1961, Tanganyika gained 
independence with Nyerere at the helm as prime minister, while a year later it became a 
republic with Nyerere as president. Zanzibar followed shortly afterwards, celebrating 
independence from British rule in 1963. In 1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar formed a 
republic later renamed the United Republic of Tanzania.  
 
1.1.3. Nyerere, with Chinese backing, issued the so-called Arusha Declaration in1967, which 
called for self-reliance and pursued the ideal of an African socialism. Despite the backing 
of major institutions such as the World Bank, the Arusha plan ultimately failed due to 
inefficiency and corruption. An early tripartite economic link between Tanzania, Kenya 
and Uganda, although promising, came to an end in 1977 due to political differences. That 
same year, Nyerere consolidated his power by merging the TANU party with Zanzibar’s 
ruling party, the Afro-Shirazi Party, to form the CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi), 
Revolutionary Party of Tanzania.  
 
1.1.4. President Nyerere remained in power until 1985, when Tanzania changed direction 
from a centralized socialist economy to an outward-looking market-oriented nation. After 
Nyerere’s resignation, his successor Ali Hassan Mwinyi attempted to a certain degree to 
rescind some of his predecessor’s more restrictive economic policies by dismantling 
government control and attracting foreign investment. This policy continued under 
Benjamin Makpa who was elected president in 1995.  
 
                                            
6
 Most of this part is borrowed from the introductory articles of Corporate Tanzania 2007/2008 – The 
Business, Trade and Investment Guide.  
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1.1.5. The United Republic Of Tanzania (URoT), the Mainland Tanzania and the Tanzania 
Zanzibar, have enjoyed an somewhat uneasy but dependable union for the past more than 
four decades. That is unique in itself as it is Africa’s only surviving union of states. All 
state authority in the United Republic is exercised and controlled by two organs: the 
Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Revolutionary Government of 
Zanzibar.  
 
Table 1: Socio-economic Indicators – Tanzania Mainland & Zanzibar  
 
Indicators Tanzania Mainland Zanzibar 
Population(2007) 40,213,162 1,137,000 
Real GDP Growth rate(2007) 7.1% 6.5% 
GDP Composition(%) 
Agriculture, hunting and 
forestry 28.2, Fishery 
1.4, Industry and 
construction 23.1, 
Services 47.3 
Agriculture 27.3, 
Industry 15.4, Service 
43.9, Amortization 13 
GDP Per Capita(Nominal USD) 460 416 
Inflation Rate(2007, %) 7.0 13.1 
National Basic Needs Poverty Line 36% 49% 
Gini Coefficient 0.35 0.31 
Maternal Mortality Rate/100,000 578 377 
Under Five Mortality Rate/1,000 112 101 
Life Expectancy at Birth 51 years 57 years 
Literacy Rate 69% 73.4% 
Net Primary Enrollment Rate Girl 90%, Boy 91% 100% 
Economic Aid Recipient(USD) 1,505 billion - 
External Aid as % of National Budget est. 25 ~ 45% - 
    Source: Strengthening Aid Effectiveness in Tanzania, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, 
August 2008m 
 
1.2. Endowments 
 
1.2.1. People and Their Mindset 
 
1.2.1.1. Tanzania is an African melting pot a number of ethnic groups and much more diverse 
tribes inter-mingled and amalgamated. The Tanzanian society experienced a massive 
migration during the period of Ujamaa villagization movement in 1960s and 1970s, 
promoting social mobilization and racial integration. Therefore, a racial grouping of 
Tanzanians seems neither appropriate nor accurate. However most of the people carry their 
tribes or clans as their family names. Among the more than one hundred tribes of 
indigenous people, Sukuma, Haya, Chagga, Nyamwezi, Makonde, Hehe, Gogo, and 
Masaai are the more frequently called name of the people. And none of them consists of 
less than ten per cent of the total population, being a minority by themselves. It must be 
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dangerous if we generalize the identical features of the extremely complex social entity 
into some stereotyped national characters and mindsets. However, it may not impossible to 
do it, because they have developed their communal group dynamics of collective social 
values, cultures, and way of thinking.    
 
1.2.1.2. Tanzanians seems to be quiet and prudish. Whether it is originated from long-
suffering and mistreatment by the foreign oppression or they are brainwashed by extra-
ordinary strictness requiring national unity and harmonization, self-reliance and prudence 
in the course of far-extreme socialist experimentation, Tanzanians look seldom impatient 
and frustrated. If their basic needs were met, there would be no cause for concern7. As 
some Africans are prototyped as lacking the sense of ambition and aspirations, “People 
cling to life and are not yet at the stage where they will fight for the quality of that life.’’8 
And Tanzanians seem not an exception to this.  
 
1.2.1.3. The quietness and prudence the Africans developed over the years might have made 
Tanzanians alienated themselves from their meticulous attachment to the zest of everyday 
life and living except something particular and important. Despite the abundance of flora 
and fauna which could be planted in their front yard, the surroundings of the houses and 
the villages are usually devoid of them. I tried repeatedly by asking several local residents 
to find out the name of a wild flower which is common at the country side, however, I 
really disappointed because I could not. Knowing that the common English name of the 
wild flower is ‘bindweed’ which also has its local name in Korean, still I wonder what the 
local name of the species in Kiswahili is.  
 
1.2.1.4. As much as they are tolerant to their surroundings, they seem also to be generous to 
time of one’s own and the other’s as well. The two old sayings represents the people’s 
attitude toward the sense of time and the way of living and doing work in Tanzania: 
Haraka haraka, haina Baraka meaning ‘If you do hurry, you are not entitled to the 
blessing’; and Safari pamoja na Mungu ‘Travel together with the God’. They seldom 
blame for being late or delayed as they are not as much conscious as about the 
procrastinations of others.  
 
1.2.1.5. The single-hearted respect for one’s clan and family seems to be one of the 
prominent characteristics of Tanzanian people are possessing. As usual as in many other 
pre-industrial societies, in Tanzania the deep-rooted consciousness of affiliation to a clan 
or a tribe precedes the sense of belonging to a local community or a regional society. It is 
considered as essential that every member should abide by the cause of the clan and the 
family more than any other personal aspirations. The prestige and the wealth one may 
achieve through his own endeavors are thought to be shared with other members of the 
                                            
7
 Robert Calderisi, The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn’t Working, p. 86 
8
 Op. cit. 
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family and the clan. Tanzanians seem to share the same behavior of other Africans. ‘If 
someone succeeds, however modestly, relatives will often insist on sharing in the fruits of 
that accomplishment. Africans are not savers. Those who accumulate capital can be 
considered traitors to their family rather than investors in its future well being.’9 The 
family order and tribal attachments tells the rank of the society more important than any 
other social values. And this might have developed the inertia for inward-looking 
alienating themselves from others.   
  
1.2.2. Blessed with Abundance and Diversity 
 
1.2.2.1. (The Land) The land size of Tanzania equals to the sum of France and Germany, 
twice the size of California. Accounting the inland water area such as Lake Victoria, Lake 
Tanganyika into the territorial jurisdiction, it is almost ten folds bigger than that of South 
Korea. Apart from the sheer size of the territory, the nation boasts of being endowed with 
diverse geographical features as well as varied climatic conditions. The Kilimanjaro, the 
roof of Africa, is well-known as the only snow-capped mountain in the continent. Unlike 
the continental and temperate climate of the Korean Peninsula, the most part of Tanzania 
features her tropical or semi-tropical climate almost of the year around which enables 
farmers to engage in agricultural activities throughout the whole year. Two or three crops 
are common in Tanzania, but in Korea only crop is possible in a year. However, the inland 
area of high altitude could produce a variety of agricultural commodities from temperate 
zones. Hombolo Village located in the foothill of Mt. Hombolo, 1,995 meters high above 
sea level and fifty kilometers away northeast from Dodoma was harvesting the second crop 
of their grape cultivation. TACEWICO(Tanzania Central Winery Company Limited) in 
Hombolo which I visited later last month was producing some superb wines with its own 
brand names such as Presidential, Ambassador, The Last Supper, and Mon Trésor.  
 
1.2.2.2. (Natural Resources) Apart from the sheer size and the diversities of geographical 
features, Tanzania is well endowed with abundant precious minerals as well as energy 
resources. Its broad range of highly valuable mineral resources includes proven deposits of 
tin, phosphate, iron ore, diamonds, gemstones, gold, and nickel. The nation has substantial 
reserves of coal and natural gas and the option of uranium for nuclear power that will 
enable her to reduce its dependence on hydropower10. Tanzania is known to be rich in 
alternative energy resources which are free and renewable. These includes biomass, hydro, 
solar, geothermal, wind, tidal and wave power. New technologies and the depletion of non-
renewable fossil fuels will make the nation’s rich renewable sources of energy more 
dependable and profitable in the future.       
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1.2.2.3. (Wilderness and the Natural World) The largest country in East Africa, the territorial 
boundary of Tanzania is largely defined by natural boarders which make the natural 
resources of the nation intact and distinctive from other neighbored regions. To the east is 
the Indian Ocean, to the north lies the Lake Victoria, and the River Ruvuma supplies the 
southern frontier. The border with Kenya may be an artificially straight line, skirting just 
north of Mount Kilimanjaro, but the western boundary is one of the most spectacular 
geographical features of Africa: the Great Rift Valle, and along it the two mighty lakes 
Malawi and Tanganyika.11  And ‘Tanzania has it all’. Tourist magazine or tourism 
promotional brochure of Tanzania may use this title in copywriting as a slogan or 
catchphrase for attracting foreign tourists. That’s because Tanzania a quarter of her land is 
reserved for wilderness reserve and national parks processes almost all of the varieties and 
wonders of the natural world. There are 15 national parks and 32 game reserves. Some of 
them are the most spectacular natural sites in the world and are among the 7 UNESCO 
World Heritage Sites including the Stone Town of Zanzibar, the Kondoa Rock Art Site and 
the Ruins of Kilwa Kisiwani and Gongo Mnara. The Olduvai Gorge, often called the 
Cradle of Mankind, is located in one of the vast wilderness of the Northern Tanzania adds 
an extra dimension to the depths of the history of mankind. The ‘Savanna Syndrome’12 we 
might have experienced when we visited nearby ‘endless plain’ Serengeti, the vast grass-
land sanctuary, seems to revive our déjà vu into a traceable memory imprinted in vivid 
remnants and footprints of hominids, the earliest human creatures.  
 
1.2.3. Strategic Location and Geopolitics 
 
1.2.3.1. Tanzania has boarders in the coastal region on Kenya and Mozambique and is the 
gateway to the sea of the landlocked countries of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Zambia, 
Malawi and the eastern interior region of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The East 
African Community (EAC) region which comprises of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi 
and Tanzania as well is endowed with rich and varied natural resources that include vast 
fertile lands, minerals, water, energy, forestry and wildlife. All of these offer great scope 
for agricultural, industrial, tourism and trade development and expansion. With a 
combined population of 93 million, the EAC region has a considerable human resource 
base to stimulate and sustain the development of a viable single market and investment 
area.13  And the United Republic of Tanzania is in the center of this region as a 
geographically strategic location being the nucleus of the regional integration and 
international cooperation.  
                                            
11
 Harry Campbell, What Happened to Tanganyika?, Portico Books, 2007 
12
 The sociologists propose a “Savanna Syndrome”: Encoded in our DNA is a preference for open 
grassy landscape resembling the short-grass savannas of Africa on which we evolved and spent our 
first few thousand years. A grassy plain dotted with trees provides safety from predators and a 
suitable environment for grazing animals.(Michael Pollan, Second Nature: A Gardener’s 
Education, Dell Publishing, 1991) 
13
 Corporate Tanzania, The Business, Trade and Investment Guide 2007/2008 
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1.2.3.2. Since the foundation of the nation 1n 1960s, Tanzania became an active player in 
regional politics, supporting anti-colonial movements in the African continent and 
becoming a political Mecca for liberal and socialist progressives all over the world14. In 
1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar formed a united republic rarely seen in the Third World 
politics and is lasting to this day. Although it came to an end in 1977 due to political 
difference, the Tanzanian leadership played a leading role to construct an early tripartite 
economic and regional cooperation between Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Tanzania’s 
vision for a regional entity envisaged in the previous tripartite cooperation has been 
revived in 1999 by founding the East African Community. As Rwanda and Burundi joined 
the community in 2007, Tanzania’s influence is increasing over the regional cooperation 
under which framework the expanded plans for a single common market and a single 
currency are being discussed and consultations on political integration are also have been 
taking place.     
 
1.2.4. Social Stability and National Unity 
  
1.2.4.1. Tanzania is a highly multi-racial society comprised of more than 120 tribes speaking 
a quite number of indigenous local languages. In spite of the complexity of its ethnicity 
and cultural diversity along with its vastness of regional circumferences, the united 
republic has largely been spared the internal strifes and conflicts raging across many parts 
of the continent. As a new-born country in the early 1960s, Tanzania established a sound 
and strong tradition of cultural identity, social solidarity and national unity which is 
enough to be respected and revered by the world and the other African countries. Mwalimu 
Julius Nyerere, the Father of the Nation15, carries the symbol of national independence and 
unity based upon the principle of self-reliance and human dignity and equity. Even the 
lofty ideal of the African socialism leaded by Julius Nyerere, the first president and the 
founding father of the nation, could not have been realized, the legacies Nyerere left 
behind are deep-rooted and profound, and could become a sound step stone for the nation 
to take off toward a civil and modernized society with a high vision and national pride in 
the future. 
 
                                            
14
 Martin Meredith, The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence, p. 250  
15
 Julius Nyerere was known throughout Tanzania affectionately as Mwalimu, a Kiswahili word 
meaning teacher. Also called as Baba wa Taifa meaning Father of Nation, Nyerere was widely 
regarded as a leader of outstanding ability with his personal integrity and modest lifestyle and 
highlighted by his contribution to the development and inculcation of ideas of socialism in Africa, 
to the struggle against poverty and backwardness, as well as to the cause of African liberation 
from colonialism and racism. Leading the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) since 
1954, Nyerere was appointed as the Prime Minister of the nation upon independence in 1961. 
Elected as the president in 1962, he ruled the country up to 1985 when he stepped down as 
president of his own free will.  
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1.2.4.2. (Umoja and Ujamaa) Though most Tanzanians may have a mixed feelings about the 
two words Umoja and Ujamaa, evoking a complicated ethos, these might be the prevailing 
values in the Tanzanian society. More deep-rooted pathos in Tanzanian society seems to 
be Umoja, a sense of collectiveness, togetherness and social solidarity, which origins are 
running through since the tribal society formed in the continent. Umoja, a social value 
cherished by all the tribes and clans for a long time, had been abused as a means of divide 
and rule and more recently prototyped as Ujamaa by the socialist ideology pursued during 
the earlier stage of national foundation and development in the late 1960s and 1970s. Now 
Tanzanians very seldom mention about Ujamaa, however, it left a profound imprint on the 
whole of the Tanzanian society and actually contributed to the social integration and 
national harmonization more than anything else. As the Tanzanian economy and society 
are becoming more dynamic and complex in the course of sustained economic growth and 
social diversification, those community values will be of more importance in promoting 
national unity and conciliation. 
 
1.2.4.3. Since the peaceful transition of power made by the first president of the republic in 
1985 the new political leadership put a monumental milestone toward the political 
development of the nation. The tradition of sound political governance and democracy has 
been strengthened by the introduction of political pluralism and a successive and smooth 
transfer of the government during the time.16 Although yet the full-fledged democracy and 
political pluralism should be geared by a further development in this arena, Tanzanians 
have developed a highly stable and peaceful society guided by the credible political 
leadership. The somewhat delicate relationships between Zanzibar and the mainland could 
bring a kind of turbulence in the course of concluding the sovereignty matters pending 
over the years. 
 
1.3. Legacies of the Past 
 
1.3.1. Colonial Legacies 
 
1.3.1.1. People don’t want to remember unpleasant history, but it cannot be forgotten. No 
longer people are mentioning about the colonial past, but very few are free from the 
feelings hidden in the bottom of their consciousness: a sense of loss and persecution, 
economically, spiritually and culturally; and a sense of inferiority?  
 
1.3.1.2. People seemed to be pro-Westernized in their attitude and the way of thinking, but 
intrinsically adamant to stick to their own way of living and thinking preserving their own 
                                            
16
 Upon Nyerere’s resignation in 1985, Ali Hassan Mwinyi succeeded the long time ruler as president 
and governed for the next 10 years. Benjamin Makpa, the country’s first democratically elected 
president since 1961, took the office in 1995 and after the second term of Makpa’s presidency the 
leadership of the nation was transferred to the current president Jakaya Kikwete in 2005.  
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social norms, values and spirits. Benign hospitality and outward-looking mindset 
sometimes are distorted into a sudden remembrance of hostility and a reclusive mentality 
of inward-looking.  
 
1.3.2. Socialist Legacies 
 
1.3.2.1. It may not be appropriate for us to find out the legacies left behind from the past 
socialist regime existed two decades ago, in the sense that the Constitution of the United 
Republic of Tanzania of 1977 contains the controversial provision that the country is a 
socialist state.17 In respect of constitutional fundamentality, the Republic still remains a 
socialist country. However, practice and experience have shown that Tanzania, a former 
avid socialist nation, is no longer a socialist state and further that the country are silently 
succumbing to the capitalist ideology. The ideology and principles of TANU’s socialist 
nation had forgotten and become obsolete. But some of the societal systems and people’s 
mindsets brainwashed by the socialist ideals and principles are lingering on up to now as 
such some of the socialist values and principles persist in the Constitution.18  
 
1.3.2.2. (Self-reliance and Inward-looking) For a long time of its history before the coming 
of the colonizers, the African continent was rather isolated and self-reliant more than any 
other else. Foreign pressure prevailed by the colonial exploitation and oppression made the 
Africans self-defending and obsessed with a strong sense of deprivation and their 
aspirations for self-help and self-reliance has been never abraded among themselves. 
Countered by the external oppression, their perception of the outer world was highly 
negative and disapproving and they developed an apparent mentality of alienation from 
alien culture and its influence. These attitudes with an overwhelming yearning for 
independence was highly susceptible to endorse the ideology of socialism which values 
the spirit of communal works and discipline based on self-help and self-reliance. Attaining 
national independence and unifying the nation with her lofty and grand vision as a modern 
state of unique sovereignty in the early 1960s, Tanzania adopted this ideology of 
                                            
17
 Article 3(1) of Part 1 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 stipulates in 
Chapter One at page 14 that: “The United Republic of Tanzania is a democratic and socialist state 
adheres to multi-party democracy.” Article 8(1) declares that the United Republic of Tanzania is a 
state which adheres to the principles of democracy and social justice.  
18
 The Preamble says that the Constitution is enacted for the purpose of building such a society and 
ensuring that Tanzania is governed by a Government that adheres to the principles of democracy 
and socialism. Some articles which could be probably controversial appear: Article 9 The state 
authority and all its agencies are obliged to direct their policies and programmes towards ensuring - 
(d) that the national economy is planned and promoted in a balanced and integrated manner; (i) that 
the use of national resources places emphasis on the development of the people and in particular is 
geared towards the eradication of poverty, ignorance and disease; (j) that the economic activities 
are not conducted in a manner capable of resulting in the concentration of wealth or the major 
means of production in the hands of a few individuals; (k) that the country is governed according to 
the principles of democracy and socialism.      
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socialism19. It was very natural for a nation deprived of its national identity and lack of 
economic competence and social foundation. In retrospect the new revolutionary approach 
of national foundation and development was highly experimental and proved less effective 
and inefficient in motivating and mobilizing the people’s creativity and endeavors for 
national modernization and the advancement of the society.  
 
1.3.2.3. The Report of the South Commission20 produced in 1990 by an independent group 
of intellectual and political leaders from the South also stressed self-reliant and people-
centered development in reorienting development strategies of the Third world countries. 
The socialist ideology which preaches an orthodox self-reliance no longer is considered as 
a prime tool of sustained national development in this age of inter-dependence and 
international cooperation. However, the deep imprint of its tradition is consisting of the 
undercurrent of the every corner of the society. The spirit of self-help and self-reliance per 
se is one of the paramount values required for a self-respected society and a healthy and 
robust economy as well. Reclusiveness and obsession to and excessive and prerogative 
emphasis on those qualities may develop inward-looking way of thinking and hamper 
broadening our wider perspective and the horizon of more open and outward-looking 
developmental mindset.      
 
1.3.2.4. (High Consciousness on Social Equity) The Arusha Declaration which stipulated the 
ideology and principle of Tanzanian socialism led by TANU proclaimed as the very first 
creed that all human beings are equal. Social justice and equal right of every individual 
were stated as the prime values of the society: all citizens together possess all the natural 
resources of the country in trust for their descendants; in order to ensure economic justice 
the State must have effective control over the principal means of production; and it is the 
responsibility of the State to intervene in the economic life of the Nation ….. so as to 
prevent the accumulation of wealth to an extent which is inconsistent with the existence of 
a classless society. Thereafter, all the policies and development strategies followed the 
guidelines in a strict and totalitarian manner for about the next two decades. The highly 
experimental socialist policies made deep and long-lasting imprints on the mentality of the 
people. Even in contemporary Tanzania the virtues of social equity are prevailing over the 
respect for merit or reward, not as the socialist ideal, but as the barometer of balanced 
social advancement in multi-racial development context.   
 
1.3.2.5. (Strong Emphasis on Public Social Services) Under the socialist system of totalitarian 
intervention of the State in the economic life of the people, not only the means of 
industrial production but also the instruments for operating and delivery of social services 
were nationalized and the supply of goods and services was entrusted to the various state 
enterprises and public organizations. So as to prevent the exploitation of one person or 
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group by another, and so as prevent the accumulation of wealth to an extent which is 
inconsistent with the existence of a classless society, the profitable businesses and 
industries were not on the development agenda of the nation. The Arusha Declaration 
stated clearly that ‘in addition to make a mistake to choose money, another big mistake 
was made by putting too much emphasis on industries.’21  Instead the emphasis of 
development policy objectives was placed on the maximization of social well-being. The 
bulk of budget expenditures were allocated for expanding the provision of social services 
including education and primary health care. Regardless of racial and social strata, people 
were able to receive education and medial service free and fair.  
 
1.3.2.6. Once accustomed to the system of easy and convenient fringe benefit, the customary 
practice of public social services is most persistent even after the market-led economic 
system began to replace the government-controlled socialist one more than two decades 
ago. A strong drive for privatization of state and public enterprises are pursued during the 
time and most of them were handed over to the private hands, however, most of the public 
social services, especially education and health care, remain the responsibility of the 
government. 
 
1.3.2.7. (Mistrust in Government Intervention) The drive for socialism President Julius 
Nyerere took single-handedly after the Arusha Declaration in 1967 was determined and 
decisive.22 The State began to intervene in the life of the people by controlling all major 
means of production and exchange. With a drastic proposal for collective farming and 
rural villagization campaign known as Ujamaa, a Kiswahili word meaning ‘familyhood’, a 
mass nationalization programme had been followed soon in a vigorous manner. All private 
banks and insurance companies, the major food processors and foreign export trading 
companies were nationalized. Controlling sisal plantations and manufacturing companies 
producing cement, cigarettes, shoes and beer, the government later put the entire 
wholesaling system, all commercial buildings, apartments and even houses under state 
management.23 In 1973 the government announced that all small business conducted by 
non-indigenous people, in villages, should be taken over by indigenous people.24 By mid-
1973 the number of Ujamaa village had increased to 5,000, involving some 2 million 
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 The Arusha Declaration and TANU’s Policy on Socialism and Self-reliance, p. 11 
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 Op., cit. p. 3, The major means of production to ensure to be under the state control stipulated in 
the Declaration are: the land; forests; mineral resources; water; oil and electricity, communications; 
transport; banks; insurance; import and export trade; wholesale business; the steel, machine tool, 
arms, motor car, cement and fertilizer factories; the textile industry; and any other big industry 
upon which a large section of population depend for their living, or which provides essential 
components for other industries; large plantations, especially those which produce essential raw 
materials.  
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 Martin Meredith, p. 252 
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people, or about 15 per cent of the population. Between 1973 and 1977 some 11 million 
people were placed in new villages, in what amounted to the largest mass movement in 
Africa’s history.25 Despite the backing of the major institutions such as the World Bank, 
the Arusha plan ultimately failed due to inefficiency and corruption.26 A radical change 
usually brings a corresponding repercussion. These unpleasant experiences the Tanzanians 
underwent imbedded an intrinsic disgust against state control and intervention. Due to the 
failure of the government centrally-administered with immense authority, the people’s 
high aspirations for economic and social advancement could not have been fulfilled and 
they bred a strong sense of mistrust in the role and function of the government.           
 
1.4. Recent Reform and Transformation of the Economy 
 
1.4.1. From a Socialist Economy  
 
1.4.1.1. Tanzania has passed through two main economic regimes. The first policy regimes 
was between 1976 and 1985, which mainly based on socialism and self-reliance with the 
state owning almost all major means of production and acting as a provider of essential 
social public services. The second regime started from 1986 to date, in which the main 
role of the government becomes to provide socio-economic policy guidance that entrust 
private sector to act as an engine of economic growth.27  
 
1.4.1.2. During the first policy regime Tanzanian socialism led by Julius Nyerere, much was 
achieved, notably in the fields of education, health and social services. Primary school 
enrollment increased from one-quarter of the school-age population to 95 per cent; adult 
literacy from 10 to 75 per cent; four in ten villages were provided with clean tap water, 
three in ten had clinics; life expectancy increased from forty-one years to fifty-one years.28 
However, what progress made could not be sustained. Agricultural productivity of 
communal farming in Ujamaa villages plunged far below the level of previous peasantry 
farming. A multitude of state enterprises and public corporations proved inefficient, 
overstaffed and corrupted, and incompetently managed, making huge loss and 
accumulating surmounting debts. Far from being self-reliant and reducing its dependence 
on foreign market economy, Nyerere’s socialist program made Tanzania more dependent 
on foreign assistance. By the end of the 1970s Tanzania was in dire straits.29 The problem 
reached in the early 1980s, whereby the government formulated internal initiatives in 
response to the crisis resulted from the policy failure.  
 
                                            
25
 Martin Meredith, p. 255 
26
 Corporate Tanzania, p. 12 
27
 Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, Reference Note, August 2008 
28
 Martin Meredith, p. 259 
29
 Op. cit., p. 257 
   
 
 
15
 
1.4.2. Transition to the Market Economy  
 
1.4.2.1. Since 1985, the nation has undergone a rather smooth transition to a market-led 
mixed economy and made substantial progress in economic reform and liberalization.  
After Nyerere’s resignation in 1985, the new government undertook a comprehensive 
review of the country’s development strategy. A profound shift of development policy and 
strategy was made from a centrally-planned extreme socialist economy to a market-
oriented capitalist economy. While dismantling the restrictive socialist policies and 
government control on the one hand, the government implemented the Economic 
Recovery Programmes(ERP)30 on the other hand. Under the ERP supported by the 
international development institutions, wide range of reform and structural rehabilitation 
programs were carried out: liberalizing agricultural market and input distribution; 
deregulating prices, exchange rates, wages and interest rates; rationalizing the tariff 
structure; adopting national investment policies; civil service reform; restructuring 
parastatals; and financial sector reforms. Later the ERPs replaced by the medium-term 
three year Rolling Plan and Forward Budget Framework (RPFB), which now is called the 
Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). Furthermore, sector policies and 
development programs are formulated in a more coherent and consistent manner.  
 
1.4.2.2. Over the period of policy reform and transition, the political leadership provided a 
reliable and credible policy environment. Sustained political and macro-economic stability 
for more than a decade enables the nation to launch further aggressive policies and 
strategies for an accelerated economic growth and development. Gaining confidence and 
competence in policy reform and economic management, the government advances in 
performing more comprehensive reform programs and addressing more integrated 
development agenda through a holistic approach.  
 
1.4.3. Economic Policy and Public Sector Reform 
 
1.4.3.1. (Economic Policy and Structural Reform) The socio-economic reforms in the 
economy initiated in mid 1980s have managed to improve the economic situation, both 
stabilizing and rehabilitating the economy. Since the 1990s, political stability and sound 
fiscal and monetary policies have allowed Tanzania to make substantial progress in macro-
economic stability and structural reforms. This has laid down the foundation for economic 
growth and a wide range of structural reforms, which have resulted in an annual average 
GDP growth of more than 6 per cent for the last five years.31 Based on the past 
performance, The Tanzanian government embarked further on policy reforms to sustain 
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and accelerate economic growth as well as to strengthen the economic systems and 
industrial structure. At the center of the reform policy is the program for private sector 
promotion aiming to facilitate business investment and to strengthen the industrial 
competitiveness: Private Sector Competitiveness Project; Property and Business 
Formalization Programme (PBFP); Reform in the Business Registration and Licensing; 
Land Registration Reform; and Labor Law Reform. Tanzania’s financial sector remains 
small in relations to the requirements and the regulations of banking institutions are 
excessively restrictive and precautionary. To strengthen the contribution of the financial 
sector to investment promotion, the government is carrying out the Second Generation 
Financial Sector Reforms (SGFSR). The SGFSR consolidates achievement made during 
the first generation reforms and are attempting to address remaining structural constraints 
to the sector’s development. The emphasis includes: establishment of a framework for 
lease mortgage financing; a credit information data bank; and a legal and regulatory basis 
for a credit information bureau.32 Privatization program pursued vigorously during the 
time. Since the government introduced a parastatal sector reform policy in 1992, the Public 
Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) has concluded more than 900 divestiture transactions 
before its function handed over to the Consolidated Holding Corporation (CHC) at the end 
of 2007.  
 
1.4.3.2. (Fiscal and Budget Policy Reform) Even though the private sector continues to 
expand, the public sector plays a dominant role in sustainable growth with equity as well 
as poverty reduction. Fiscal management and budgetary performance has been improving 
over time. Domestic resource mobilization has improved following tax administrative 
reforms and rationalization of the tax regime. The Tanzania Revenue Authority 
implements the 5-year Corporate Plan as part of the tax reform and modernization 
program. The adoption of the Public Expenditure Review (PER) and Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) has improved budget management and accountability. 
Macroeconomic objective and policy targets are set up in line with the national 
development strategy and MTEF priority sectors are identified in a medium-term rolling 
planning paradigm. 
 
1.4.3.3. (Public Service Reform) With a review the whole public sector, the reform process 
started in 1991. UNDP funded a study of the weakness and problems in the civil service 
and in 1993 the Public and Parastatal Sector Reform Project was launched with support 
from the World Bank. The initial step of civil service reform focused on cost containment 
and government restructuring in the 1990s proved far from complete. Since 2000 
Tanzania’s Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) has been implemented in longer-
term strategic perspective. The PRSP Phase 1 originally planned from 2000-2005 carried 
out by June 2007 focusing on instituting performance management system. The 2nd phase 
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of PRSP aiming at enhancing performance and accountability is under implementation 
from August 2007. The public service reform program will be further developed into the 
3rd phase for quality improvement by 2015.33  
 
1.4.3.4. (Local Government Reform) In the context of public service reform the Local 
Government Reform Programme (LGRP) was launched in 1999/2000 which reflects the 
policy shift from state control and central planning of the national economy and 
government administration to liberalization and local autonomy. The LGRP was preceded 
in 1995 by the policy pronouncement that it would decentralize the powers and functions 
from the central government. This was formalized in the 1998 Policy Paper on Local 
Government Reform that spelled out a policy of decentralization by devolution, which has 
come to be known as ‘D by D’.34 Focused on instituting autonomous local government 
system which is strong and effective through decentralization by devolution, the 1st phase 
of the LGRP implemented from 1999/2000 to 2007/2008. Now the D by D is under new 
stage of the 2nd phase of LGRP 2008/09-2012/2013 which aims at enhancing political, 
fiscal, administrative autonomy, strengthening clear and robust legal framework, and 
improving governance for better service delivery.35  
 
1.4.4. The Current Economy and the General Trends 
 
1.4.4.1. Tanzania is one of the fastest growing economies in the African continent. Since 
2000, the real GDP of Tanzania has grown at an annual rate of more than 6 per cent. In 
2007 the economic growth rate reached 7.1 per cent. The economy is projected to expand 
by 7.8 per cent in 2008 and 8.1 per cent in 2009.36 The African Economic Outlook 2008 
shows that Tanzania is the best performer among the oil-importing countries in the 
continent with the average economic growth rate of 6.7 per cent per annum between 2000 
and 2007, surpassing Ghana’s 5.2 per cent and Tunisia’s 4.9 per cent.37 The high growth 
performance gives cumulative real GDP growth of 51.7 per cent over the period. The 
growth was driven by public and private investment and government consumption. 
Household consumption grew far more slowly, by 46.8 per cent.  
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 PO-PSM, Medium Term Strategy 2007/08-2011/12, Public Service Reform Programme Phase Ⅱ, 
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 PMO-RALG, The Status of Implementation of Decentralization by Devolution in Mainland 
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35
 PMO-LARG, Local Government Reform Programme Ⅱ(Decentralization by Devolution ), July 
2008-June 2013 
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 Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, Medium Term Plan Outlook 2008/09-1010/11, June 
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1.4.4.2. According to the revised national accounts estimates for Tanzania Mainland in 2007, 
the GDP share of the primary sector including Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 
accounts for 27.1 per cent in 2007 decreased from 30.7 per cent in 2001. Owing to the 
expansion of the mining and quarrying, and construction sectors, the proportion of 
industry and construction increased to 21.2 per cent from 18.0 per cent during the same 
period. The services sector accounts for 43.3 per cent in 2007 declined slightly from 45.5 
per cent in 2001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Gross Domestic Product and Expenditure 
(At 2001constant prices, Tsh. billion)  
 2001 2007 Growth(%) 2001/07 
Growth per 
capita(%) 
2001/07 
GDP 9,100.2 13,801.9 51.7 27.8 
Final Consumption      
    Households   6,826.4 10,021.7 46.8 23.7 
    Government 1,075.4 2,496.0 132.1 95.5 
Investment 1,587.7 3,358.3 111.5 78.2 
Exports 1,547.6 2,768.7 78.9 50.7 
Imports -1, 936.9 -4,842.8 150.0 110.6 
Sources: The Economy Survey 2007, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 
 
Table 3: Structure of Gross Domestic Product 
(At market current prices, Percentages) 
Economic activity 2001 2007 
Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry   
Crops 
Livestock 
Hunting and forestry 
29.0 
21.4 
5.0 
2.5 
25.8 
19.0 
4.7 
2.1 
Fishing 1.7 1.3 
Industry and construction 
Quarrying and mining 
Manufacturing 
18.0 
1.8 
8.4 
21.2 
3.5 
7.8 
Services 
Trade and repairs 
45.5 
13.0 
43.3 
11.5 
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Transport 
Communications 
Public administration 
Education 
Health 
5.4 
1.2 
7.0 
2.1 
1.3 
4.2 
2.3 
7.9 
1.4 
1.6 
Adjustment and taxes on products 5.8 8.4 
Gross Domestic Product(GDP) 100.0 100.0 
  Sources: Op. cit. 
 
1.4.4.3. Due to the sustained growth, the level of poverty has steadily decreased during the 
time. The 2007 Household Budget Survey(HBS) shows that the proportion of people 
living in poverty has decreased by 2.4 per cent, from 35.7 per cent in 2001 to 33.3 per cent  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Trends in Selected Macroeconomic Indicators 2000 – 2007 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 200738* 
Real GDP Growth - % 4.9 6.0 7.2 6.9 7.8 7.4 6.7 7.1 
Inflation - annual average  - % 6.0 5.2 4.5 4.4 4.2 4.3 7.3 7.0 
Exchange Rate (shs/USD) - annual 
average  
808.4 876.4 966.6 1038.6 1089.3 1128.8 1251.9 1251.9 
Exchange Rate (shs/USD) – end of 
period 
803.3 916.3 976.3 1063.6 1042.9 1165.5 1261.6 1132.1 
Merchandise Exports (mil. USD) – 
FOB 
663.3 851.3 979.6 1216.1 1473.1 1675.8.3 1736.0 2006.6 
Merchandise Imports (mil. USD) – 
FOB 
1367.6 1560.3 1511.3 1933.5 2482.8 2997.68 3864.1 4826.9 
Export/Import ratio  (Goods) - % 49.6 54.6 64.8 62.9 59.3 55.9 44.6 44.0 
Current Account Balance (mil. 
USD) 
-498.6 -200.0 83.6 -87.5 -383.3 -881.67 -1379.3 -2056.2 
Investment/GDP ratio - % 17.6 17.0 18.9 18.5 21.0 22.0 23.4 24.3 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) – 
mil. USD 
463.4 467.2 387.6 308.2 330.6 494.1 597.0 640.5 
Foreign Reserves (months of 
imports) 
5.6 6.3 8.6 9.2 8.0 5.8 5.3 5.0 
 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
Govt. Domestic Revenue (% of 
GDPmp) 
12.2 12.1 12.8 13.4 13.1 14.2 14.5 16.8 
Total Govt. Expenditure¹  (% of 
GDPmp) 
20.6 19.1 23.4 24.9 24.4 27.7 28.3 28.8 
Fiscal Balance (before grants) - % 
of GDPmp 
-4.6 -5.6 -8.2 -11.2 -11.8 -13.5 -13.8 12.0 
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Fiscal Balance (after grants) - % of 
GDPmp 
-1.2 -1.1 -1.7 -4.0 -4.5 -6.6 -5.4 3.9 
Growth of Money Supply (M2) - % 12.5 12.3 13.0 14.2 19.2 27.5 24.5 28.8² 
Average Deposit rate  - % 4.2 3.5 3.1 2.4 2.5 2.61 2.54 2.59 
Average Lending rate  - % 19.6 16.4 15. 7 14 14.4 15.4 16.4 16.03 
Disbursed External Debt (mil. 
USD) 
6312.2 6559.7 6413.4 6730.8 6,99.6 6743.6 4409.0 5367.7³ 
Total Debt Stock (mil. USD) 7482.1 7464.0 7268.17 7890.7 9,219.3 9383.9 7188.4 7,041.3⁴ 
    Note  * Provisional results 
1 Including amortization 
2 As at end December 2007 
3 As at end December 2007 
4 Including interest on disbursed debt and as at end Dec 2007  
     Sources: Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, August 2008 
in 2007.39 The reduction in the poverty ratio indicated by the 2007 HBS data has, however 
not been able to compensate for the growth rate of the population of about 2.6 per cent per 
year. As a result, the reduction in the proportion of poor translates in an increase of 1.0 
million people living in poverty in Mainland Tanzania between 2001 and 2007 from 11.7 
million in 2001 to 12.7 million in 2007.  
 
1.4.4.4. According to the Integrated Labor Force Survey(ILFS) 2006, there are an estimated 
20.6 million economically active people in Tanzania Mainland in 2005/06 compared to 
17.8 million in 2000/01 This population has increased by 2.8 million since 2000/2001 
representing an annual increase rate of 3 per cent with approximately 560,000 people 
entering the workforce each year. About 18.3 million or 89.0 per cent of the active labor 
force are employed, of which 9.0 million were male while 9.3 million were female. The 
unemployment rate declined to 11.0 per cent in 2005/06 compared to 12.9 per cent in 
2000/01.40    
 
1.4.4.5. The result of ILFS 2006 shows that the majority of the workforce is employed in the            
agricultural sector representing 77.0 per cent in 2005/06. Significantly, the share of 
agriculture in total employment has declined by 8.0 percentage points in 2005/06 from 
84.0 per cent in 2000/01, indicating that employment growth is shifting away from 
agriculture towards private non-farm activities, including informal sector employment. 9.3 
per cent of the total workforce is employed in informal sector, while 8.0 per cent in the 
private formal sector41. 
 
1.5. Socio-Economic Conditions in Reality 
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1.5.1. Incidence of Abject Poverty 
 
1.5.1.1. In spite of the remarkable achievement of economic progress and social advancement 
in recent years, the realities of socio-economic conditions in the country are highly 
disappointing. Without noting the major economic and social development indicators, we 
can easily recognize the wide-spread incidence of abject poverty and under-development 
throughout the nation. The situation in the rural area is even more striking. According to 
the result of HBS 2007 less progress has been made in reducing rural basic poverty. 37.4 
per cent of the rural population lived below the basic needs poverty line42 in 2007 
compared to 38.7 per cent in 2001 and 40.8 per cent in 1991. 
 
 
Table 5: Percent of Population below Basic Needs Poverty Line  
(Percentage) 
 Tanzania 
Mainland Dar es Salaam 
Other Urban 
Areas Rural Areas 
1991/92 38.6 28.1 28.7 40.8 
2000/01 35.7 17.6 25.8 38.7 
2007 33.3 16.2 24.1 37.4 
   Sources: The HBS 2007, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs    
 
1.5.1.2. Wage is one of the barometers of the incidence of poverty. Apart from the rareness 
of job opportunities, the wage earned in the region shows us the level of income poverty. 
The New Minimum Wage Order of 2007 effective from January 1, 2008 tables a scale of 
minimum wages according to the professions of the workers employed. The rates are 
varied from Ths.65,000 in agricultural sector, the lowest, to Tsh.350,000 in mining and big 
and international companies, the highest, per month. The reality is that the temporary 
laborers at the coffee plantation I visited in the outskirts of Arusha July this year, were 
paid by their performance: Tsh.600 for picking coffee fruit in a bag of 20 kilograms and an 
ordinary worker could pick an average of 3 bags per day from 6 to 8 hours work. It meant 
that the worker working 22 days a month could earn about Tsh.39,600 monthly, slightly 
over half of the minimum wage rate. According to the result of a random inquiry, a house 
keeper staying at the place, one of the most common employment in informal sector, 
receives about from Tsh.10,000(in Tabora region), Tsh.15,000(in Dodoma and Morogoro 
region), to Tsh.25,000(in Dar es Salaam region) per month. 
 
1.5.2. Insufficiency of Basic Social Services 
 
1.5.2.1. Through a field trip to the rural area not so much remote from the coastal region, I 
could witness rampant poverty as well as considerably insufficient provision of adequate 
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basic human needs: primary education, primary health and family planning, housing, 
water, electricity as well as food. Needless to refer the data on the workforce and 
employment, we could be able acknowledge the actual level of unemployment and under-
employment apart from the high fluctuation of the seasonal unemployment.  
      
1.5.2.2. The primary school with 10 class rooms which had 19 classes and 800 school 
children was taking two-shift operation, one in the morning and the other in the afternoon. 
I was startled to find that 6(six) students should use the same single textbook, so-called 
“one for six”. And I found that many of them studied in a classroom without blackboard, 
even chairs and desks. Half of the class rooms constructed in 1967 were without windows 
in their frames. The educational indicators show that the national average book-pupil ratio 
(BPR) in 2006 ranged from 1:5 to 1:12 compared to an average of 1:3 in 2001.43  
 
1.5.2.3. The medical dispensary of the rural area was much short of medical equipment and 
supplies as well as doctors and nurses. In the ward for daily medical practice, one patient 
bed seemed to be the medical facility in normal operation. Only one million shillings were 
allocated for the medical prescription and the maintenance of the dispensary for the three-
month period. It meant that only 10 thousand shillings went for more than 50 patients 
treated on average one day among some 13,000 residents in the villages. There was no 
vehicle for the out-going medical practice or the transfer of patient in emergency. I seeded 
difficult for the field workers to go round for pre-emptive and family planning instruction 
to the resident in the remote areas.    
 
1.5.2.4. We must have felt somewhat scared when we see the figures on the spread of HIV 
throughout the nation. It is known that the infection rate in some regions is alarmingly 
high over 14 per cent.44 It seems not strange that a key reason for health care workers 
leaving government services is lack of protection from HIV. It is even more startling that 
not the family planning but the epidemic of HIV/AIDS would curb the population growth 
in the years to come. A population estimate was projected that by the year 2035, 
Tanzanian population will grow up to 86.6 million people from about 36 million in 2005. 
According to the forecast, if Tanzanians were free from the HIV/AIDS scourge, 
population growth would have reached 95.4 million by the projected year.45 The nation is 
losing the hundreds of thousands most precious resources for national development every 
year due to the incidence of HIV.   
 
1.5.3. Lack of Socio-economic Infrastructure 
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1.5.3.1. Clearly the nation lacks social and economic infrastructure: not only education, 
primary health and medical care but also road, railway, electricity and water. The two 
roads I travelled from Dar es Salaam to Morogoro and Arusha considered as the main 
arteries of the nation and connect the mid-western and northern major corridors 
respectively. Both of them have several sections of bottleneck and the traffics on the 
sections of two-lanes are already beginning to be clogged by the increasing transportation 
of heavy container trolleys, trucks and passenger vehicles. The main road to Seronera from 
the entrance of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area around 200 kilometers was not paved 
and seemed difficult to pass in some sections in case of heavy rain during the wet season. 
The railroads running in parallel with the land roads in some places seemed not under 
proper utilization.  
 
1.5.3.2. Access to utilities such as electricity and protected water sources are unchanged or 
even declining in recent years. The percent of households in Dar es Salaam connected to 
the electricity grid dropped from 58 per cent in 2000/01 to 50 per cent in 2007. Most part 
of the rural areas where more than 70 per cent of the people reside could not access to 
electrical power supply. Overall connection to the electricity grid remains at about 10 per 
cent. The house of Ms. Besta, located in a newly created housing in the outskirts of 
Morogoro municipal town, was not equipped with electricity and piped water. Dar es 
Salaam saw a large drop in access to piped water from 86 per cent in 2000/01 to 58 per 
cent in 2007. The drop in access to piped water could be a result of the large growth of Dar 
se Salaam in recent years, with the new neighborhoods relying on alternative sources of 
drinking water.46  
 
1.5.3.3. Even in the virtual capital city of Dar es Salaam, dependable water supply is fairly 
limited to the privileged areas. And the supply of the water in these areas is often 
disconnected from time to time. I advised Mr. Hussein to cultivate a kitchen garden for 
growing some vegetables for his family. He has accumulated some know-how of taking 
care of gardening at my residence and is willing to try a very small plot at his house. 
However, the lack of water prevents him from running his kitchen garden. In order to keep 
the crops growing, he has to get the water from a stream nearly one kilometer away. And 
this is a job he can’t do every day. Even they are unevenly distributed both in time and 
region, Tanzania boasts its abundant water resources with an amount of more than 1,600 
millimeters of rain a year. The inadequacies of in national capacity to manage and utilize 
the water resources are the main constraints of water scarcity and shortages. Only 0.6 per 
cent of the total rainfall the country receives annually is estimated to be utilized.  
 
1.5.3.4. An appalling news appeared on the cover page of the Guardian in the Friday morning 
of July 4, 2008. Titled the headline as ‘Vegetables in the city gardens declared as silent 
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killers’, the news article was warning consumers of fresh vegetable grown from Dar es 
Salaam city gardens and river valley. Extending the results of a recent research carried out 
by an institute at Ardhi University, the news revealed that a great deal of water used for 
gardening was highly polluted by chemical byproducts discharged into city’s creeks and 
valleys. According to the study, nearly all river streams used to irrigate vegetables in city 
gardens contain heavy metals which are harmful to humans when consistently consumed. 
The city dwellers read it must have been shocked. The Msimbazi River running under the 
Salender Bridge toward the mouth of the Msimbazi Bay was one of the streams highly 
contaminated. Occasionally I could see the water pitchy black below when I was passing 
the bridge. Apart from undermining the capacity for sustainable development, pollution 
and environmental degradation caused by the mismanagement endanger the lives of our 
own. 
  
1.5.4. Weak Socio-economic Structure 
 
1.5.4.1. The socio-economic structure of Tanzania has remained largely untransformed in 
terms of national production, industrial diversification, employment, investment and fiscal 
management, international trade and development cooperation. Due to partly from the 
deep-rooted legacies of colonial economy and partly from the lingering inertia of inward-
looking development strategy based on self-help and self-reliance, it took a considerable 
period of time for rehabilitation and smooth and stable transformation and rehabilitation 
toward market-oriented capitalist economy.    
 
1.5.4.2. The industrial structure the Tanzanian economy can be characterized by its 
substantial dependence on the primary sector including subsistent agriculture, fisheries, 
mining and quarrying, accounting nearly one third of its GDP. It is estimated that nearly 
80 per cent of the workforce are employed in the primary sector, most of them in the 
agricultural sector. The GDP proportion of manufacturing is meager less than 8 percent, 
while the remaining bulk of the products are originated from the tertiary sector of 
commerce, social services, economic infrastructure, construction, and tourism. Industrial 
base on which productive outputs and incomes are generated is scant and the level of 
investment in the productive sectors is deficient in inducing a virtuous circle of sustainable 
growth with equity.       
 
1.5.4.3. The rate of savings and investment is being increased considerably in recent years 
largely due to the increase of domestic resources mobilization. But the accumulation of 
socio-economic infrastructure falls short of its requirement. Only half of the required 
investments for the attainment of development objectives are being realized largely 
dependent on foreign investment. Especially the public investment expenditures are 
heavily dependent on external financing. The financial resources of public development 
expenditures, accounting a third of the budget of the central government, should be 
mobilized from borrowing or foreign assistance.  
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1.5.4.4. The structure of international trade reflects those of national production and 
investment. Over the last four years, the rate of export expansion is encouraging more than 
13 per cent annual average increase. Though non-traditional exports have substantially 
increased over the years, the structure of the exports has remained predominantly primary 
products less processed including fisheries and mining products. Surged imports in the last 
few years has widened the chronic gap of trade and current account balance in deficit, with 
the latter going from 3 per cent of GDP in 2004 to about 10 per cent in 2006 and 11 per 
cent in 2007.47 And the large deficit of trade is narrowed significantly by the contributions 
of robust tourism earning. Foreign aid and investment offset most of the remaining gap of 
the deficit.  
 
1.5.5. Divergence and Dichotomy 
 
1.5.5.1. While the informal underground portion of the economy is still prevailing over the 
rapidly expanding formal sector, the divergence of productivity improvement is evident 
among the sectors. The agricultural sector containing more than the three quarters of total 
workforce produces only one quarter of the national product. Instead of stagnating 
agricultural export, the importation of food stuff is on the rise in recent years.  
 
1.5.5.2. There seems no evidence of urban bias of growth between the rural and urban people 
or increased inequality between the poor and rich. The disparities in the rural and urban 
growth due to the lagging agricultural output appear to be offset by rural-urban migration. 
There was indeed faster growth in urban areas but there was also faster population growth, 
especially in Dar es Salaam which saw 100 per cent population growth against a national 
average of 20 per cent. The data shows consumption of the poor growing at close to the 
average and hence no evidence of any rise in inequality. However, it should be noted that 
those variations of sector performances and productivity gap may further aggravate the 
existing income and poverty gap between the urban rich and the rural poor.  
 
1.5.6. Acknowledgement of Cultural Assets and Soft Power 
 
1.5.6.1. (Lack of Interests in Intangible Cultural/Intellectual Assets) In comparison with great 
emphasis on the protection and conservation of natural resources and wildlife, it seems that 
awareness on the nation’s cultural and intellectual assets which are intangible is lacking.  
 
1.5.6.2. The wood carving workshops at Mwenge, Dar es Salaam, is one of the must-visiting 
place of interests for not only foreigners but local residents also. Tens of souvenir shops 
and wood-carving workshops are congregated in a compound where numerous kinds of 
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wood carving are on display for sale and a number of sculptors mostly from Makonde tribe 
living in the Tanzania-Mozambique border are running their studios. The humble shops 
connected in rows wall by wall with rusty galvanized roof have narrow corridors 
displaying wood carving and others of various styles, stuffy and dim inside. Sculptors 
work using the most elementary tools only in their studios not more than a hut. Each shops 
and sculptors depict and represent their own artistic styles and distinctive sculpture, 
however, none of them carries their own brands, trademarks or the names of the shops. 
The identities or distinctions of the shops are represented only by either their products or 
the Arabic number given on a small plate to each shop just for reference. 
          
2. National Development Strategy of Tanzania 
 
2.1. Paradigm of National Development Strategy 
 
2.1.1. Framework of the Development Policy and Strategy 
 
2.1.1.1. The basic framework of the current policy and strategy for national development is 
constituted under the Tanzanian Development Vision 2025 which aims at transforming the 
nation’s low productivity economy into a semi-industrialized one led by modernized and 
highly productive agricultural activities. A subsequent strategic action plan for the 
realization of the Vision was formulated and a consecutive national strategy for poverty 
reduction and broad-based economic growth has been designed and implemented. Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Phase One (2000/01-20002/03) and the Phase Two (2003/04-
2005/2006) which embodies the Millennium Development Goals of Tanzania was 
followed by the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty(NSGRP) 2005-
2010. The new strategy known as MKUKUTA outlines the mid-term agenda of the 
mainland of Tanzania for accelerated economic growth and social advancement targeting 
the attainment of MDGs as well as the long-term goals of the Tanzanian Development 
Vision 2025.  
 
2.1.1.2. Under the long-term and medium-term framework of national development, sector 
policies, strategies and thematic strategic plans are prepared and being undertaken. They 
are the key vehicles for implementing country development goals. The current sector 
policies and strategies derived its objectives from MKUKUTA which acts as a medium 
term strategy to implement the long term development objectives. Decentralization by 
Devolution(D by D), the decentralization policy of 1998, spells out government’s 
objective of devolving powers and responsibilities to autonomous local authorities.   
 
2.1.1.3. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar has her own strategic paradigm for the 
islands’ socio-economic advancement. With her quite different historical and cultural 
background and socio-economic endowments from the mainland, the semi-autonomous 
government projected her own development vision and growth and poverty reduction 
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strategy. The Zanzibar Vision 2020 was launched in 2000, and subsequent strategic 
poverty reduction program had been carried out in line with the goals and objectives of the 
Tanzanian MDGs. And contemporary policies and programs for the accelerated economic 
growth has been strengthened by inaugurating a fairly advanced framework for sustainable 
development: Zanzibar’s Growth Strategy (2006-2015) in 2006; and Zanzibar Strategy for 
Growth and Reduction of Poverty (ZNSGRP) in 2007. 
 
2.1.2. Mechanism of Policy Making and Strategic Planning  
 
2.1.2.1. (Development Leadership and Policy Initiative) The process of policy making and 
strategy formulation in Tanzania is participatory in nature, whereby sector specific or 
development issue oriented is required to come up with critical analysis of the policy or 
strategy that is going to be tabled. Even the policy initiative is being taken by the higher 
authority, the policy making decision is starting from downward to the national level 
depending on the relevance of the issue being addressed. The formal policy making 
process at the national level centers around the cabinet paper. A cabinet paper is a proposal 
made by a respective sector or coordinating agency for a government decision either in 
form of legislation or executive/ministerial directive. After integrating comments from the 
Cabinet Secretariat, the subject for decision is circulated for the meeting of Permanent 
Secretaries that is Inter-ministerial Technical Committee (IMTC) for further modification 
before being tabled to the Cabinet Meeting. Consensus through mutual consultation and 
moderation is more valued than an innovative initiative and prominence taken by the 
authoritative development leadership which could be more visionary and insightful.         
 
2.1.2.2. (Policy R & D and Strategic Planning) A rather turbulent history of economic 
planning authority may reflect an intrinsic reluctance to the centralized strategic planning 
and government intervention. The Planning Commission, an agency for strategic thinking 
on the national economy, a government think-tank, which mission is to provide advice to 
the Government on medium and long-term strategies for socio-economic development, has 
been revived early this year. Disappeared from the chart of the government organization in 
2003, when the Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment had been introduced, 
the Planning Commission was recreated in February 2008. Instead, the former Ministry of 
Planning, Economy and Empowerment was dissolved transferring the role of economic 
policy planning and strategy formulation and the function of policy research and 
development to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs(formerly Ministry of 
Finance) and the Planning Commission respectively. The Tanzanian Development Vision 
2025 disclosed in 1999 was projected by the Planning Commission. MKUKUTA 2006-
2010 was prepared by the Vice President’s Office. And responsibility for the 
implementation of the MKUKUTA and its subsequent planning was handed over to the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. Economic and Social Research 
Foundation(ESRF), an independent non-profit research institute, and Economic Research 
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Bureau(ERB), an affiliated research institute of Dar es Salaam National University, 
provide the policy makers in the government with entrusted socio-economic survey and 
analysis, policy research and development. 
 
2.2. National Development Vision 
 
2.2.1. Tanzania Development Vision(TDV) 2025 
 
2.2.1.1. The Tanzania Development Vision (TDV) 2025 was formulated in 1999. The Vision 
outlines the broad national long-term social and economic development goals and 
perspectives. The Vision describes the kind of society that Tanzania will be achieved by 
the year 2025 with respect to improving quality of life, improving governance and rule of 
law and transforming the economy to a middle-income country. Vision’s core objective is 
to awaken, co-ordinate and direct the people’s efforts, minds and national resources 
towards those sectors to enable Tanzanians to attain their development goals and withstand 
the expected intensive economic competition faced by their nation.48 The Vision aspires 
Tanzania of 2025 to be a nation imbued with five main attributes which are: 
 
• high quality livelihood;  
• peace, stability and unity;  
• good governance; 
• a well educated and learning society; and 
• a competitive economy capable of producing growth and shared benefits.  
 
2.2.1.2. In order to realize the Vision, development goals and targets were identified for each 
key sector for effective implementation49, and review on the progress of the Vision was to 
be undertaken every five years. In the process of implementing the TDV 2025 several 
measures have been put in place in terms of policies, strategies and institutional 
frameworks for implementation. The Vision is implemented through medium and long-
term strategic interventions and some coordinated institutional frameworks. Such tools 
include the Tanzania Mini-Tiger Plan(TMTP) 2020 and the National Strategy for Growth 
and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP/MKUKUTA). 
 
2.2.1.3. While Vision 2025, and MKUKUTA provide guiding frameworks on cross-sector 
and general issues, sector policies and strategies provide guidance on sector specific 
issues. These sector policies and strategies are linked to the national frameworks and in a 
specific and systematic way show how to achieve the national goals and objectives by 
identifying sector interventions. Some of the sector policies and strategies include:  
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 Planning Commission, Reference Note, July 2008 
49
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• Rural Development Policy (RDP), Rural Development Strategy(RDS); 
• Agricultural Sector Development Strategy(SADS), Agricultural Sector Develop-  
ment Programme(ASDP); 
• Tanzania Trade Policy (TTP), Small and Medium Enterprise Development Policy; 
• National Energy Policy, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources Strategic Plan; 
• National Policy on HIV/AIDS, National Multi-Sectoral Strategy for HIV/AIDS;  
• Educational Sector Development Programme(ESDP), Primary Education Develop- 
ment Programme(PEDP); 
• Construction Industry Policy 
• National Information and Communications Technologies Policy 
• Transport Sector Investment Program(TSIP) 2007/08-2011/12 
• Land Use and Management Plan, National Water Policy (NWP); 
• National Employment Policy, National Social Security Policy (NSSP); 
• Public Financial Management Reform Programme(PFMRD); 
• Public Service Reform Program(PSRP), Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP); 
• National Anti-Corruption Policy (NACP). 
 
2.2.2. Zanzibar Development Vision(ZDV) 2020 
 
2.2.2.1. The Zanzibar Vision 2020 foresees a longer term social and economic development 
perspective and envisions the development goals and objectives for the economic well 
being of the people. The overall Vision 2020’s objective is to eradicate poverty in the 
society. To attain the grand objective, the Vision specifies the policy objectives and 
strategies. The document acknowledges that the Vision is part and parcel of the general 
United Republic of Tanzania Vision. 
 
2.2.2.2. The Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (ZSGRP) known as  
MKUZA in its Kiswahili acronym provides the framework of development policy and 
strategy to implement Vision 2020 in line with MDGs. The MKUZA in tuning with the 
programming modality of the MKUKUTA took the cluster development approach setting 
goals and operational targets and strategic interventions in each of the three clusters.  
 
2.2.2.3. In recognizing the growth as the paramount objective of MKUZA, the Zanzibar 
government and launched the Zanzibar’s Growth Strategy/ZGS(2006-2015) in February 
2007. The ZGS is designed to promote pro-poor growth aiming at result oriented 
implementation of cluster 1 goal: growth and reduction of income poverty. 
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2.3. National Development Policy and Strategy 
 
2.3.1. NSGRP/MKUKUTA 
 
2.3.1.1. NSGRP/MKUKUTA is building on broad objective enshrined on the long-term 
development vision, the National Development Vision 2025. It also builds on lessons 
learned from PRS (Poverty Reduction Strategy). The Strategy which accords top priority 
to poverty reduction in Tanzania’s development agenda seeks to strengthen private sector 
development; foster effective participation of civil society; enhance country ownership; 
and build smart partnership with development partners.  
 
2.3.1.2. Unlike the PRS, NSGRP is a five-year strategy, a period considered feasible for a 
more sustained resources mobilization and result-oriented implementation. 
Implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Strategy is based on key principles – 
national ownership; political commitment to economic and structural reforms; local 
partnerships; harmonized assistance; equity; sustainable human development; macro-micro 
linkages; and mainstreaming cross-cutting issues. The Strategy identifies three cluster 
outcomes aiming at achieving the Vision 2025 and the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). The three clusters are as follows:  
• Growth and reduction of income poverty;  
• Improvement of quality of life and social wellbeing; and  
• Good governance and accountability. 
 
2.3.2. Zanzibar’s Growth Strategy and MKUZA 
 
2.3.2.1. The Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty provides a strategic 
framework for attaining sustainable growth and poverty reduction. The strategic approach 
is to create an enabling environment for high and sustainable growth and to promote 
sustainable pro-poor and broad-based growth with three main clusters outcome: (1) 
Growth and reduction of income poverty; (2) Social Services and Well-being; and (3) 
Good governance and national unity. And the strategy is to ensure the each cluster 
outcome by achieving cluster goals with its concrete operational targets. The Cluster 1 has 
three goals, the Cluster 2 eight ones, and the Cluster 3 eleven ones.  
 
2.3.2.2. The Zanzibar Growth Strategy (ZGS) (2006-2015) is an implementing path for 
Cluster 1 in ZSGPR. The ZGS is a result oriented st
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comprehensive framework for promoting growth.50 Defining the fundamentals for growth 
as rapid, broad-based and sustainable growth, the Strategy aims at promoting 
competitiveness by focusing on areas of comparative advantage and transforming them 
into competitive advantage over time. In this context, the two key sectors for strategic 
intervention have been identified: trade and tourism. These two sectors which takes 
advantages of the strategic geographical position of Zanzibar in the region and the rich 
history and natural resources, receive the highest priority in policy intervention, 
investment and institutional development. Agriculture and manufacturing sectors support 
the developing the leading sectors.  
  
3. Sector Review: Policies and Development Programs 
 
3.1. Agricultural Development 
 
3.1.1. Agricultural Development Context 
 
3.1.1.1. Agriculture is the base and backbone of Tanzania’s economy. Since the colonial 
economy placed an utmost priority in agricultural production over other industrial 
development, the agricultural sector played a central role in production, employment, 
external trade and industrial investment. The Arusha Declaration proclaimed that 
‘Agriculture is the base of development’.51 Kilimo cha kufa na Kupona. ‘Do or die in 
Agriculture’ was the catch phrase in the earlier decades of the nation’s development. 
Agriculture highlighted the nation’s development vision of self-reliant economic and 
social progress. Agriculture-first sentiment is prevalent and the agriculture-based 
development strategy pursued avidly in the era of the socialist economy still reigns over 
the people’s development mentality. And though agriculture produces only slightly over 
one fourth of domestic national income, the sector employs around three fourth of its total 
workforce. The agricultural sector provides more than 90 per cent of foods to the 
Tanzanian population. The sector supplies the raw materials of agro-based industries while 
the export of agricultural commodities contributes about one third of foreign earnings. The 
similar portion of the people employed in agriculture live in rural area where subsistent 
farming is dominant and the traditional values and customs of an agrarian society are 
prevailing over their way of living. The community and family ties are tight and the social 
mobility is still very low.  
 
3.1.1.2. The natural endowments in this sector are more than abundant. Of overall 94.5 
million hectares of the land area, 44 million hectares are suitable for agricultural 
production and 38.8 million hectares forest and woodland. Around 60 million hectares 
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could be utilized as rangelands for livestock farming and bee-keeping.52 Though the 
precipitation is unevenly distributed both in season and region, the average rainfall 
throughout the nation is more than 1,600 millimeters annually. More of its sheer size of 
the arable land area, the climate of the nation is predominantly tropical and the wide range 
of its temperature and topography classified into seven (7) agro-ecological zones over the 
nation ensures an ample diversity of agricultural production from major stable foods to 
traditional and non-traditional cash crops. 
 
3.1.1.3. In spite of its great potential for development, the performance of Tanzania’s 
agricultural sector has been highly disappointing. The growth rate of the sector has been 
increasing from an annual average of 3.2 per cent during 1990~2000 to 4.9 per cent during 
2000~2004. In recent years the agricultural sector continued a positive growth around 4 
per cent, slightly outpacing the rate of population increase: 4.3 per cent in 2005; 3.8 per 
cent in 2006; and 4.0 per cent in 2007.53 These poor performances led to a noticeable 
dwindling of the share of agricultural production in national domestic products (GDP) to a 
meager 26.5 per cent in 2007. Although the agricultural labor productivity grew by 1.8 ~ 
4.6 per cent in recent years, the sector is still being captured in the low level of 
productivity yet to recover from a serious setback to a dire conditions in the late years of 
state-controlled economy. More than 90 per cent of the farmers are small-holder subsistent 
producers and depend on traditional cultivating tools of hand-hoe and ox-plough. Only a 
small portion of arable land is in cultivation and most of them depend on the rainfall. Only 
289,000 hectares, less than 3 per cent of cultivated land and only around one percent of the 
existing potential of 29.4 million hectares irrigated farming, are currently under irrigation. 
Agriculture within Tanzania remains vulnerable, burdened with an unproductive 
workforce, still heavily reliant upon rainfall, restricted by poor quality inputs and a lack of 
technological innovation.54        
 
3.1.2. Agricultural Development Policy and Strategy 
 
3.1.2.1. The government and stakeholders in agriculture share an agricultural development 
vision of TDV 2025 which envisages a modernized, commercial, highly productive and 
profitable agriculture by utilizing natural resources in an overall sustainable manner and 
acting as an effective base for inter-sectoral linkages. In line with the development vision, 
the Agricultural Sector Policy 1997 was embodied its directions and development targets 
through the implementation of the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) 
2001 and the Agricultural Sector Development Programmes (ASDP) 2006. The Livestock 
Development Policy, the Rural Development Policy and the Rural Development Strategy, 
and the Economic Empowerment Policy (EEP) are reinforcing each other in attaining the 
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agricultural development goals and targets. The National Strategy for Growth and 
Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP/MKUKUTA) 2005~2010 which aims at poverty reduction 
through sustainable and broad-based growth emphasizes the widening of the actors’ 
spectrum in the economy and the strengthening the link between agriculture and industry 
with specific operational targets and strategic actions.  
 
    < Goals and Targets of Agricultural Development in NSGRP > 
     • Reduced proportion of rural poor from 27 per cent in 2001 to 14 per cent in 2010  
• Increased agricultural growth from 5 % in 2002/03 to 10 % by 2010 
• Increased growth rate for livestock sub-sector from 2.7% in 2000/01 to 9% by 2010 
• Increased food crops production from 9 million tons in 2003/04 to 12milliom tons in 2010 
• Maintained Strategic Grain Reserve of at least 4 month of national food requirement 
 
    < NSGRP Strategic Actions for Sustainable Agricultural Development >  
     • Increasing the number of irrigation schemes and area under irrigation and promoting rainwater 
harvesting 
     • Increasing productivity and profitability in agriculture through technological innovations such 
as use of improved high-yielding and pests-, disease- and drought-resistant varieties, 
improved tools and equipment and better soil and water management, improved extension 
services, training and promotion of Integrated Pest Management(IPM) 
     • Promoting efficient utilization of rangeland, empowering pastoralists to improve livestock 
productivity through improved access to veterinary services, reliable water supply, 
recognizing pastoralism as sustainable livelihood  
     • Providing targeted subsidy to selected food crops, identifying and promoting modern farming 
technologies especially in rural areas and providing support for increased utilization of 
improved technologies for crop and livestock production 
     • Identifying research activities and promote food storage technologies/facilities and enhance 
agro-processing as well as environmentally friendly farming technologies and practices 
especially for rural areas  
 
 
   3.1.2.2. While a new agricultural sector policy is under finalization based on a sector-wide 
comprehensive review on agricultural sector including livestock, irrigation, capacity 
building, marketing and agro-processing, rural infrastructure and environmental 
conservation, the ASDS adopted in 2001 aims to achieve a sustained agricultural growth 
rate of 5 per cent per annum which later upgraded to 10 per cent by 2010 in the 
MKUKUTA and the ASDP. Core features of the strategy are to strengthening public-
private partnership across all levels of the sector and implementation of the District 
Agricultural Development Plans (DADPs) as the comprehensive tool for agricultural 
development at district level.55 The ASDS strategy focuses on five(5) major strategic 
interventions: (1) Strengthening the institutional framework for managing agricultural 
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development(central and local government, public sector organizations, farmer groups and 
the public sectors); (2) Creating a favorable climate for private sector 
investment(commercial activities); (3) Identifying and promoting public and private sector 
roles in improving support services such as agricultural extension, research and training; 
(4) Strengthening market efficiency for agricultural inputs and outputs(support to 
agribusiness, promoting agro-processing, rural industrialization and market information); 
(5) Mainstreaming planning for agricultural development in other sectors and cross-cutting 
issues namely, road, energy, trade, environment, gender and HIV/AIDS.  
 
3.1.2.3. The ASDS was implemented through the Agricultural Service Support Programme 
(ASSP), prepared by a joint government-development partner team in 2004, and the 
government support programme for the DADPs, completed in May 2005 before the two 
programmes are integrated into the ASDP framework in 2006. The ASDP, programmed by 
a sector-wide approach (SWAp), aims to enable farmers to have better access to and use of 
agricultural knowledge, technologies, marketing systems and infrastructure, all of which 
contribute to higher productivity, profitability, and farm incomes, and to promote private 
investment based on improved regulatory and policy environment. The programme, an 
advanced operational response to the ASDS, identifies five key operational components as 
a focus for implementation at : (1) District level through DADPs; (2) National level 
including zones; (3) Cross-cutting and cross-sectoral issues. The components are: the 
policy, regulatory and institutional arrangements; agricultural services(research, advisory 
and technical service, and training); public investment; private sector development, market 
development, and agricultural finance; and cross-cutting and cross-sectoral issues 
including gender mainstreaming and implementation of the land acts.  
 
3.1.2.4. The ASDP has a 15 year programme horizon, but is phased in a flexible manner to 
allow all Local Government Authorities (LGAs) time to adjust to the new funding 
mechanisms and to manage the proposed reforms. The programme cost is calculated for 
seven years from 2006/07-2012/13 and the seven year period is divided into a three-year 
first phase and a four-year second phase. Adopting a decentralization policy ‘D by D’, the 
main components of the ASDP are forwarded toward the local level support for the 
DADPs.  
 
< Program Components and Costing of the ASDP > 
 
   • Component 1 : Local Level Support (Tsh.1,876 billion) 
     - Sub-component 1.1: Local Agricultural Investments (Tsh.1,629 billion) 
     - Sub-component 1.2: Local Agricultural Services (Tsh.190 billion) 
     - Sub-component 1.3: Local Agricultural Capacity Building and Reform (Ths.57 billion) 
   • Component 2 : National Level Support (Tsh.615.9 billion) 
     - Sub-component 2.1: Agricultural Research and Extension Services (Tsh.107 billion) 
     - Sub-component 2.2: National Irrigation Development (Tsh.474 billion) 
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     - Sub-component 2.3: Market and Private Sector Development (Tsh.11.4 billion) 
     - Sub-component 2.4: Food Security (Tsh.5.3 billion) 
     - Sub-component 2.5: Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation (Tsh.17.9 billion)  
 
3.1.2.5. (Programme Financing Arrangement) The majority of ASDP expenditures are being 
allocated to LGA level and are provided through three fiscal grant transfers: (1) the 
District Agricultural Development Grant (DADG); (2) the Extension Block Grant (EBG); 
and (3) the Agricultural Capacity Building Grant(A-CBG). The two funds for irrigation 
development are established: the District Irrigation Development Fund (DIDF) and the 
National Irrigation Development Fund (NIDF).    
    
3.1.2.3. However, the agricultural sector, the hugest sector in every standard, does not receive 
its due attention in terms of government expenditure and public investment. Apart from 
the government investment target in agriculture manifested in the Maputo Declaration56 
which urges the governments of developing economies in African continent to allocates at 
least 10 per cent of their public spending to agricultural development, the government 
budget of FY 2008-09 plans to spend no more than 6.4 per cent of its expenditures for 
agricultural development programs. There are five basket funds for agricultural sub and 
cross-sectoral programs are under implementation and some of the standing-free technical 
cooperation projects are being carried out through several channels of bilateral 
cooperation. The scheme of general budget support (GBS) which account more than half 
of external financing by donors may constrain the flow of foreign assistance in the 
agricultural sector, because the GBS investment portfolio are going to set aside a bulk of 
its resources for social development and other investments. Without credit lending or 
investment programs preferred for the agricultural sector development over the other 
industrial sectors, farmers and investors in the field of agriculture should compete with 
others investors whose business prospects are usually more promising and productive in 
comparison to those of agriculture.  
 
3.1.2.4. It is expected that the financing gap between the required investment and the public 
sector support could be filled by the private sector participation. Anticipating an extended 
role of the private sector, the government initiated a drive for promoting private and 
foreign investment in agriculture by providing investors a package of investment 
incentives: (1) Zero-rated duty on capital goods, all farm implements including fertilizer, 
insecticides and pesticides; (2) Reduced import tariff on project capital items to 0 per cent 
for large investor as related to Tanzania Investment Center; (3) Favorable investment 
allowances and deductions i. e. 100 per cent first year capital allowance on agricultural 
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plant and machinery; (4) Zero-rated VAT on agricultural products and for domestically 
produced agricultural inputs, etc.  
 
3.1.3. Future Agricultural Development Prospects  
 
3.1.3.1. Fust as the potential of agricultural development is considered as more than 
substantial, the performance of the sector has been always disappointing. Agriculture 
endured tens of thousands years as a form of subsistent farming, a way of living itself 
rather than a business activity. And the most part of Tanzania’s agriculture remains as was 
in the past traditional farming, with neither modern farm inputs and techniques nor 
effective incentives for production of more quantity and better quality. As experienced 
earlier during the colonial eras, the agriculture and agro-business are integral but part of 
the entire economy and they are highly dependent each other upon the effective demand 
and the reliable supply. Not only the external demand for export and before blaming the 
conditions of commodity index in the international market, there should occur an effective 
and sustained demand for agricultural products in the domestic market at the same time. It 
means that the all endeavors and integrated programs for agricultural development should 
go side by side with the creation of effective demand for the products which is supported 
by the increase of the purchasing power within the sector as well as of the numerous 
consumers domestic and abroad. The agricultural development could not be sustained 
without the growth of viable consumers’ market for agricultural products and the related 
industries.  
 
3.1.3.2. The Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP) under implementation 
provides stakeholders with a well designed policy framework and elaborate programmes 
all over the sector. While the programme deals with every matters related to agricultural 
development in a wider perspective, it seems that the central government refrains from 
intervening in regional strategic planning and programming and promoting strategic fields 
or programmes instead of making general enabling environments work and mandating the 
development stewardship to local district government in a great extent. Neither strategic 
crops or commercial plantations, nor focused areas of strategic intervention appear on the 
programme document. Considering the quite limited resources allocated to this sector, this 
broad-based and thinly decentralized approach may contribute to an even slower growth 
across the sector, but could not be able to motivate a viable and dynamic growth in certain 
particular fields or areas of which performance spill over the other fields or areas and 
accelerate the process of higher growth. Without a stronger engagement and intervention 
of the public sector in some strategic promotional programs and activities, the prospect of 
agricultural development in Tanzania seems not to be much different from the previous 
performance.  
 
3.1.3.3. For the expansion of external demand for agricultural products of Tanzania, the 
quality as well as price competitiveness of the products should be secured and this needs 
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an integrated and concentrated investment in some strategic crops or regions from 
improvement of farmland and related infrastructure, development of farming techniques 
and technologies, and increased farm inputs and mechanization to quality management 
and marketing. Sustainable agricultural development cannot be solely dependent on the 
external market. A bigger portion of perpetual demand for agricultural products should be 
created from the domestic market where the purchasing power of non-farmers is steadily 
increasing owing to the continued expansion of the other productive sectors. The healthy 
growth of the other sectors could be able to bear the burden of price support for the 
strategic agricultural commodities which enables farmers to produce more and get higher 
income.  
 
3.2. Industrial Development 
 
3.2. 1. Industrial Development Context 
 
3.2.1.1. The basis of all modern economies is industry and trade. During the colonial era both 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar were seen as exporters of agricultural produce and importers of 
finished manufactured products. Following independence and the initiation of the policy of 
‘African Socialism’ the trade and industry plan change to dramatically to one close to 
autarky. A strategy of import substitution was followed and industries, mostly parastatal 
industries, were developed behind a tariff barrier that restricted the import of manufactured 
products, particularly those that competed with local industry.57 The industrial sector 
deadlocked by less competition, low investment and productivity declared a total failure 
and sought for a solution. Considering Tanzania’s reclusiveness 58  from industrial 
promotion during the earlier stage of her development, the subsequent policy shift made in 
the late 1980s and thereafter was remarkable. Overhauling the trade regime and the 
industrial policy, a bold counter policy shift was made toward the liberalization of the 
economy and a balanced development of the industrial sector. Tanzania has realized that 
political enthusiasm does not build the economy and that socialism requires modern 
economy.59 Before an adoption of new industrial policy in mid 1990s, a comprehensive 
structural adjustment program had been started and this included macro-economic 
stabilization, privatization and governmental reorganization.          
 
3.2.1.2. The process of structural adjustment and economic liberalization was painful and 
difficult causing a serious counter response of demise of local industries and massive 
layoffs of numerous parastatal companies which lost competitiveness against foreign 
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counterparts. While the production of traditional products were declined due to weak 
demand and low prices, the non-traditional industries could not be able to catch up the 
productive and technological gap widened during the time. Acknowledging the structural 
problems, the third government introduced a new policy, the Sustainable industries 
Development Policy (SIDP).  
 
3.2.1.3. Since the Investment Promotion Authority (IPA) was established in 1990, an industry 
friendly policy has been developed. However, it was in 1997 when the Tanzania 
Investment Act was enacted and the IPA was institutionalized as the Tanzania Investment 
Centre (TIC) that a pro-investment policy was adopted away from investment controlling 
to investment promoting approaches. The Sustainable Industrial Development Policy 
(SIDP) 1996-2020 formulated in 1996 aims to mobilize industrial stakeholders’ efforts for 
the development of the sector and enhancing its contribution towards the achievement of 
national development goals. And years later the Tanzania’s development vision disclosed 
in 2000 endorsed the long-term goals of the SIDP. This Policy also renders the basic policy 
targets of the lately projected growth and poverty reduction strategy MKUKUTA. And in 
line with the Policy and the Vision, some important policies and plans were formulated. 
The National Trade Policy and the Small and Medium Enterprise Policy were implemented 
in 2003. And the Tanzania Mini Tiger Plan (TMTP) 2020, an integrated strategy for 
promoting industrial development promotion was designed and implemented in 2004. 
 
3.2.1.4. Contemporary policies for industrial promotion are focusing on providing an 
enabling business environment that would facilitate the development of the private sector. 
Among other initiatives is the Business Environment Strengthening for Tanzania (BEST) 
program. The BEST, a multi-sectoral five-year program launched in 2003, contributes to 
reducing the administrative and regulatory burden in doing business in Tanzania and 
improving government and judicial services to the private sector. Specific areas targeted by 
BEST include business licensing, land regulations and labor law reforms.60     
 
3.2.2. Industrial Development Policy and Strategy 
 
3.2.2.1. The SIDP 1996~2020, a roadmap for Tanzania’s industrial development, lays down 
the short-term, medium-term and long-term industrial development strategy, where the 
focus was placed on restructuring the existing capacities through privatization, soliciting 
new capacities through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the transformation of the 
industrial sector. The key feature of SIDP is a redefinition of the role of the government 
and the private sector, where the private sector is tasked with driving industrialization 
through market forces.61 Since the primary investment and the management of industries 
was seen as the responsibility of the private sector, the role of the government in 
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facilitating the strategy and achieving the objectives of the policy was seen as the creation 
of an ‘enabling environment’. The Policy redefines the role of the government as the 
provider of a suitable environment and the facilitator of support policies and programs 
covering fourteen main areas as follows: (1) The creation of liberal market mechanism 
through the economy; (2) selective protection for particular industries with the framework 
of Tanzania’s adherence to the World Trade Organization(WTO) Agreements; (3) the 
formulation of a favorable trade policy; (4) the creation of fiscal policies favorable to the 
development of indigenous industry; (5) the development of monetary policies favorable to 
industry; (6) improvement in the Investment Promotion Act; (7) the promotion of standards 
and quality assurance; (8) the creation of an adequate physical infrastructure; (9) the 
development of sectors complementary to industrial growth, especially in the areas of 
agriculture, minerals and tourism; (10) the improvement of human resources both at 
entrepreneurial and managerial level, and by apprenticeship and other schemes for training 
labors; (11) the implementation of new and modernized labor legislation; (12) the 
rationalization of land tenure and transfer arrangements; (13) the encouragement of 
research and development; (14) the provision of adequate legislation for the protection of 
both foreign and local investment in private industry. 
 
3.2.2.2. Along with the privatization and rehabilitation of parastatal industries, the policy of 
new industrial promotion was geared by extending the role of private sector and inducing 
foreign direct investment. In line with the SIDP the legal framework and institutional 
arrangements were strengthening by enacting the Tanzania Investment Act. The 
restructured Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) coordinate, encourage, promote and 
facilitate investment both domestic and foreign as one-stop facilitation center for all 
investors. Investment incentives including a number of tax exemptions and deductions are 
granted to both local and foreign investors. The TIC provides other investment services 
such as company registration, land acquisition, immigration procedures and issuance of 
business licenses.      
 
3.2.2.3. The TDV(Tanzanian Development Vision) 2025 recognizes the role of industrial 
sector in transforming the nation from a least developed country to a middle income semi-
industrialized country by 2025. It is recognized that the transformation path from a low 
productivity agricultural economy to a semi-industrialized economy characterized by 
modernized agriculture constitutes the necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving 
the desired level of economic development. The industrial sector, through its role in 
creating wealth and employment as well as provision of basic needs and facilitating the 
process of stimulating growth, is critical in sustaining broad based growth and achieving 
poverty reduction.62 
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3.2.2.4. The industrial sector is one of the multi-sectors which receive fairly broad-based 
growth spectrum under the strategic framework of MKUKUTA, the 2nd generation 
NSGRP which emphasizes the role of the private sector. For sustainable and broad-based 
growth, the manufacturing sector is expected to grow up to 15 per cent annually by 2010 
from 8.6 per cent. The export proportion of value-added minerals is expected to increase to 
3.0 per cent by 2010 from 0.5 per cent. The two major strategic actions for promoting 
accelerated industrial development are to be taken by implementing the BEST programme 
and the Tanzania Mini-Tiger Plan (TMTP) 2020. 
 
3.2.2.5. The Tanzania Mini Tiger Plan 2020 aims at fast tracking implementation plan with 
the private sector participation. It is an instrument of getting the country out of poverty trap 
through the adoption of the Asian Development Model. The model is focusing on 
employment creation by attracting FDI and promoting exports by developing Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs)63. The theory of ‘Ponds and Birds’ which is believed to have been 
successfully applied in the Asian countries including ASEAN64, China, India and more 
recently Vietnam is the background of the plan: Creating ‘Ponds’, SEZs, and attracting 
‘Migrating Birds’, investment especially FDI. The plan pursues a three stage strategy: (1) 
Build SEZs and aggressively promoting most promising industries such as primary and 
light industry and tourism by use of well proven SEZ concept ‘Ponds and Birds Theory’; 
(2) Quickly improve the national balance sheet by expanding exports from $ 1.0 billion to 
$2-3 billion within 3-4 years and then expand badly needed public projects in 
power/energy/water/transport sector by long-term borrowing from multilateral and bilateral 
development banks; (3) Solving as many bottlenecks by additional borrowing and foreign 
currency earning plus FDI, expand investment activities further more into high value-
added sectors and moving into larger investment projects. Recommended specific 
programs and projects of the plan includes (1) 4 light industry SEZ programs by 2006 and 
25-30 by 2020, (2) 3 cash crop based SEZs by 2006 and 50 by 2020, (3) One tourism based 
SEZ by 2006 and 5 by 2020, (4) Out-board ship engine project in fishing fleets and ship-
breaking project by 2008, (5) Biomass energy program, (6) National heritage/cultural park 
project, (7) and nation-wide program such as ‘One Village One Product(OVOP)’ program 
and Village scholarship tree planting program. Expected results and targets of the plan by 
2020 are as follows:  
 
   • GDP to be growing at an average of 8-10 per cent and reach $40 billion 
• Exports expanded from $1.1 billion to $20 billion 
• Per capita income to be increased from $280 to at least $1,000 
• Creating 2-3 million new jobs by 2020 
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• Develop at least 25-30 SEZs in the country and attracting FDI aggressively     
 
3.2.2.6. (Promotion of Small and Medium Enterprises) In promotion of industrial 
development the small and medium enterprises (SMEs)65 receives greater emphasis as the 
SMEs in Tanzania play a crucial role in employment creation and income generation as 
well as private sector-led growth. The vast majority of Tanzanian manufacturing 
enterprises are small and medium enterprise employing less than 100 people. The Small 
and Medium Enterprises Development Policy launched in 2003 focuses on three main 
areas namely; the creation of an enabling business environment, developing the financial 
and non-financial services and putting in place supportive institutional infrastructure.66 
The Small Industries Development Organization (SIDO) established in 1973 intervenes to 
tab the full potential of the sector by providing sustainable, integrated and coordinated 
promotional measures.  
 
3.2.2.7. (Trade Promotion) The economic reform programs implemented in the 1990s onward 
toward market-led economy came through the opening of the market and trade 
liberalization. Tanzania acceded to the WTO in 1995 as one of its founding members, and 
is bound by all its agreements and has to comply, taking into consideration the country’s 
status as a LDC (Less Developed Country).67 Even some of the waiver clauses, the Trade 
Defense Instruments, are granted within a limited-timeframe, it means that the external 
trade of Tanzania is exposed to trade liberalization and globalization which lead to the 
integration of the domestic market into the world market, shedding off the trade defense 
measures as well as eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers. In these circumstances, the 
Tanzanian government strides to promote both internal and external trade and aims to 
spurring the export-led growth and balancing the external trade. The Trade National Policy 
launched in 2003 outlined the trade policy toward a competitive economy and export-led 
growth. The policy projected some specific targets in line with basic policy objectives: (1) 
Contribute to raising per capita income to levels targeted in National Development Vision 
2025; (2) Trade development measures to stimulate and expand domestic demand through 
product and market diversification; (3) Limited interim safeguard of domestic economic 
activity threatened by liberalization while building economic competitiveness; (4) 
Achieving and sustaining a rate of growth in trade of not less than 14 per cent i.e. an 
average of twice the targeted rate of growth of GDP; (5) Achieving and sustaining the 
long-run share of exports in GDP of about 25 per cent and reversal of the declining trend 
in the import-coverage ratio; (6) Attainment of a two-fold increase in manufactured 
exports for every ten-year interval, and a two-fold increase in trade in services at intervals 
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of 6 years; and (7) Raising the value of merchandise export earnings in absolute terms to 
US$1,700 million within five years as envisaged in the EDS (Export Development 
Strategy).68 To achieve the targets a policy implementation matrix was designed to 
facilitate an integrated support for trade promotion. And the interdependent matrix of trade 
development includes (1) Improvement of macro- economic environment, (2) Enabling 
business environment, (3) Competition policy and law, (4) Human skills development, (5) 
Hard infrastructure(Transportation and communication systems), (6) Hard 
infrastructure(Utilities, water and power), (7) Soft infrastructure(Finance and insurance), 
(8) Electronic commerce, (9) Consulting services, (10) Travel and tourism service 
industry, (11) Intellectual properties services (TRIPS), (12) Trade support network for 
trade development, (13) Regional trade arrangements(RTA), (14) WTO and Multilateral 
Trading System (MTS).69  
 
3.2.3. Industrial Development Prospects 
 
3.2.3.1. In spite of great growth potential the contribution of the industrial sector to the 
Tanzanian economy is marginal. The industrial sector accounts not more than 10 per cent 
of the nation’s GDP, contributing quite minimum impact on GDP growth also less than 10 
per cent. The industrial growth is mainly attributable to increased production in areas such 
as cement, beverages, corrugated iron sheets, steel products, cigarette, plastic products, 
textile and leathers. The industrial outputs have been increased due to the boosting of 
domestic demand rather than external demand which expands the market domain with a 
competitive edge. The export of industrial products contributes only around 11.4 per cent 
to total export in 2006. The overall performance of the industrial sector is below than 
expectations envisaged in the policy and strategy documents.  
 
3.2.3.2. Policy makers and planners are wondering about the frustrated results produced in 
the industrial sector and trying to find out the reason why the policy and strategy doesn’t 
work as they are expected to perform. In the course of monitoring and reviewing on the 
MUKUKUTA in 2007 a special attention was paid on the framework of Tanzania’s 
growth strategy. The 2007 Poverty and Human Development Report70 diagnosed that 
Tanzania’s growth performance had been poor for years, in part of limited resources, but 
also because of the country had chosen to spread its resources too thinly. Being aware of 
countries that have focused resources in carefully chosen growth drivers have achieved 
high economic growth and development, the report concludes that given the limited 
resources there is need for a clear direction for resource mobilization and a concentration 
efforts – Tanzania needs a well focused national growth strategy. And the report 
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recommends that the general direction of Tanzania’s growth strategy should be translated 
into practical links to available resources and markets based on comparative and 
competitive advantages and through a number of selected interventions which have 
synergies and complementarity.  
 
3.2.3.3. Years after the implementation of the TMTP 2020 and the National Trade Policy, a 
general review on the existing policies was made and the subsequent process of 
conceptualization on a new industrial development approach is under progress. 
Acknowledging that a more integrated development strategy is needed for the promotion 
of the targeted sub-sectors, a new proposal of ‘Water Front Export Platform Approach’ is 
being developed as a part of the Integrated Industrial Development Strategy and Master 
Plan.71  The concept is to streamline the integrated efforts for promoting industrial 
development by concentrating on the identified industries in some selective business 
locations. Three export platforms at water front in the coastal regions where the business 
can be done best are proposed: Mbegani(Bagamoyo) for Central Corridor; Mwanbani for 
Tanga Corridor; and Mtawara for Mtawara Corridor. A reorientation of policy direction is 
recommended from import substitution to export promotion. And strong government 
leadership is advised in setting up the development vision to be followed by policy mix 
support to the identified industry. The new approach which reflects the fundamentals of 
the industry and the reality of the manufacturing sector requires a policy shift from the 
previous approach by which the establishment of SEZs are spread all over the region 
throughout the country without any preference or concentration in terms of the available 
resources and development capacity.     
 
3.2.3.4. There has been a lengthy debate on the institutional development of the supporting 
agencies in both industrial development and trade promotion. A newly drafted act is under 
preparation for proposal in which the Export Processing Zones Authority (EPZA) 
responsible for the matters of EPZs development and management will be strengthened so 
as to implement the newly developing Integrated Industrial Development Strategy and 
Master Plan under a unified umbrella and a streamlined concept of Economic 
Development Zones (EDZ), comprising ESZs and EPZs. Tanzania does not have any 
subsidy schemes for export promotion and has few conventional export facilitation 
institutions and instruments rendering export facilitation services .An extensive review and 
study was carried out regarding the institutional and program development for trade 
promotion. The study72 entrusted by the Board of External Trade (BET) proposed a 
reform program making some substantial change in the landscape of trade promotion in 
Tanzania. It describes the way forward for BET, proposing its transformation into a 
Tanzania Trade Development Authority, TanTrade for short which envisions to enable 
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Tanzania to become and remain a strong and competitive trading nation, by being an 
effective focal point for building and sustaining Tanzania’s trading capabilities. In a 
proposed hybrid financing instrument, TanTrade shall benefit from budgetary allocations 
to cover at least 30 percent of its budget for the next fifteen years, an import levy of 0.5 
percent to be charged on dutiable imports, limited to six years. And TanTrade shall, with 
assistance of the government, undertake initiatives to establish a Trade Development 
Endowment Fund (TDEF).  
 
3.2.3.5. Tanzania’s industrial sector is already well integrating into the regional economy as 
well as the world market. Not only taking part in the WTO mechanisms, but also Tanzania 
participates in regional, multilateral and bilateral trading arrangements including the EAC, 
and the SADC(South African Development Community). The other inter-regional trade 
and cooperation schemes include ACP/EU73 cooperation and the AGOA(African Growth 
and Opportunity Act)74. The proposal to merge the three African regional blocs, EAC, 
SADC, and COMESA(Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), and create a 
huge tariff-free market made by President Jakaya Kikwete at a summit meeting in 
Kampala recently was endorsed by the heads of states and governments from 26 member 
nations.75 These expanded cooperative relationships with countries in the region and the 
other part of the world will contribute to promoting Tanzania’s trade and industrial 
development. 
 
3.3. Tourism Development 
 
3.1. Tourism Development Context 
 
3.3.1.1. Endowed with abundant natural resources, diverse topography and biology, and rich 
cultural heritages Tanzania is a country of blessing envied by the people all over the 
world. Tanzania’s great grassland savannas are the places where people believe that the 
humankind in earlier years might have lived with every kind of other creatures for a long 
time. And there is an ancient archaeological site which is believed to be one of the places 
where a human species had been originated there in Olduvai George. The fact that 
Tanzania is one of the ancient places of human trade and mistreatment recalling atonement 
adds an extra dimension to the depth of human pathos and conscience. Tanzania has a 
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wealth of natural, cultural, historical and man-made attractions more than plenty in all 
parts of the country which are untapped from the standpoint of tourism development.  
 
3.3.1.2. Owing to the insightful guidance to the preservation of the natural resources in earlier 
independence era, the natural resources represented by wildlife has been largely conserved 
and protected during the time. At independence the nation’s commitment to wildlife 
conservation was extra-ordinary. The President of Tanganyika released a statement, the 
famous ‘Arusha Manifesto’ in 1961.76 The manifesto has been used to guide wildlife 
conservation in Tanzania until 1998 and this made the basement of tourism development 
since then. The present framework of Wildlife Protected Areas(PAs) in Tanzania 
comprises of National Parks(NPs), Game Reserves(GRs) and Game Controlled Areas. 
Tanzania’s wildlife protected area network covers 24 per cent of the total land surface area 
of which about 4.38 per cent is 14 National Parks, 0.88 per cent Ngorongoro Conservation 
Area, 12.98 per cent 34 Game Reserves, and 5.54 per cent 38 Game Controlled 
Areas(GCAs).77   
 
3.3.1.3. Previous to the National Tourism Policy of 1991, the tourism industry was 
intentionally de-emphasized and was thus underdeveloped.78 Under the 1991 policy, 
considerable achievement was secured such as the establishment of the Tanzania Tourism 
Board(TTB), the improvement of private sector participation, and the approval of many 
tourism-related projects. In 1999 a new National Tourism Policy, the revised one, which 
accounts the considerable change of the socio-economic environments in domestic and 
international arena, was formulated. Not only the shift of tourism paradigm due to rapid 
development of technology and transportation, but also the international commitment to 
sustainable development such as the 1992 Rio Declaration of Environment and 
Development and the Agenda 21 for Travel and Tourism Industry led to the revision of the 
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policy. In order to attain the policy objectives, the Tourism Master Plan, a strategic action 
plan, was prepared in 2002. The wildlife, one of the most protected natural resources 
which includes wildlife protected areas and wetlands, receives particular attention, 
therefore, Tanzania had had a age-old wildlife policy until 1998 when the Wildlife Policy 
of 1998 was projected for comprehensive conservation, management and development of 
wildlife in Tanzania. In the context of ‘sustainable conservation of natural and cultural 
resources and development of responsible tourism’, the revised Wildlife Policy of 
Tanzania was put into implementation in 2007.  
 
3.3.1.4. While growth is welcome, the number of safari tourists is kept down consciously 
through higher park fees than competitor countries such as Kenya and South Africa and 
higher taxes on operators. Though this means that Tanzania has not attracted as many 
tourists, this conservation-minded policy has turned out to be wise as Tanzania’s parks 
remained attractive while Kenya, which operates on a lower cost, higher volume model, is 
generally regarded as having overexploited its resources.79 In terms of absolute quantity 
and quality of existing natural resources as well as the immense possibility of resources 
renewal, Tanzania has great potential of sustainable tourism. The tourism sector has a 
number of characteristics, which suggest that it can make a significant contribution to the 
economy of the country.80 In 2007 the tourism sector earned US$800 million, 25 per cent 
of the nation’s export revenues from 719,031 tourists and this contributed 17.2 per cent to 
the GDP. Yet the tourism industry has the ample capacity for satisfying increased number 
of foreign tourists in case an effective measures for promoting sustainable tourism which 
is acceptable to the community culturally, economically and environmentally. 
Furthermore, the industry inter-linked with other sectors such as agriculture and traditional 
handicrafts could generate pro-poor growth which leads to improve employment and 
contribute to poverty reduction.  
 
3.3.2. Tourism Development Policy and Strategy  
 
3.3.2.1. (The Wildlife Policy 2007) In prior to tourism promotion Tanzania considers the 
protection and conservation of natural and cultural resources including wildlife and 
wetlands as prerequisite to sustainable development and poverty reduction in long term 
perspective. The wildlife policy of 1998 and the revised policy of 2007 highlight the 
biological value of the species and habitats found in Tanzania and also pay great attention 
to the economic value of the resources and their potential to contribute to the sustainable 
development of Tanzania. The Wildlife Protected Area (PA) network ensures the 
appropriate protection and conservation of wildlife and wetlands. And the policy aims to 
utilize the wildlife resources as a means of sustainable tourism such as game viewing, 
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tourists and residents’ hunting, wildlife farming, breeding and ranching as well as eco-
tourism, cultural tourism and game sanctuary. Public awareness, research and monitoring, 
human resources and capacity building on wildlife protection and preservation are among 
the objectives of the policy. The government facilitates international cooperation in the 
conservation of trans-boundary eco-systems and natural resources. 
 
3.3.2.2. (The National Tourism Policy 1999) The 1999 tourism policy recognizes that though 
Tanzania’s tourism sector is among the sectors with great growth potential, there are lots 
of constraints and limitations in exploiting the sector’ full potential as an attractive tourist 
destination as well as a lucrative business market. Among others, there is need for easier 
access, higher quality accommodation, and lower operational costs. Most tourist 
attractions need to be better developed and utilized, and tourist related infrastructure, 
facilities and services should be much improved. Addressing the tourism promotion as a 
multi-dimensional task of economic, social, environmental and cultural components, the 
policy attempts to boost the tourism industry at an annual growth rate of 10 per cent by 
2005 and envisages that the number of tourists will be increased to 1 million by 2010.  
 
3.3.2.3. In sequence to the revised national tourism policy of 1999, a strategic action plan was 
developed in 2002. The Tourism Master Plan – Strategy and Action reviews the current 
conditions and characteristics of Tanzania’s tourism sector and identifies the strengths and 
weaknesses of her tourism products and service management. Based on detailed review 
and analysis, the future character of Tanzania tourism is defined as possessing a diverse 
component of superior and competitive tourism assets to be developed. The plan proposes 
to designate Tourism Development Zones and recommends six(5) zones of priority 
development among the ten(10) zones throughout the country that could most effectively 
support tourism development within the 10-year planning period of the Tourism Master 
Plan. The six priority tourism zones are Northern Wildlife Zone, Kilimanjaro Arusha 
Zone, North East Mount and Coast Zone, Coastal Zone, Dar es Salaam and Environs 
Zone, and Southern Wildlife Zone. The others are Southern Coast and Mafia Island Zone, 
Southern Highlands Zone, Lake Tanganyika Zone and Lake Victoria Hinterland Zone.  
 
3.3.2.4. The master plan recommends the designation of Tourism development zone be 
accompanied by the development of tourism products which comprise of (1) Special 
interest and activity products, (2) Resorts products, and (3) Cultural/historical tourism 
products. Development of tourist circuits is to respond to the demand of the international 
market which requires a tourism product with several different tourism experiences 
connecting some tourist attractions and activities in a round of journey. Two tourist 
circuits are indentified: The Northern Circuit which stretches from Lake Victoria in the 
west to Tanga in the east through the northern wildlife areas of the Serengeti, the 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Arusha and Kilimanjaro National Parks; and the Southern 
Circuit which connects from the Cosral Zone of Dar es Salaam, Bagamoyo and Mafia to 
Southern Wildlife Zone of Ruaha and Selous. The development strategy is composed of 
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three strategic components: (1) Product, (2) Infrastructure, and (3) Enabling environment 
of which specific action strategies are put in place.                 
 
3.3.3. Tourism Development Prospects  
 
3.3.3.1. African idleness and romanticism, pristine natural wonders, unique and mystic 
scenery, biological and cultural diversity, remotely wildered vastness, pre-historic human 
heritages…. Tanzania possesses every ingredients and elements of exotic journey and 
exciting travel which are not fully tapped more than any other country in the African 
continent. The wealthy natural resources are extraordinary if they are appropriately 
preserved and cultivated in an environmentally sound and ecologically harmonious way.  
 
3.3.3.2. The identity of journey to Tanzania could be refined as a pilgrimage to the birth of 
human species and a tour for homage to natural sanctuary. In addition to having the 
pleasures of entertained excursions and delighted adventures the travelling to Tanzania 
could be itinerated so as to renew and awaken the human tradition of harmony with the 
nature and other living creatures. 
 
3.3.3.3. The natural assets and the inventory of tourism resources should be meticulously 
compiled and evaluated regularly as heritages blessed to whole mankind in terms of both 
absolute enumeration and relative qualitative value. In parallel with continued 
rehabilitation and conservation efforts, a sound and sustainable tourism program which 
attracts increased number of tourist from all over the world should be promoted. Based on 
extensive research and study, a comprehensive plan for revitalizing and propagating the 
healthy natural environment should be implemented together with the upgrading of the 
accommodation and other tourism services. The activities of research and study which are 
interdisciplinary and consolidated should be undergone not temporarily but on a 
permanent stewardship.  
 
3.3.3.4. The agenda of economic development is not included in the category of ‘Union 
Matters’. More than any other issues, however, subject of tourism development must be 
handled in a manner of union matters between the mainland of Tanzania and the 
Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. The group dynamism and system dynamics of 
tourism development could be well manifested in case a collaborative endeavor of the two 
facilitators is ensured.  
   
3.4. Education  
 
3.4.1. Educational Development Context 
 
3.4.1.1. At independence the formal education system of Tanzania operated at three levels 
without the provision of higher tertiary education: primary; middle; and secondary, each 
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with four standards of grades. A World Bank study published prior to independence in 
1960 showed that only 45 per cent of children at school age enrolled in Standard One.81 
Social equity and the policy of self-reliance were underpinning principles of Arusha in 
1967, which set out to provide adequate ‘Education for All’. Under the first phase of 
government, Tanzania had abolished fees in state schools and had built up an enviable 
reputation for comprehensible primary schooling. The approach was strengthened in 1974 
by policy that pushed rapidly towards Universal Primary Education(UPE) and universal 
literacy in the shortest possible time. The results were highly encouraging, upgrading the 
enrollment ration of children at primary school age to 93 per cent in 1979 and the literacy 
rate to 60 per cent from just 10 per cent in 1961.  
 
3.4.1.2. Yet by the early 1980s it proved that the programs for UPE could not be sustained 
anymore. The public expenditure could no longer support the massive investment in 
education due to the dwindled economy and its weakened financial capacity, also causing 
the declining public capital input into health. Together with the strategy of import 
substitution industrialization, the state control on major means of production spawned a 
multitude of inefficient parastatal organizations and public enterprises which made huge 
loss and accumulated surmounting debt. The further deterioration of the economy in the 
early 1980s made the government withdraw from heavy involvement in the education 
sector. There was a severe lack of resources throughout the system both in terms of 
quantity and quality. By 1995 the net enrollment ratio of primary school had fallen 
considerably to a little over 66 per cent.82 This fiasco also resulted in greater inequality of 
education provision in regions, income strata, and gender.   
 
3.4.1.3. In the course of introducing macro-economic policy reforms that emphasized, inter 
alia, increased role of the private sector, continued liberalization of the economy and 
increased investment in infrastructure, a review and structuring of the education and 
culture system was carried out and this led to the formulation of the Education and 
Training Policy(ETP) in 1995.The EPT and other socio-economic reforms brought some 
amendment toward the liberalization of education, formalization of pre-primary education, 
universal and compulsory primary education. The formulation of the Higher Education 
Policy was followed in 1997 and the Education Sector Development Programme(ESDP) 
was prepared in the same year for the implementation of the new policies. The ESDP was 
revised in 2001 in order to endorse the TDV 2020’s educational vision and the Tanzanian 
MDGs to eradicate poverty as well as the goals and targets of the MUKUKUTA. A 
comprehensive revision of the ESPD was carried in 2007 and the new ESPD covers the 
period of 2008 through 2017. In implementing the ESDP the Government launched the 
Primary Education Development Programme(PEDP) 2002-2006, and the Secondary 
Education Development Programme(SEDP) 2004-2009. The PEDP is now under the 
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implementation of the Phase 2 PEDP 2007-2011 and the process of developing a higher 
education development programme(2009-2014) is in the finalization stage.  
 
3.4.2. Educational Development Policy and Strategy 
 
3.4.2.1. Education is regarded as the one coherent entity, from basic to higher education. The 
components of Tanzania’s education sector includes pre-primary, primary, secondary, 
teacher education, adult and non-formal education, folk education, technical education and 
vocational training, and higher education. All sub-sectors falls under the authority of the 
parent ministry, the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MoVET) except for 
folk education sub-sector which falls under the Ministry of Community Development, 
Gender and Children (MCDGC). Delivery of pre-primary, primary and secondary 
education is on the hands of the local government authorities under the Prime Minister’s 
Office - Regional Administration and Local Government.  
 
3.4.2.2. In response to the TDV 2025, Tanzania’s education aims at creating ‘well educated, 
knowledgeable and skilled Tanzanian who can competently and competitively cope with 
political, social, economical and technological development challenges at national and 
international levels.’83 While a set of medium term development goals and targets are 
specified in the MKUKUTA 2005-2010, the policies and strategies for attaining those 
developmental progresses are defined in the new phase of ESDP 2008-2017 and the 
respective sub-sectoral development programmes. In achieving the goal of improving 
quality of life and social well-being, the educational sectors try to ensure equitable access 
to quality primary and secondary education for boys and girls, universal literacy among 
women and men and expansion of higher, technical and vocational education. The major 
operational targets are as follows; 
 
    A. Early Childhood 
• Increase in the number of young children for school and life 
    B. Primary Enrollment 
• Increased gross and net enrolment of boys and girls, including children with disabilities in 
primary schools from 90.5 per cent to 99 per cent by 2010  
C. Secondary Enrolment 
• At least 50 per cent of boys and girls aged 14~17 years are enrolled in ordinary level 
secondary schools by 2010  
• At least 25 per cent of boys and girls are enrolled in advance level secondary schools by 
2010 
D. Primary Achievement and Quality 
• Achieving an average daily attendance in primary schools of at least 85 per cent 
• At least 95 per cent of cohort complete standard 4 and 90 per cent of standard 7     
E. Secondary Achievement and Quality  
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• At least 70 per cent of girls and boys pass at Division 1-3 in Form 4 examination and girls 
• 90 per cent of primary and secondary schools have adequate, competent and skilled teachers 
by 2010  
F. Higher and Technical Education 
• Increased enrolment in higher and technical education in universities and in technical 
colleges to 30,000 full time students, 10,000 part time, and 15,000 distance learners by 2008  
G. HIV/AIDS 
• Effective HIV and AIDS education and life skills programmes offered in primary, secondary 
schools and teachers colleges  
H. Adult and Non-FORMAL Education and Culture 
• At least 80 per cent of adults, especially women in rural areas, are literate 
• Reduced number of illiterate adults from 3.8 million in 2004/05 to 1.5 million in 2007/08 
• Reduced number of young people involved in COBET (Complementary Basic Education in 
Tanzania) from 234,000 in 2004/05 to 70,566 in 2007/08 
• Expanded and improved public participation in cultural activities     
 
3.4.2.3. For the attainment of policy objectives encompassing the capacity building from 
educational information system, teaching talents and competence, teaching methods and 
environment to institutional development, the ESDP focuses on improving educational 
system function through:  
 
   (1) Achieving sector-wide harmonization and coordination through uniting educational activities 
within the stakeholder ministries; 
   (2) Activating the sub-sectors to ensure the intra- and inter-synchronization of Basic Education, 
Higher Education, Technical and Vocational Education and Training, and Folk Education;  
   (3) The participative development of rolling three-year plans within each of sub-sectors, each 
consistent with ESDP and aimed at enhancing that sub-sector within the broader education 
sector context; 
   (4) The delineation within sub-sectors of agreed objectively verifiable indicators in relation to 
outcomes within each key result area, including ‘unit costs per graduate’; 
   (5) The establishment of delivery strategies and actions that emphasize the achievement, 
improvement and evaluation of learning outcomes and outputs; 
   (6) The adoption of strategic planning and budgeting, including the reassessment on costs-benefits 
bases of current investment practices(such as teacher housing, laboratory and library 
construction, special schools for talented pupils, and student loans) examining alternative 
approaches and opportunities for public-private partnerships;  
   (7) The installation of an Education Sector Management Performance System for monitoring 
educational outputs and outcomes;  
   (8) Strengthening nationally controlled, locally delivered quality assurance systems; and  
   (9) Reviewing and modernizing school/college/institutional management. 
   
3.4.2.4. In primary education the achievements recorded during the implementation of PEDP 
2002-2006 were impressive. Though there remains a large room for enhancing the quality 
of the education, the figures realized are extra-ordinary. The Gross Enrollment Rate(GER) 
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and Net Enrollment Rate(NER) improved from 84 per cent and 66.5 per cent in 2001 to 
112.7 per cent and 96.1 per cent in 2006 respectively. The number of primary schools 
increased from 11,873 in 2001 to 14,700 in 2006. Transition rate from primary to 
secondary school increased from 22.4 per cent in 2001 to 49.3 per cent in 2005. And a 
total number of 50,800 under-qualified teachers have been upgrading professionally to 
attain the minimum qualifications for Grade A teachers. Almost attaining the MKUKUTA 
goal already, the PEDP 2 2007-2011, a medium term sub-sectoral programme of five 
years, focuses on quality enhancement through improved teaching approaches and 
methods in classrooms, ensured availability of quality teaching and learning resources, and 
strengthened support for maintaining educational standards.  
 
3.4.2.5. The Secondary Education Programme (SEDP) 2004-2009 outlines the framework for 
achieving greater access to secondary education while simultaneously tackling equity, 
quality, cross cutting and management issues at secondary level. The SEDP started 
operating using the normal local government budget funds and a credit from the World 
Bank. Activities for improving science and technical education which were supported by a 
credit from the African Development Bank (AfDB) were mainstreamed into the SEDP 
when the plan was operationalized. The secondary education gross enrollment ratio (Form 
1-6) increased from 7.5 per cent in 2003 to 26.1 per cent in 2008. The number of students 
that joined high school(advance secondary education) in public schools increased from 21, 
789 in 2007 to 25,240 in 2008, an increase of 16 per cent. Since the initiation of SEDP in 
2004 much has been achieved and the enthusiasm for expanded access and quality 
secondary education among the Tanzanian community has been awakened to the extent 
that improvement in strategies and targets are necessary to address the felt needs.  
 
3.4.2.6. Higher education sub-sector which is guided by the Higher Education Policy in 1999 
is in the process of developing a Higher Education Development Programme 2009-2014. 
This programme which addresses the objectives of the Educational Sector Development 
Programme (ESDP) is aimed at providing the nation with the critical mass of experts to 
realize Vision 2025 goals of making Tanzania a medium level industrialized country. In 
2007/2008 academic year a total of 82,428 students out of whom 25,342 were female and 
54,919 were male enrolled in higher learning institutes.  
 
3.4.2.7. The provision of technical and vocational education is directly linked to the goal 1 of 
cluster 2 of MKUKUTA which is in line with TDV 2025 and MDGs. The goal addresses 
the improvement of the quality of technical and vocational education as well as equitable 
access at all levels of the education and expansion of the education and training. There are 
922 VET(Vocational Education and Training) centres, of which 12 are Regional Training 
and Service Centres (RVTSCS) and 9 Vocational Training Centres (VTCs) managed by 
the Vocational Education and Training Authority (VETA). And there are currently a total 
of 210 technical institutions in the country which offer technical education programmes in 
different fields; Agriculture, natural resources and environment; business and 
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management; engineering and other sciences; health and allied science, and planning and 
planning and welfare. In 2007, a total of 120,644 attended long and short cources in 
different skills from public and non-public institutions. In 2007/08 a total of 47,079 
students were enrolled in technical education institutions, an increase of 17.5 per cent from 
the previous year.  
 
3.4.2.8. The educational sector is the top prioritized area of public investment alluring around 
one fifth of government expenditures. Tsh.1,430.4 billion was allocated for the educational 
sector in FY 2008/09, equivalent to 19.8 per cent of the total government budget. Among 
them the budget of the MoEVT accounts slightly over one third of the total educational 
sector budget allocation amounting Tsh.527.5 billion of which three fourth are for 
recurrent expenditures and the remains for development expenditures. A fully subsidized 
compulsory primary education is provided and similar supports for the secondary and 
higher education are being delivered through the public educational system. In addition to 
the whole provision of the school facilities and manpower, a fee subsidy amounting Tsh. 
13,485.2 per secondary student in FY 2007/08 was provided and an average amount of 
Tsh.11,340 and Tsh.2,242 respectively for government schools and non-government 
schools, Capitation Grant (CG) for purchasing teaching and learning materials were given 
to each student of the secondary schools. 
 
3.4.2.9. People’s high aspirations for education and the policy of D by D produced a cost-
sharing approach in primary and secondary education. For instance the construction of 
classrooms and the operation of the school board are being processed by the school 
authority in close collaboration with local community. The local community and students’ 
parents co-finance the classroom construction costs by rendering locally procured building 
materials and their labors. A cost sharing approach is being attempted in higher 
educational sector. The Higher Education Students Loan Board provides students in both 
public and private institutions in and outside the country with loans for tuition as well as 
school boarding.  
 
3.4.3. Educational Development Prospects 
 
3.4.3.1. The recent drive for promoting education which occupies the first priority of the 
nation’s development agenda remind us the heavy intervention made by the first phase 
government in the 1970s and 1980s. The global social democracy popular at that time 
emphasized the eradication of absolute poverty and the fulfillment of basic human 
needs(BHN) including food, education, health and housing. Both the international 
community and the recipient countries prepared a kind of basic needs strategy in which the 
provision of social services and the improvement of income distribution were sought for a 
prime objective of development. Embedded by its own inertia for socialist ideals and 
propelled by the internationally agreed agenda for development ‘MDGs’, Tanzania is in 
full swing for an accelerated investment in educational sector. Public expenditure for 
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educational development in FY 2008/09 accounts about 20 per cent of the nation’s 
government budget and this is equivalent to 5.58 per cent of GDP.84  
 
3.4.3.2. Owing to the increased investment in the educational sector, an outstanding 
performance is being made in recent years. It is assured that the goals of Tanzania’s 
MDGs in educational development are to be met years ahead of the targeted year 2015. A 
progressive programme for enhanced education is on the track with an added importance 
very recently. Some rapid expansion targets for the MoEVT include, but not limited to 
each village having a primary school and each ward having a secondary school. This 
expansion programme requires an increase in employment of ‘non-existent’ teachers. In 
line with the Teacher Development and Management Strategy (TDMS) 2004, THE 
Ministry has, as an emergency response, embarked on the Teacher Training Crash 
programme, a one year training course instead of the normal two years.85 Employing 
around 200,000 teachers nearly half of the government job, the education sector requires 
more than the existing number of pre-primary, primary and secondary teachers for the next 
five years up to 2012/13.86  
 
3.4.3.3. The commitment of the government is strong and is willing to meet the increasing 
demand for education at different levels the recent achievements has led to the public in 
recent years. And this requires even a greater sums and portion of public expenditures in 
the years to come, considering that the government has no clear strategy of shedding-off or 
burden-sharing of the cost for expanded educational services. The new phase of the ESDP 
which aims at enhancing the quality of education will bring an extra burden for financing 
in the sector. And certainly these may cause an apparent crowding effect affecting the 
resources allocation both financial and human to the productive sectors such as agriculture 
and other industries. And in the long-run, the aggressive programmes for promoting 
education could not be sustained as experienced earlier.  
 
3.4.3.4. The sheer expansion of education per se may bring a considerable positive effect 
conducive to socio-economic development of the nation in a loner-term perspective. 
However, the sub-sectoral educational programs carried out under the different time and 
independent framework may fail to bring an integrated outcome forwarded by a clustered 
approach pursuing the accelerated high growth of the economy. The very rapid expansion 
of the educational sector spearheaded by the government focusing on the promotion of 
public investment in education may incur a heavy fiscal burden for the recurrent 
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government expenditures in this sector in the long run, causing a crowding out effect on 
the other sectors of public investment. The highly increasing demand for educated 
manpower in need of new teachers also may bring a distortion of manpower supply in 
favor of the social sector over the industrial sector.  
  
3.5. Health  
 
3.5.1. Health Development Context 
 
3.5.1.1. Health provision is a basic human right; it also plays a vital role in the development 
of economies. A vibrant and robust workforce increases levels of productivity and 
efficiency, creating an attractive investment climate both domestically and internationally. 
In the course of earlier socialist development, the government focused heavily on 
providing free healthcare to all. In 1972 ‘private for profit’ was abolished, abandoning 
private healthcare schemes. Via a ‘basic needs’ approach, the government aimed to 
provide basic services to the whole population, using uniform population-based 
standards.87 The policies through the 1970s emphasized public spending on health. This 
revealed some positive outcomes of public health development. However, the impending 
economic crisis forced a major-appraisal of these policies. 
 
3.5.1.2. In 1991 the government reinstated the ‘private for profit’ policy, leading in recent 
years to the rapid growth of the private sector. While this has helped to expand the health 
service and increase flexibility, it has also exacerbated regional imbalance, particularly the 
rural-urban divide. This was followed in 1993 by the introduction of cost-sharing within 
public hospitals. The aim was to reduce the financial deficit in an attempt to recover costs, 
while improving the availability and quality of health services and increasing ownership 
and community participation.88 The Health Sector Reform (HSR) started in 1994 placed 
its focus in decentralization of health services; financial reforms, such as enhancement of 
user-charges in government hospitals, introduction of health insurance and community 
health funds and public/private partnership reforms such as encouragement of the private 
sector to complement public health service.89 However, health service depends heavily on 
public health care in terms of the number of health workers. The majority of health staff 
about 74 per cent works in the government health facilities, followed by faith-based 
facilities with a share of 22 per cent. Private facilities employ about three percent and 
parastatal owned facilities have one per cent of total workforce in the health sector.90   
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3.5.1.3. In spite of rehabilitation and reform measures for improving healthcare services 
during the 1990s, the health sector faced a period of stagnation. Local health services were 
characterized by severe shortages of essential drugs, equipment and supplies and 
deteriorating infrastructure and were plagued by poor management, lack of supervision 
and lack of staff motivation. The sector also faced stagnating and deteriorating hospital 
care. There were little cooperation in health service delivery between the public sector, 
faith-based organizations, and private service providers. Health services were severely 
under-funded, with public health sector spending at US$3.46 per capita. There was also 
little coordination of support to the health sector by development partners.91    
  
3.5.1.4. In advent of the new millennium the health sector received an added attention as an 
essential ingredient of poverty reduction and sustainable development. The nation’s 
development visions and the poverty reduction strategies put a high priority on health 
issues especially in reproductive health and HIV/AIDS. Of the eight of MDGs, three are 
entirely about health: (1) Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five 
infant mortality rate; (2) Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal 
mortality rate; and (3) Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and other major diseases. Under the umbrella of the MDGs and the 
TDV 2025, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the first generation poverty reduction 
strategic plan, and the consecutive strategic plan MKUKUTA 2005-2010, the second 
generation one, in which health issues are one of the prime concerns, are being carried out.  
 
3.5.1.5. For attaining the development goals and targets in health sector, specific policies, 
strategies work plan and programmes have been produced, which guide the 
implementation of activities in those areas: Health Sector Strategic Plan Phase One and 
Two; National HIV/AIDS Policy(2001); Health Education Strategic Plan(2003-2007); 
National Adolescent Health and Development Strategy(2004-2008); National Tuberculosis 
and Leprosy Programme (2004/05-2008/09); national Roadmap Strategic Plan to 
Accelerate the Reduction of Maternal and Newborn Deaths(2006-2010); National Malaria 
Medium Term Strategic Plan (2008-2013); Human Resources for Health Strategic Plan, 
etc.  
 
3.5.1.6. The government has formulated a new National Health Policy in 2007 replacing 1990 
policy. Ongoing socio-economic changes, new government directives, emerging and re-
emerging diseases and changes in science and technology necessitated the update of the 
policy. For the time being, a strategic planning process is under way for updating the 
existing Health Sector Strategic Plan Phase Two based on the Health Sector Policy 2007 
and the Joint External Evaluation on the Health Sector in Tanzania in 2007.  
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3.5.2. Health Policy and Development Strategy 
 
3.5.2.1. (Vision) The TDV 2025 identifies health as one of the priority sectors contributing to 
a higher quality livelihood for all Tanzanians. This is expected to be attained through 
strategies, which will ensure realization of the following health service goals:  
 
• Access to quality primary health care for all; 
• Access to quality reproductive health service for all individuals of appropriate ages; 
• Reduction in infant and maternal mortality rates by three quarters of current levels in 1998; 
• Universal access to clean water and safe water; 
• Life expectancy comparable to the level attained by typical middle-income countries; 
• Food self sufficiency and food security; and 
• Gender equality and empowerment of women in all health parameters.              
 
3.5.2.2. Perhaps influenced by the high priority given to health in the MDGs, and to facilitate 
the much-needed improvements within the sector, the MKUKUTA strategy attempts 
provide a long-term development approach to sustain efforts toward poverty reduction. 
The specific targets by 2010 are grouped under six main categories: infant and child 
health; child nutrition; maternal health; HIV/AIDS; and human resources and 
management. And some of them are as follows: 
 
  (1) Infant and Child Health 
• Reduced infant mortality from 95 in 2002 to 50 in 2010 per 1,000 live births 
• Reduced child under five mortality from 154 to 79 in 2010 
  (2) Child Nutrition 
• Reduced prevalence of stunt in under fives from 43.8 per cent to 20 per cent in 2010 
  (3) Maternal Health 
• Reduced maternal mortality from 529 to 265 in 2010 per 100,000 
• Increased coverage of births attended by trained personnel from 50 per cent to 80 percent  
  (4) HIV/AIDS 
• Reduced HIV prevalence among 15-24 year old pregnant women from 11 per cent to 5 per 
cent in 2010  
  (5) Human Resources and Management 
• Health Boards and Facility Committees in place and operation in all districts 
• Service delivery agreements operational and effective 
  
3.5.2.3. The objectives of new Health Sector Policy 2007 focuses on health services for those 
most at risk and the needs of the citizens in order the lifespan of all Tanzanians. 
Specifically the government aims to:  
 
  (1) To reduce morbidity and mortality in order to increase the lifespan of all Tanzanians by 
providing quality health care;  
  (2) To ensure that basic health services are available and accessible;   
  (3) To prevent and control communicable and non-communicable diseases; 
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  (4) To sensitize the citizens about the preventable diseases;  
  (5) To create awareness to individual citizen on his/her responsibility on his/her health and health 
of the family; 
  (6) To improve partnership between public sector, private sector, religious institutions, civil society 
and community in provision of health services; 
  (7) To plan, train, and increase the number of competent health staff; 
  (8) To identifies and maintain the infrastructures and medical equipment; and 
  (9) To review and evaluate health policy, guidelines, laws and standards for provision of health 
services.   
 
3.5.2.4. In 2007 the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW) developed the Primary 
Health Care Service Development Programme 2007-2017 known as MMAM in Kiswahili 
acronym. The objective of the Programme is to accelerate the provision of primary health 
care services for all by 2012, while during the remaining five years of the programme 
consolidation will be achieved. The third phase of Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP) 
2009-2015 which is under preparation has developed a strategic framework in four 
dimensions; (1) Types of services; (2) Levels in the health sector; (3) Development 
strategies; and (4) Crosscutting issues, which each serve as entry point for addressing key 
strategic choices, and which together result in one consistent strategic plan.  
 
   (1) Types of services - Health promotion; Preventive health services; Care and treatment; 
Rehabilitation services; and Services to the chronically ill 
  (2) Levels in the health sector - Council health services in district or municipality; Regional health 
services; and National level services 
(3) Eleven development strategies – (1) District Health Service; (2) Referral Hospital Service; (3) 
Central Support; (4) Human Resources for Health; (5) Health Care Financing; (6) Public 
Private Partnership; (7) Maternal, Newborn and Child Health; (8) Disease Prevention and 
Control; (9) Emergency Preparedness; (10) Social Welfare and Social Protection; (11) 
Monitoring and Evaluation. 
(4) Crosscutting issues – quality; equity; gender sensitivity; community ownership; coherence; 
and complementary in governance.  
 
3.5.2.5. Most of the health programs including HIV/AIDS strategies are funded by the 
government expenditures, partly financed by development partners both on-budget and 
off-budget. In recognition of surmounting needs for public health spending, the 
government tries to target resources to the priority interventions and to find out some 
alternatives for shedding off the costs borne by the public sector. The first approach is the 
initiative of cost sharing in government health facilities through the Community Health 
Funds (CHF) and National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF). This approach includes the 
receipt of user fees and the operation of Drug Revolving Fund. The second attempt is the 
application of Public Private Partnership (PPP) collaboration by which it is expected that 
an increased participation and contribution of the private sector in achieving accesses to 
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health services will be encouraged and equality between players will be created through a 
common accreditation for government and private sector.        
 
3.5.3. Health Development Prospects 
 
3.5.3.1. As in the case of the educational sector development, a high priority is placed on the 
health care services, fueling more than 10 per cent of the nation’s government budget into 
the health sector. 92  The health sector is one of the two pillars which ensure the 
improvement of quality of life and social well-being. Over the years positive trends on 
different health indicators have been seen with a decreasing rate of child and infant 
mortalities. Other positive developments have been seen concerning the coverage of child 
immunization and vitamin A supplementation. Contrary almost three third of children 
under five are anemic and chronic malnutrition is still common.93 And the recently 
disclosed data are disappointing. According to the HBS 2007, the proportion of people 
who reported being sick or injured in the last four weeks of the survey did not change 
compared to 2000/01 HBS. The proportion of people who reported that they consulted a 
health service provider for this sickness or injury also remained unchanged.94 
 
3.5.3.2. MMAM, the Primary Health Care Service Development Programme 2007 -2017 as 
well as the draft third phase Health Sector Strategic Plan focuses on strengthening the 
health systems, rehabilitation, human resource development, the referral system, health 
sector financing and the provision of medicines, equipment and supplies. The first element 
of the Programme is to increase the workforce in health by upgrading the throughput in the 
existing training institutions by 100 per cent. The rehabilitation of existing health facilities 
and construction of new ones is planned as well as improving the outreach services. This 
includes 8,108 primary health facilities, 62 district hospitals, 128 training institutions by 
year 2012. 95  The referral system is to be strengthened by improving information 
communication system and transport. The Programme will address the new Health Policy 
2007 and the health related MDGs in the areas of maternal health and priority diseases. 
However, the programme costs are estimated to be around 9.66 trillion shillings, which are 
far beyond of the presently available budget range.96 
 
3.5.3.3. In recent years public investment in health sector has been expanded considerably 
both in terms of value and the portion of government expenditure. The proportion of 
health spending in FY 2008/09 government budget accounts for 11.1 per cent increasing 
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significantly from 9.7 per cent in 2007/08. The figure may reach 13 per cent in case the 
Consolidated Fund Service charges are included. Tanzania is apparently on track to 
meeting the 15 per cent target under the Abuja Declaration.97 As same as the case of 
education, the emphasis on the health sector will certainly burden the government treasury 
by increasing the development expenditures and the recurrent costs as well. And even with 
increased portion of government spending on health, the expansion of quality health care 
seems not feasible if not an aggressive burden-sharing and shedding-off initiative, a kind 
of health sector privatization program, is taken immediately.    
 
3.6. Economic and Social Infrastructure Development 
 
3.6.1. Overview 
 
3.6.1.1. Infrastructure development is a pivotal sector that plays a critical role in the growth 
of the national economy. It enables the industries to invest and produce, facilitates trade, 
contributes to national integration, and provides access to jobs, health, education and other 
activities and facilities. All socio-economic sectors and activities are dependent both on 
physical and infrastructures such as road, railway, electricity, telecommunications and 
information technology, water supply system, etc., and economic and social infrastructures 
including manpower, institutional system of innovation, and research and development 
(R/D) as well as education and health services. Investment in physical and socio-economic 
infrastructure development is required ahead of industrial and productive sector 
investment. And the virtuous circle of infrastructure investment, socio-economic growth 
and development should be sustained, going hand in hand. Infrastructure development is 
the backbone of providing enabling environments for investment promotion and economic 
empowerment.   
 
3.6.1.2. The lack of physical infrastructures and the weakness of socio-economic 
infrastructures simply explain the contemporary conditions of the Tanzania’s economy 
and the status of socio-economic development. Of Tanzania’s 124 airports or airstrips, 114 
of them have yet to have their runways paved; and of the existing 79,000 kilometers of 
road, more than 72,000 kilometers are unpaved to say nothing of many thousands of 
kilometers of new road which remains to be built.98 Though the use of wireless solutions 
and the implementation of new fixed-line infrastructure mean that number is continuing to 
grow, internet access in the country is limited to 1 per cent of the population.99 Around 
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700 thousand households are benefitted from the supply of electricity, just 10 per cent of 
the whole households. Less than 2 per cent of the people in rural areas are the beneficiaries 
of having electricity. Largely dependent on renewable bio-mass energy sources, the 
electricity accounts only 1.2. per cent of the total energy consumption. The investment in 
research and development is negligible, not more than 0.3 per cent proportion of R & D 
expenditures to GDP. 
 
3.6.2. Transportation 
 
3.6.2.1. Tanzania’s transport network not only facilitates the movement of people and trade 
within the country, it serves as an essential conduit to international markets for goods to 
and from neighboring land-locked countries Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda and 
Zambia. The country’s roads, rail network, air links and ports are undergoing 
modernization in partnership with international public and private investors. Considerable 
investment in the road networks is planned in the immediate future, with the help of 
development funds from, among others, Millennium Challenge Corporation. Privatization 
of the country’s major rail networks is on going, with the Indian company RITES taking 
over management of the Tanzania Railway Corporation (TRC) in 2007.100  
 
3.6.2.2. Up to 2002 the emphasis was placed on road transportation. Two consecutive 
Integrated Road Projects Plans (IRPP) were implemented from 1991 to 2002. In 2002 the 
government formulated the National Transportation Policy which aims to develop safe, 
reliable, effective, efficient and fully integrated transport infrastructure and operation in 
the country. In order to encourage the development of the transport sector, the government 
is implementing the Transport Sector Investment Programme (TSIP), which commenced 
in 2006 and will run until 2016. Unlike the previous segregated sub-sectoral approaches, 
the TSIP adopts a sector-wide approach encompassing major systems of transport: road, 
railway, and marine and air transportation. The investment is focused on strengthening the 
four main corridors connecting the coastal major port cities to the interior regions of the 
nation and the neighboring land-locked countries: (1) The Dar es Salaam Corridor; (2) The 
Central Corridor; (3) The Tanga Corridor; and (4) The Mtwara Corridor.  
 
3.6.2.3. Many challenges are ahead in implementing the TSIP, a two five-year step 
programme. Among others, the inadequacy of financing for investment and maintenance is 
the most acute constraint. The government tries to facilitate the mobilization of local and 
external resources, by increasing public investment in this sector on the one hand and 
introducing various schemes for private sector engagement including Build Operate and 
Transfer (BOT), Build Own Operate and Transfer (BOOT), etc. Allocation of funds to the 
transport sector has increased from Tsh.215.5 million in 2001/02 to Tsh.687.1 million in 
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2007/08. The road infrastructure only accounts for 13.0 per cent of the government 
expenditure amounting to Tsh.973.4 billion in FY 2008/09. However, funds are far short 
of the TSIP implementation. Of US$6.2 billion required for the 1st step of TSIP 
investment, US$ 2.5 billion, only 40 per cent of the requirements have been secured. 
 
3.6.3. Telecommunications and IT 
 
3.6.3.1. Telecommunications and IT in Tanzania constitute one of the most dynamic sectors 
of the economy and communication infrastructure in the country is developing rapidly. 
The government policy of liberalization and deregulation, as well as its innovative 
licensing regime, has encouraged the entrance of new participants into the market.101 The 
mobile market is experiencing particularly rapid growth – in 2007, the number of mobile 
phone customers increased to 8.4 million from 5.6 million in 2006, equivalent to an 
increase of 50 percent.102 As far as the telecommunications concerned, Tanzania is 
skipping the conventional development stage of universal access to land lines. The number 
of land line subscribers was around 146 thousands, far less than the number of mobile 
subscribers.  
 
3.6.3.2. If noting the 1974 Prohibition Order on Electronic Computers and Television Sets, 
Tanzania achieved notable progress in deploying information and communications 
technologies (ICT) and providing ICT-related services. It was only in 1997 that the 
National Telecommunications Policy (NTP) was formulated following the enactment of 
the Communications Act in 1993. The policy allowed a partial liberalization and 
deregulation of the telecommunication sector in parallel with the privatization process of 
the sector in 1990s. The National Information and Communications Technologies Policy 
of 2003 replacing the NTP of 1997 deploys a broad-based strategy to address the sector-
wide challenges Tanzania is facing. The new policy stipulates ten main focus areas in 
harnessing ICT in Tanzania which include strategic ICT leadership; ICT infrastructure; 
ICT industry; human capital; legal and regulatory framework; productive sectors; service 
sectors; public services; local content; and universal access. Among the policy objectives 
and statements of each main focus area, the role of the government as a powerful 
development facilitator, and the active involvement of the private sector in ICT industrial 
development were emphasized.  
 
3.6.3.3. ICT is both cross-sectoral and a sector in its own right. ICT policy has to relate to the 
most other sector policies and the deployment of ICT in any sectors or areas affects 
profoundly in their activity operation and institutional management. And the application of 
ICT became indispensable from government to private and from developed nations to 
developing countries. It means that the construction of ICT infrastructure and the 
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application of ICT throughout the entire economy are of paramount importance and the 
facilitation of corresponding enabling environments and regulatory framework are also 
becoming increasingly more important than ever before. All MDAs (Ministries, 
Departments and Agencies) are eager to introduce their own ICT application and 
promotional programs with their different standards and qualifications. However, since the 
new ICT policy was launched in 2003, the subsequent implementation plan or strategy of 
this policy was not properly developed. That seems partly because the government leave 
matters of ICT development to the liberalized environment and the private sector too much 
and also because the responsible policy authority was not be able to secure the policy 
coherence and integrity due to the repeated change of the ICT development stewardship. 
The policy mandate of the government was given to the Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Communications away from the Ministry of Communications and Transport, then now to 
the Ministry of Communications, Science and Technology.  
 
3.6.4. Energy and Electricity 
 
3.6.4.1. The energy consumption level of Tanzania is very low and the structure of energy 
sources is highly sustainable, heavily dependent on renewable energy sources such as bio-
mass and hydropower. Bio-massed fuel such charcoal and firewood accounts for around 
90 per cent of primary energy supply. Commercial energy sources i.e., petroleum and 
electricity, account for about 8 per cent and 1.2 per cent respectively of the primary energy 
used. Coal, solar and wind energy contributes less than 1 per cent of energy used. 
Tanzania’s electricity market is still in its infancy, with little more than 10 per cent of the 
population having daily access to it. Only 2 per cent of the rural population benefits from 
electric power supply.     
 
3.6.4.2. Most of the indigenous energy sources which are abundant are not appropriately 
tapped for development so far. Oil exploitation projects is on-going and other indigenous 
energy sources include forests, hydropower, coal, natural gas, uranium, and renewable 
alternative energy sources such as solar, wind and geothermal. Tanzania has forest area of 
about 35.5 million hectares. Hydro potential is estimated at 4.7 GW (Giga Watt), of which 
only 12 per cent is developed. Coal reserves are estimated at about 1,200 million tones, of 
which 304 million tones are proven. Natural gas was discovered in 1977 with reserves 
estimated at some 737 billion cubic feet. Nearly thirty years after the discovery of natural 
gas, first electricity was generated from gas produced in Tanzania. With discovering a 
second well of significant gas reserves, it is hoped that Tanzania could signal an end to 
over dependence on unreliable hydro-electricity and costly imported fuel oil.  
 
3.6.4.3. The National Energy Policy revised in 2003 retains the objective of the 1992 
National Energy Policy which aims to provide an input in the development process by 
establishing an efficient energy production, procurement, transportation, distribution, and 
end-user systems in an environmentally sound manner. The new policy focuses on market 
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mechanisms and means to reach the objective, and achieve an efficient energy sector with 
a balance between national and commercial interests.103 And the plan gave priority to 
power generation capacity based on indigenous energy resources. In the context of 
privatization drive, the role of the Tanzania Electric Supply Company (TANESCO) has 
been adjusted mainly for the buying, transmission, distribution and sale of electricity 
nation-wide. By introducing independent power producers (IPPs) system, Tanzania 
encourages the private investors to invest in electric power generation projects of their 
own. TANESCO buys electricity from the Independent Power Tanzania Limited (IPTL) 
and IPPs, and sells it to the customers with ‘pay-before-use’ payment system just similar 
to that of mobile phone payment.  
 
3.6.4.4. Domestic energy demand has grown rapidly due to population growth and the 
increase in economic activities in recent years. With positive prospect of the Tanzanian 
economy in years to follow, the demand of energy will increase higher than the expected 
rate of economic growth. The high elasticity of electricity consumption will bring a 
substantial increase of electricity demand which already surpasses the capacity of reliable 
supply. In order to meet the energy demand in a longer term perspective an intensive long-
term plan for development of electric power sources based on a progressive forecast of 
energy and power demand should be developed and implemented immediately. One of the 
alternatives for securing the sources of stable and economic power generation could be the 
development of nuclear power. Tanzania has uranium deposits, the primary sources of 
atomic energy and nuclear power is one of the lowest in its production costs. It is to be 
seen whether the development stewardship which is somewhat segregated and rendered to 
the private sector according to the privatization and liberalization policy would work well 
or not in addressing the challenges of constructing infrastructures and modernizing 
distributional logistics as well as rural electrification.           
 
3.6.5. Human Resources and Institutional Capacity Development 
 
3.6.5.1. All history as well as all current experience points out to the fact that it is man and 
the human, not material and the nature which provides the primary source of progress and 
advancement and that the key factor to all economic development comes out of the mind 
of man. Human resource formation, the human and social infrastructure, seems to be the 
single most important contributor to growth. Of all endowments, human capital probably 
does most to fuel long-term economic growth. Simply put, countries with human capacity 
grow faster. And socio-economic systems and institutions are the culmination of human 
capacity through which progress or retreat is made and reform and innovation are 
generated as well. The well-educated and trained people are the base of institutional 
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capacity by which systems and institutions are working and all the resources are mobilized 
and applied for better performance. 
 
3.6.5.2. Amid abundant natural resources and physical endowments, what Tanzania lacks 
most seems the educated and motivated human resources notwithstanding insufficiency of 
financial resources. Despite the rapid expansion of the education system and the universal 
primary education in the past decades, human resources remain largely underdeveloped. 
Not many of the working population have adequate knowledge and skills to meet the 
demand of rapid socio-economic development. Obsessed by the paramount objective of 
the educational MDGs the focus of education has been placed the expansion of school 
facilities in primary and secondary level. Under the umbrella of 1995 Education and 
Training Policy the approach of sub-sectoral development was adopted implementing sub-
sectoral programs such as the PEDP, the SEDP, the Higher and Technical Education 
Development Programme and the Teacher Development and Management Strategy. The 
concept of human resources development in some strategic industries or areas is newly 
forming in recent years.  
 
3.6.5.3. The Tanzanian government acknowledges the important reality that “people are the 
most valuable asset of any organization.”104 Based on the understanding of the need for 
human resources development in some strategic sectors the government began to take a 
piece-meal approach to meet immediate mid-term objectives. PO-PSM (President’s Office 
– Public Service Management) places great emphasis on improvement of human resource 
management and capacity development in the public sector. During the 1st phase of PRSP 
(2000-2007), a wide-range of tools and processes were created and rolled out to MDAs to 
manage the HRD process. Both the Teacher Development and Management Strategy 
2006-2013 and the Human Resources for Health Strategic Plan 2008-2013 recognize that 
the two sectors are facing a serious need for human resource development. However, this 
kind of independent emergency measures may bring a crowding-out effect on the other 
sectors by misallocating the scarce resources. A strategic program for human resources 
development both in public and private sector inter-linked closely with the socio-economic 
policy and employment strategy as well as education and vocational training policy should 
be developed. An extensive survey and research on manpower and the demand of 
workforce is advised to be carried out so as the results could be used as reference data. 
  
3.6.6. Innovation, Research and Development 
 
3.6.6.1. It seems not easy to grasp the landscape of Tanzania’s science and technology since 
the concept of innovation is yet premature and the level of R&D is also beyond concrete 
apprehension. During the time the popular subject of debate, development policy and 
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strategy was reform, governance, growth and poverty reduction, education and health, 
development finance, and private sector empowerment. It was rare and beyond reach that 
the subjects searching for the essential factors or driving forces of successful reform, good 
governance, and socio-economic progress were on the table of debate and discussion. If I 
count just three of the factors or forces, they might be leadership, human resources and 
science and technology. It is the time to think and talk more about those issues, not the 
results we enjoy, but the ways and means of those accomplishments. In particular, science 
and technology is what makes a country superior to others. And it is an important tool to 
bring about development.  
 
3.6.6.2. The National Science and Technology Policy for Tanzania projected in 1996 
acknowledges the critical importance of science and technology as well as research and 
development through which innovation and technological progress are achieved. The 
revised policy based on the review on the previous National Science and Technology 
Policy of 1985 identified resources limitation as the primary constraint of poor 
performance. The lack of financial and human resources as well as institutional capacity 
for research and development considered as hindrance the nation could not have 
overcome. Then the later policy set up the target of R&D investment and designed specific 
objectives and strategies of science and technology promotion in major sectors: (1) Food 
and agriculture; (2) Industry; (3) Energy; (4) Natural Resources; (5) Environment; (6) 
Health, Sanitation and Population Planning; (7) Transport and Communication; and (8) 
Science and Technology Education and Manpower. The initial target of investment was 
the allocation of funds for scientific research and technological development about 1 per 
cent of GDP by the year 2000. Currently the target is upgraded up to 1.5 per cent by 2011 
in the Ministry’s MTEF 2008/09-2010/11.  
 
3.6.6.3. It is generally recognized that the stages of science and technology development 
begins from imitation and proceeds to internalization, then to generation.105 Imitation 
through acquisition and assimilation is the most prevalent policy of science and 
technology development in the stage of economic take-off and semi-industrial 
development. Importation of intermediate technology, transfer of technologies through 
international development projects and foreign direct investment are the practical means of 
acquisition and assimilation. A gradual approach of research and development is 
indispensible even though the late-comer’s advantages are fully utilized. Tanzania’s 
science and technology policy does not pay attention to this simple but crucial aspect of 
R&D strategy. It is estimated that expenditures for R&D are meager 0.3 per cent of GDP 
far below than the target. 
 
3.7. Rural and Regional Development 
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3.7.1. There seems to be several categories of ‘region’ according to how the concept of region 
is defined. Most of all, the United Republic of Tanzania consists of the two administrative 
territories, the Tanzania Mainland, the former Tanganyika, and Zanzibar comprising 
Unguja and Pemba Island. Though Zanzibar is small in its land size and the number of 
constituents106, the entity of Zanzibar retains a particular significance in the nation’s unity 
and polity. In terms of agriculture the country is parceled into 7 agro-ecological zones 
mainly characterized by their climate and topographic features. 107  For efficient 
administration of education, the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training divides 
the mainland into 12 educational administrative regions accounting the socio-economic 
regionalism and their localities. For protection and conservation of natural resources and 
wildlife, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism focuses on the designated 
Protected Areas (PAs), around one fourth of the land area including national parks, game 
reserves, and conservation areas. 
 
3.7.2. Tanzania is administratively divided into 26 regions: 21 regions in the mainland and 5 
in Zanzibar. Regions are divided into districts which are then sub-divided into wards. 
Villages are the basic unit of regional community, but as far as Central Government is 
concerned ward is the basic administrative unit. The local government authorities on the 
other hand are separated into rural and urban authorities. Urban authorities consists of 
City, Municipal and Town Councils whereas the rural councils include all district councils 
with Township Council and Village Council Authorities. In Mainland Tanzania there are 
133 district-level authorities, rural and urban. 50,836 Kitongojis make 10,397 Villages 
throughout the mainland.   
 
3.7.3. Tanzania is still basically a largely agrarian society. Around 80 per cent of the people 
live in rural areas. For most of the time regional development meant rural development. In 
earlier period of national development, Ujamaa, a massive and extensive movement of 
community development was initiated by the nation’s leadership. The nation-wide 
movement aimed both the consolidation and unity of Tanzania’s multi-racial and diverse 
society and the development of rural region into modern communities from tribal and 
clans’ villages. The government-led mega project which cost lots of investment and 
administrative effort could not be able to be sustained and produced a profound counter-
response. Mistrusts in government intervention and centrally-initiated program led to the 
change of the mode the government administers and the development programs are carried 
out. In the course of economic transition and government reform in 1980s and 1990s the 
role of the central government had been reviewed and a comprehensive restructuring 
program was implemented toward economic liberalization and empowerment of the 
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private sector. Regarding government administration the policy of deregulation and 
decentralization was adopted.  
 
3.7.4. Under the new regime of reform and market-oriented economy, the policy and strategy 
of rural and regional development are undergoing in two directions. The first one is the 
program of poverty reduction which is pro-poor and rural-oriented. Major socio-economic 
development programs are targeting the improvement of social welfare and livelihood of 
the rural poor in the district level. The focus of the MMAM, PEDP and SEDP, SMEDP, 
and ASDP, of course, is placed on the rural area in the district region where the majority 
of the people are living. The other is the policy of D by D, by which the mode of regional 
administration and local governance is determining and every program for regional and 
community development is formulated and implemented.108 
 
3.7.5. The Prime Minister’s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-
RALG) is responsible for policy formulation, coordination, standard setting for quality 
assurance, etc. The core policy program of PMO-RALG is the Local Government Reform 
Program (LGRP) which is now in the 1st year of the Phase Two(2) from 2008 to 2012. 
Actually the program is an executive plan of D by D Policy and aims to facilitate the role 
and function of the local government authorities so as to build capacity and further take 
charge of the responsibilities. Other key programs under PMO-RALG includes Local 
Government Support Program (LGSP), Local Government Transport Program(LGTP), 
and Village Travel and Transport Program(VTTP). In order to address disparities among 
the regions and districts a formula based resource allocation system has been developed 
under which disadvantaged regions get more resources.109  
 
3.7.6. Though the local autonomy and administrative capacity are secured in a great extent 
due to the decentralization and devolution process, the financial plans of the local 
government authorities depend heavily on financial support from the central government 
and development partners. The base of local tax revenues is very weak and mobilizes only 
5 per cent of local government budget expenditure. Around 95 per cent of the expenditure 
are financed by transfer from central government and external assistance of development 
partners.  
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III. Korea’s Experience and Tanzania’s Development Strategy110 
 
1. Development Experiences: The Korean Case 
 
1.1. Introduction 
  
1.1.1. It is widely recognized that Korea's economic accomplishment was remarkable 
especially in its earlier stage of development in the 1960s and 1970s. From a subsistent 
heavily-agrarian economy, Korea transformed itself into one of the outstanding newly 
industrializing countries(NICs) in the late 1970s, within less than two decades since the 
launch of an aggressive strategy for national development in the early 1960s.  
    
1.1.2. The sources of Korea's economic success cannot be attributed to one or two prominent 
factors or inputs. It was a result of a complex and dynamic process in which a number of 
                                            
110
 This Chapter is the summary of an extensive research study on Korea’s development experience 
and international cooperation titled Development Assistance and Cooperation to Korea(In 
Korean) conducted in 2004 by Lee Kyong Koo, a senior research fellow of the Korea 
International Cooperation Agency.   
 
   
 
 
71
factors were interwoven and integrated and every factor was marshaled to contribute to 
attain the prime objective of economic and social advancement.  
   
1.1.3. Factors contributing to Korea's successful social and economic development, political 
democratization, and growth of civil society have been labeled and explored as sources of 
one of the world's most impressive examples of post-World War Ⅱ development. The 
most significant factor was the free market economy where an ardent desire for 
development and growth can be freely pursued. In addition, political and social stability, 
outward-looking development strategies, a strong leadership committed to national 
advancement and dynamic entrepreneurship in the private sector should all be taken into 
account for that extra-ordinary achievement. Pro-growth socio-economic policy based 
upon free trade and investment along with great emphasis on education and human 
resources development made the war-stricken and resource-scant poor country able to 
build development capacity and to become a nation stepping into the ranks of other 
developed nations.   
    
1.1.4. Another indispensable factor for success was the international community's support of 
Koreans and their development efforts. Korea had received a substantial amount of 
development assistance. While the country was experiencing severe hardship and was in 
dire need of help, the international community was generous enough to extend a helping 
hand, for which all Koreans were, and still are, thankful. International development 
cooperation forwarded to the Korean people decades ago, nearly forgotten from their 
memories nowadays, once was a lifeline for survival and became the stepping stone for a 
new beginning for the nation's building and progress.  
    
1.1.5. Korea is now standing as an emerging donor in the international community.111 
However, not long ago the nation was a heavy recipient of foreign assistance. Through 
such aid, Korea adopted various techniques, know-how and institutions introduced by 
developed countries and acquired the necessary investment and technology needed for its 
development. 
  
1.1.6. In the early phase of the period now referred as the “Development Decades”, the years 
leading up to the 1960s and 1970s including the nation’s founding years in the 1950s, 
development assistance and cooperation provided from the international community was 
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crucial in laying the foundation and building a framework for social and economic 
advancement.  
   
1.2. Korea's Indebtedness: Development Assistance and Cooperation 
 
1.2.1. Koreans received various forms of emergency relief and development assistance. 
While grant aid over the late 1940s and 1950s was the sole dependable source of foreign 
exchange and daily necessities, foreign assistance after the early 1960s was a major source 
of capital for investment as well as a channel for the introduction of management skills and 
industrial technology. The forms and modalities of assistance were different and modified 
in accordance with the needs and requests of the recipient. Heavy reliance on external aid 
in the early years of development was gradually decreased in the early 1970s.  
    
1.2.2. In the early years of the nation's foundation, Korea survived by receiving foreign aid. 
The lack of electricity caused by the division of the peninsula in 1948 was supplied for 
many years by the electricity generation ship sent by the United States. Basic daily 
necessities such as clothing, fuel, medical supplies and food were provided through UN 
agencies and international NGOs during and after the Korean War. For the reconstruction 
and stabilization of the devastated economy, a substantial amount of financial assistance 
was channeled to the nation's treasury.  
    
1.2.3. When Korea launched an aggressive outward-looking development strategy in the early 
1960s, development assistance was the sole source of investment for business promotion, 
research and development, and infrastructure. Owing to the initiatives taken by the political 
leadership, a bulk of the external aid was channeled into various sectors of the economy.  
 
 
 
Table 6: Foreign Aid to Korea 
 
Classifications Period Notes 
(1) Assistance by 
USAMGIK¹ 1945~1949 
○GARIOA (Government Appropriations for Relief in 
Occupied Area) assistance 
(2) War Relief and 
Reconstruction 1950~1960 
○Emergency aid during the Korean War(1950~1953) by 
UNCURK², CRIK(Civil Relief in Korea) and 
UNKRA³ 
○Aid for reconstruction and economic recovery by the 
United States and the UN 
(3) Development 
Assistance in the 
Earlier Decades 
1961~1975 
○Bilateral development assistance by the United States, 
Japan, West Germany, etc  
○Multilateral development assistance by UNDP, IDA⁴, 
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WFP, ADF, IBRD, etc 
(4) Development 
Assistance in the 
Later Decades 
1976~1990 
○Graduated from IDA assistance in 1975 
○Graduated from USAID assistance eligibility in 1976 
○Introduction of large-scale development and structural 
adjustment loans  
(5) Transition from 
Recipient to 
Emerging Donor 
1991~2000 
○Transition to NCC(net contributor country) of technical 
assistance in 1991(UNDP) 
○Establishment of KOICA(Korea International 
Cooperation Agency) in 1991 
○Graduated from the World Bank assistance eligibility 
1n 1995 
Note: 1 The US Army Military Government in Korea 
2 UN Commission for the Reunification and Rehabilitation of Korea 
 3 UN Relief and Reconstruction Agency 
4 International Development Association(IDA) 
  
1.2.4. Over the course of rigorous investment in the nations socio-economic development 
under consecutive five-year plans up to the 1980s, numerous projects and programs were 
executed within the bilateral and multilateral frameworks of international development 
assistance. Plants, equipment and machinery as well as techniques and industrial 
technology were transferred and filled the gap of capital and technology. Consulting and 
training services were provided and help for the building of institutions strengthening the 
development capacity of the public and private sectors. Thousands of Peace Corps 
volunteers worked for schools, hospitals, and social charity organizations from the late 
1960s to early 1980s.   
    
1.2.5. Large structural adjustment loans were provided though the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund when the nation underwent massive structural reform during 
the financial crisis of the early 1980s and late 1990s. The only form of assistance Korea 
had not received was debt relief and rescheduling. As far as international cooperation is 
concerned, Korea is a living museum of development assistance.  
    
1.2.6. Statistics show that Korea had received development assistance worth US$13,976 
million until the nation's status graduated to a developing country receiving aid in 2000.112 
Some US$12,776 million or 91.4% had been channeled through official development 
assistance (ODA). This included development loans which were concessional. The 
remaining US$1,200 million was extended through private individual Donors and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). Public development loans and non-concessional 
loans totaled US$31,196 million.  
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Table 7: Development Assistance and Public Finance to Korea 
(Unit: US$ in millions)   
Development Assistance Public Finance 
Non-concessional ODA Assistance by NGOs Total 
12,776 1,200 13,976 31,196 
Source: Lee Kyong Koo, Development Assistance and Cooperation to Korea(In Korean), 
The Korea International Cooperation Agency, 2004  
 
1.2.7. Among the US$12,776 million in ODA received by Korea, approximately 55% or 
US$6,997 million were grants and the remaining US$5,779 million were concessional 
loans. 93% of the total ODA or US$11,808 million were bilateral with the remaining 
US$968 million being multilateral aid. 
 
Table 8: Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Korea 
(Unit: US$ in millions) 
Classification Volume Composition (%) 
By Type 
Grants 6,997.5 54.8 
Loan 5,778.8 45.2 
By Donor Bilateral 11,808.0 92.4 
Multilateral 968.3 7.6 
Total 12,776.3 100.0 
Source: op. cit.  
 
1.2.8. Considering that grants were provided in various forms and through numerous 
channels, it is quite difficult to break them down by sector. Grant aid was extended for 
various programs and projects for the provision of commodities, machinery, and/or 
equipment, and provision of consulting and training services. 
 
Table 9: Public Loans to Korea by Sector  
                                                                          (Unit: Installations, US$ in millions)  
Agriculture 
Fisheries, 
Mining 
Private 
Enterprise 
SME 
Promotion Housing Health Environment 
Education / 
R & D 
1,706 
(4.3) 
4,941 
(12.5) 
761 
(1.9) 
576 
(1.5) 
550 
(1.4) 
221 
(0.6) 
1,734 
(4.4) 
Regional 
Development 
Structural 
Adjustment SOC 
Food / 
Commodities Others Total 
1,338 11,554 12,929 2,153 889 39,341 
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(3.4) (29.4) (32.9) (5.5) (2.2) (100.0) 
Note: % of proportion in parenthesis  
Source: op. cit.  
 
1.2.9. Nevertheless, statistics show that about US$5,527 million or 15% of public loans 
totaling US$36,723 million endorsed by the government was invested primarily in the 
sectors of economic infrastructure and production through the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. In 
the case of non-concessional loans that continued through the 1990s, the share of general 
programs for structural adjustment and financial stability significantly increased.  
 
1.2.10. As the economy grew and the wide-spread poverty gradually decreased, the provision 
of grant aid diminished significantly over the years and public loans for development 
began to pour into various sectors of the economy. The volume of official development 
assistance was relatively stable over the years while the portion of grant aid decreased.  
 
Table 10: Official Development Assistance by Development Decades 
                                                               (Unit: US$ in millions) 
Classification 1945-1960 1961-1975 1976-1990 1991-1999 Total 
Grants 3,045.6 (98.3) 
1999.0 
(50.7) 
750.4 
(21.4) 
1,202.5 
(54.0) 
6,997.5 
(54.8) 
Concessional Loans 52.3 (1.7) 
1,942.4 
(49.3) 
2,760.4 
(78.6) 
1,023.7 
(46.0) 
5,778.8 
(45.2) 
Total 3,097.9 3,941.4 3,510.8 2,226.2 12,776.3 
Note: % of proportion in parenthesis   
Source: op. cit.    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Public Loans to Korea by Decade 
                                                                                          (Unit: US$ in millions) 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s Total 
1,090 
(2.7) 
9,474 
(24.1) 
10,928 
(27.8) 
17,904 
(45.5) 
39,341¹ 
(100.0) 
Note:  % of proportion in parenthesis  
¹ The total is not equal to the sums of the respective brackets because of technical 
difficulties in calculating.    
Source: op. cit.  
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1.3. Introduction to Some Examples of Aid Projects and Programs  
 
1.3.1.CASE 1: Technical Assistance by the UNDP (UN Development Programme)  
 
1.3.1.1. Since its foundation in 1961, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
has extended numerous projects and programs for nearly 40 years. Most of them were for 
free-standing technical assistance (FSTC), ranging from policy development, institution 
building, and executive development to promotion of industry, development of science and 
technology, and environmental protection. 
  
1.3.1.2. The sectoral focus as well as the program priority of the UNDP evolved in response 
to the ever-changing needs and conditions of the economy. In the 1960s the emphasis was 
placed on enhancing agricultural and fishery productivity and expanding the base of 
primary education and basic health. In the 1970s the focus of the programs moved to 
strengthening the indigenous institutional capacity for public administration, research and 
development, and industrial development. In the later stages of development, areas of 
priority were government reform and governance, environment, and social development.  
    
1.3.1.3. The UNDP implemented 249 projects and programs with a combined total of 
US$95.4 million. This means the average size of each project or program was about 
US$500 thousand. The volume of assistance gradually declined in later years, however, the 
flows of aid resources were very stable most of the earlier decades.  
    
1.3.1.4. The continued and consecutive support for capacity development under the 
comprehensive framework of the UNDP was tangible and produced outstanding 
performance during the time. It helped a lot to build basic institutions and to develop 
human capacity in many ways.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: UNDP Projects and Programs in Korea 
 
1962- 
1   1975 
Soil Fertility and Soil Reaearch/1963-1971/US$1,027 thousand 
Deep Sea Fishing Training Center/1964-1971/US$2,877 thousand 
Soil Survey/1964-1971/US$1,672 thousand 
Establishment of Extension Services Department in the Medium Industry Bank PhaseⅠ,Ⅱ
/1966-1977/US$1,630 thousand 
Fine Instrument Centre PhaseⅠ,Ⅱ/1966-1974/US$2,984 thousand 
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Nakdong River Basin Delta and Tributary Studies/1966-1981/US$2,733 thousand 
Uplands Development and Watershed Development/1967-1976/US$2,156 thousand 
Forestry Survey and Development/1968/US$1,968 thousand 
Tubewell Irrigation Project/1969-1974/US$2,097 thousand 
Costal Fishing Training Center-Shipjack Fishing/1968-1982/ US$3,317 thousand 
Central Vocational Training Institute - Phase Ⅰ, Ⅱ/1968-1982/US$2,622 thousand 
Regional Physical Planning/1970-1974/US$552 thousand 
Strengthening Plant Protection Research and Training/1972/US$1,130 thousand 
Disease and Insect Pest Control on Plants/1969-1973/US$990 thousand 
Food Processing Centre PhaseⅠ,Ⅱ,Ⅲ/1973-1982/US$1,387 thousand 
Establishment of Hotel Management School/1973-1982/US$576 thousand           
Shipbuilding Industry Technical Services/1974-1984/US$2,035 thousand 
Korean Ocean Research and Development Institute/1973-1983/ US$954 thousand 
1976-
1990 
 
National Institute of Labor Science for Occupational Safety and Health/ 1975-
1985/US$812 thousand 
Mechanical Engineering Research Institute of KIST/1975-1986/US$1,107 
thousand 
Forestry Training Institute for Fire Suppression/1975-1983/ US$ 446 thou. 
Outdoor Hydraulics Laboratory of Irrigation, Drainage and Flood Control/ 1975-
1985/US$1,569 thousand 
Drainage Improvement/1975-1987/US$1,081 thousand 
Shipbuilding Welding and Steel Fabrication/1975-1984/US$523 thousands 
Semiconductor Materials Technology of KIST/1979-1985/US$ 938 thousand 
Korea Electro technology and Telecom Research Institute/1978-1985/ US$854 thousand 
International Management Institute/1977-1982/US$2,465 thousands 
Reliability and Environmental Test Centre/1982/US$499 thousand 
Assistance in Development Planning(4th, 5th & 6th Economic and Social Development 
Plan)/1975-1988/US$1,345 thousand 
Assistance Towards Korea Institute for Energy and Resources/1979-1986/ US$620 
thousand 
Productive Forest Resource Management/1983-1989/US$588 thousand 
Strengthening Meteorological Research Activities/1893-1988/ US$551 thou. 
Civil Aviation Training Centre/1984-1988/US$566 thousand  
Toxicology Research Centre PhaseⅠ&Ⅱ/1983-1990/US$796 thousand 
Korea Energy Management Corporation(KEMCO)/1985-1994/US$555 thou. 
Improving Production of Food and Agriculture through the Aid of Nuclear and Related 
Technology/1985-1990/US$644 thousand  
Assistance to Korea Electro technology and Telecommunication Research 
Institute/1985/US$1,036 thousand 
Establishment of CAD Section within the Die and Moulds of KIMM /1986-1993/US$572 
thousand 
Training of Science and Engineering Professors/1988-1993/US$732 thousand 
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Improved Industrial Management Computer Support/1987-1992/US$1,194 thousand 
Assistance to Centre of Science and Technology Policy(CSTP)/1988-1994/US$472 
thousand 
1991-
1999 
Integrated Pest Management Development and Training Program PhaseⅠ,Ⅱ,Ⅲ/1993-
/US$1,540 thousand 
Strengthening Government Capabilities PhaseⅠ,Ⅱ,Ⅲ/1988-/US$735 thou. 
Establishment of Technology and Financing Information Centre(TFIC)/ 1993-
1994/US$539 thousand 
Promotion - Scientific and Technical Information Services(STIS)/1993-1997/US$400 
thousand 
Detailed Study and Proposal for ESSD in Northern Kyunggi Province/1996-/US$500 
thousand 
Water and Marine Pollution Monitoring/1994-/US$600 thousand 
 
1.3.2. CASE 2: Vocational Training Program by West Germany  
 
1.3.2.1. Aid programs for vocational training were one of the most conspicuous sectors of 
development assistance by which a strong impact was made. Both effectiveness and 
sustainability were achieved to a great extent. Various forms of assistance were delivered 
by individual donors. A comprehensive consulting service for aid programming in 
vocational training was carried out in the midway through the 1960s prior to the inception 
of the main program.  
    
1.3.2.2. The first project for vocational training was begun with the support of the UNDP and 
was implemented in association with the ILO. However, the Korean government turned its 
attention toward one of the leaders in this field. West Germany, a new post-world war 
industrial power in Europe was the targeting partner for international cooperation. Under 
the cooperative framework established by the mutual understanding of both parties the two 
countries implemented a series of bilateral projects and programs in a consistent and 
systematic manner. Korea sent mine workers and nurses to Germany and the latter 
provided a well prepared aid program of vocational training for training Korean laborers 
and educating technicians to Korea.  
    
1.3.2.3. A comprehensive program for institution building, facility construction, and capacity 
development of vocational training was being implemented from the mid-1960s and 
continued for more than three decades up into the late 1990s. Equipment and facilities 
along with trade curricula and management systems were being introduced through the 
establishment of the German-style vocational training centers and polytechnic schools. 
Management consulting services as well as technical advice were provided in accordance 
with various project and programs executed in this field by the donors of different places.  
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1.3.2.4. German tradition, which put emphasis on direct linkages between vocational training 
schools and industry, were practical and pragmatic and played a crucial role in 
strengthening the capacity and expanding the base of industrial manpower without which 
smooth industrialization could not have been achieved. The results of the assistance 
program were impressive and outstanding in every standard of assessment and evaluation.  
 
Table 13: German Assistance Programs of Vocational Training for Korea 
 
Programs Projects Volume Period 
Establishment of 
VT Institute and 
College 
○ Busan Vocational Training Institute DM16.0 Mil. 1967~1975 
○ Changwon Industrial Masters' 
 College 
 
DM13.0 Mil. 
1979~1886 
○ Korea Poly-technique College 1989~1993 
Consulting and 
Technical Advice 
○The 1st Consulting Project DM 3.0 Mil. 1976~1978 
○The 2nd Consulting Project  DM12.5 Mil. 1978~1983 
○The 3rd Consulting Project DM 4.0 Mil. 1984~1986 
○The 4th Consulting Project DM 5.0 Mil. 1987~1988 
○The 5th Consulting Project DM 3.7 Mil. 1989~1990 
○The 6th Consulting Project DM 6.0 Mil. 1991~1993 
○Follow-up Consulting DM 0.7 Mil. 1994~1996  
Source: op. cit.  
 
1.3.3. CASE 3: Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) Project  
 
1.3.3.1. The KIST project is the single most important project which reflected the strategic 
interests of both the donor and the recipient. The strategic alliance that formed between the 
Republic of Korea and the United States during the Cold War era in the 1960s created an 
extra-ordinary project for development in the field of science and technology. As Korea 
needed to build the very basic foundation of research and development in applied science 
and industrial technology, the United States provided extensive assistance. In return for 
Korea’s engagement during the Vietnam War, the US Government provided full support 
for the establishment of an R&D institute of both scale and quality in Korea. 
 
1.3.3.2. The United States surveyed, assessed, planned, and designed the entire aid project in 
partnership with Korea and provided substantial core components for the project on a turn-
key based modality: project and programming consultancy, R&D equipment and facilities, 
managerial skills and system software. Korea, the encouraged recipient, cleared the project 
site, constructed buildings and recruited competent scientists and researchers at home and 
abroad. The national development plan was adjusted to reflect the added strategic 
importance of science and technology. A special law was enacted to speed up the 
execution of the project. The Bureau of Technology Management, within the Ministry of 
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Economic Planning Board was expanded to become the Department of Science and 
Technology, an independent authority under the Prime Minister's Office.  
 
1.3.3.3. Begun in 1965 through a comprehensive preliminary feasibility survey113, the project 
progressed smoothly and four years later, in 1969, the institute opened and began 
operations. Over the course of its implementation, the volume of investment for the project 
totaled US$23.4 million; surpassing the initial estimated investment of US$21.1 million. 
The planned contribution of the United States of US$6.8 million increased to US$9.1 
million.  
    
1.3.3.4. Operating as the nucleus of Korea's applied science and industrial technology, KIST 
produced and accumulated a number of legacies over the years, and the institute is 
expected to play an even more important role in the future. 
 
1.3.4. CASE 4: Geom-o Poly-technique High School Project  
 
1.3.4.1. Korea has little in the way of natural resources, and its industrial infrastructure was 
very poor. With scarce endowments, the country achieved national development by 
making maximum use of its human resources. The realization of human potential and the 
development of human technology and science, made the nation possible to sustain high 
economic growth and to upgrade the industrial structure step by step.  
 
1.3.4.2. In earlier stages of national development, indigenous skills and technologies were 
negligible and the saving of national income, negative in its accounts, left no room for 
expenditures on research and development. Most of the skills, techniques, and technology 
the nation needed were to be imported by way of foreign aid and investment, but the pace 
of those flows were too slow to meet the increasing demand for skilled manpower. The 
rapid industrialization required a stable, credible, and greater supply of skilled workers and 
technicians.     
 
1.3.4.3. In this context policy attention was paid to the surplus of young talent at the age of 
high school. Younger people who didn't have the opportunity of obtaining techniques and 
expertise could be trained at a newly-equipped and well-programmed vocational high 
school. However, this idea could not be realized without addressing the two intrinsic 
constraints the Korean society faced at that time. The first was the mindset of the Korean 
people. Koreans placed priorities on human science and literature rather than on pragmatic 
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science and technology. The second was the absence of those qualified training institutes at 
home.114  
 
1.3.4.4. The policy makers made breakthroughs by making use of external aid. They 
introduced a complete set of systems, facilities, and infrastructure which enabled the 
provision of superlative education and intensive training by way of receiving development 
assistance. Through fierce policy consultation with the Japanese Government on this 
matter, an agreement was made between both governments regarding the establishment of 
a model high school specialized in technical education and vocational training. All the 
equipment and facilities were provided by the Japanese side and imported teaching 
curricula and training manuals were developed apt to the contemporary needs and 
conditions.   
 
1.3.4.5. For the reorientation and motivation of young people toward realistic pragmatism, 
Korea took initiatives to give extra-ordinary incentives for applicants to enroll in the 
school and finish the course. Tuition fees and lodging at the school dormitory were free 
and every cadet received allowances for daily necessities. The compulsory military service 
every man should join was waved in case he successfully completed the whole three-year 
schooling, and every graduate of the school got a guaranteed job at a prospective company 
or public enterprise.  
 
1.3.4.6. The project proposal was made in 1970, and in 1971 an assistance agreement115 was 
signed between Japan and Korea. Under the agreement, training machines and equipment, 
as well as teaching aids and materials, were provided along with the consultancy of 
Japanese instructors for five years. The first batches of 360 cadets passed the entrance 
exam and entered the school in 1973 and were classed into 13 trades in five departments 
including machinery, electronics, welding, and metallics. Since the first crop of skilled 
technicians graduated in 1976, more than 10 thousand graduates poured into industrial 
companies and enterprises. Geom-o Technical High school located in the vicinity of an 
industrial complex named Gumi became Korea's model technical and vocational high 
school, and many schools flourished throughout the nation based on its foundation.  
   
 
 
 
1.3.5. CASE 5: Korea Medical Center Project by Scandinavian Countries  
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1.3.5.1. Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world when the nation became 
independent from the colonial rule of the Japanese in 1945. The over-populous nation was 
further devastated by the Korean War of 1950-53, and throughout the 1950s famine relief 
and reconstruction were the immediate task of the nation. The UN and other friendly 
countries extended their helping hands in doing this task.  
   
1.3.5.2. Beside the massive assistance from the United States and several UN agencies, three 
Scandinavian nations - Denmark, Norway and Sweden - took an initiative to help in the 
area of health and medical care. Living merely at subsistence level after the Korean War, 
medical service both in quantity and in quality could not have been much worse. Seeing 
this situation, the Scandinavians offered the Korean government the construction of a 
medical center and the provision of medical services for the Korean people.  
    
1.3.5.3. Welcomed wholeheartedly by the Korean people, the Korea Medical Center Project 
was launched in 1956. Partnered with the United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency 
(UNKRA), the UN coordinator of relief and reconstruction activities, the Scandinavian 
countries provided Korea with a turn-key base assistance program. On land in 
eastern Seoul, a complex of modern buildings was constructed and medical equipment and 
facilities were installed, medicines and medical supplies supplied and medical doctors, 
technicians, nurses, and administrators dispatched. The single most modern public hospital, 
the Korea National Medical Center opened in 1958. The key medical posts and staff were 
filled with Scandinavian doctors and experts. The operation and management of the Center 
was handled by the Scandinavian Mission. Korean medical staff, technicians, and doctors 
were sent to universities and medical institutes in Scandinavian nations for education and 
training. After their overseas education and training they joined the Center as Korean 
counterparts and worked with Scandinavian personnel.  
 
1.3.5.4. For this project UNKRA provided US$2.4 million, and the three modern buildings of 
34,095 square meters, housing 450 patient beds, were constructed and inaugurated by this 
fund. More than US$2.0 million worth of medical equipment and supplies were provided 
by the Scandinavian governments. For the five years under the patronage of the 
Scandinavian Mission, US$6.5 million was extended for the operation of the Center 
between 1958 and 1963. At the request of the Korean Government, the Center was 
operated and administered by the Scandinavian Mission for the next five years from 1964 
to 1968 and the Scandinavian responsibilities regarding the operation of the Center 
transferred to the Korean authorities in September 1968.  
    
1.3.5.5. The Center has been the real center of medical care and services for a long time and 
still functions as one of the nation's important institutes for medical research and 
practice.                  
 
1.3.6. CASE 6: Pohang Steel-mill Company (POSCO) Construction Project  
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1.3.6.1. Many foreigners who pay a visit to POSCO (Pohang Steel-mill Company) will find a 
very big banner posted on the entrance gate that reads “Resources are Limited, but 
Creativity is Unlimited.” Visitors who shake their heads at that catch-phrase when they 
pass the gate would probably nod and turn their heads back to see the banner again when 
they leave the company after the one-hour field trip at the site. The case of POSCO is more 
outstanding than any other development project both in the spectacular performance that 
the company has achieved and in the lessons learned over the course of its foundation and 
ever-growing innovative investments.   
    
1.3.6.2. Most of all, the POSCO project is a symbol of successful accomplishment achieved 
after repeated failure. The very first dream-project of the new government which took 
office in the early 1960s wasn't a new one. Previously, a similar project was 
conceptualized and there was lots of talk and discussion on the matter. Every time, the 
project proposals were rejected and set aside due to economic feasibility, financial 
constraints, and technical and managerial difficulties.116  
    
1.3.6.3. Recognizing that the steel-mill project was one of the very basic investments for the 
nation's industrialization and modernization, the political leadership took a bold initiative 
to realize this project regardless of its cost. With a very strong leadership committed to this 
project, there were two very big hurdles to overcome. The first was finance and the second 
was technology.  
    
1.3.6.4. The project required hundreds of millions of dollars. Experiencing chronic shortages 
of hard currency and a balance of payment deficit, it seemed impossible for the nation to 
mobilize the funds necessary for the construction of the steel plant. The political leadership 
made a breakthrough by taking a big risk of adjusting the agreed PAC appropriations 
between the governments of Japan and Korea. More than US$30 million allocated to the 
promotion of the agricultural sector was transferred for steel-mill construction. Owing to 
the arduous negotiations with the Japanese government, the Korean government got the 
large sum of credit both on concessional and commercial terms. More than US$130 million 
was borrowed from abroad; US$46.4 million from Japan‘s concessional loan scheme 
EOCF117 , US$52.5 from the Japanese Export and Import Bank(Export Credit), and 
US$38.3 million from the suppliers of the plant facilities(supplier credit). Substantial 
portions of investment capital were filled with external provisions of various kinds of 
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financial contributions. A relatively small sum of internal finance was invested in building 
infrastructure such as road, rail, seaport, water supply, and electricity.  
 
1.3.7. CASE 7: Gyung-bu Highway Construction Project118  
 
1.3.7.1. Foreign observers often recall the can-do spirit of the Korean people. One by one 
they built factories and constructed highways, steel-mills, and petrochemical plants. They 
gained confidence through trial and error and learned how to run the businesses on their 
own. Among the numerous projects initiated by the political leadership, the Gyung-bu 
Highway Construction Project (1968-1970) was probably the first and the most symbolic 
case of success in terms of securing the country's ownership of national development as 
well as enabling the Korean people's capability and potential for socio-economic 
advancement.  
    
1.3.7.2. The planners of the project anticipated a substantial contribution from foreign capital 
sources. However, international development agencies such as IDA (International 
Development Associations) and IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development) rejected Korea's proposal for financial support for this project. Other donors 
were more skeptical because the project lacked economic profitability and the uncertain 
financial feasibility.119  
    
1.3.7.3. Frustrated by the unfavorable response of the international community, the Korean 
government made a bold decision to launch the mega-project on its own. At 33.0 billion 
Korean Won or one-tenth of the national budget, the project was a highly risky endeavor 
both in economic and financial feasibility. Rejected by donors, the government worked 
hard to mobilize internal sources of income. Around 90% of the project cost, which 
increased to Korean Won43.0 billion was channeled from domestic financial sources 
including the national budget and funds raised by the sale of commodities provided by the 
PL480 aid scheme of the United States. Only 10% of the costs were supported by foreign 
sources, of which most was for technical consultancy and construction equipment. The 
main source of foreign components was from a concessional loan from Japan which the 
Korean government had the right to withdraw from in return for the normalization of 
diplomatic relations in the mid-1960s.  
    
1.3.7.4. For the successful implementation of the national project, the government organized 
an ad hoc committee presided over by the president and placed priority on the project. 
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Very often the president of the nation appeared at the construction sites of the project and 
encouraged technicians and engineers to work harder to make the grand project a success.  
 
1.3.7.5. Owing to the strenuous efforts and dedication of the Korean people, the project on 
the national agenda was completed in 1970 one and a half year in advance of the 
construction plan scheduled at the outset in 1968. The average cost of construction was 
Korean Won100 million or worth of US$300 thousands for every one kilometer of the 
four-lane 428-kilometer highway. The project connected the capital through the heartland 
of the nation with the 2nd largest southern port city of Busan. The highway became the 
symbol and the backbone of the nation's industrialization and modernization.  
 
1.4. Lessons Learned and Their Implications  
 
1.4.1. A Summary  
 
1.4.1.1. Development assistance and cooperation forwarded to Korea continued during the 
whole period of its development and advancement. Not a single assistance program was 
reported as seriously disappointing or failed. None of the development projects financed by 
loan assistance were rescheduled or subject to debt relief negotiations.  
    
1.4.1.2. Assistance programs and projects offered to Korea have been remarkably successful 
because both the recipient and the donors pursued desirable policies and programs marked 
by accountability, ownership and mutual participation. The example and experience of 
Korea as an aid recipient provides many lessons and implications to countries currently on 
the path to development.  
    
1.4.1.3. Though all of the assistance programs employed in Korea pursued the common goal 
of development, they were initiated for complicated and strategic reasons. Outcomes were 
positive when such mutual interests were smoothly coordinated and addressed in a 
cooperative manner. Distinctive features of the assistance programs to Korea, particularly 
during the Development Decades, are that of future-oriented leadership, sound policy, 
good governance, strong commitments, strategic initiatives, and a high level of 
participation by the receiving nation. Soft elements like manpower, technology, efficient 
systems and institution building were also critical instruments for the success of 
international development assistance and cooperation.  
     
1.4.2. The Importance of Visionary Initiatives with a Longer Perspective  
 
1.4.2.1. For many years after the Korean War most of the programs for reconstruction and 
economic rehabilitation were implemented under the auspices and patronage of 
international organizations and the powerful donor agencies. Famine relief and social 
stability were the prime concerns of the nation's authority. Overwhelmed by plenty of 
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liberty and talking without action, the vision of the nation drifted and the consensus on the 
nation's future could not be reached.  
    
1.4.2.2. The new leadership established in early 1960s, after the socio-political chaos and 
economic turmoil of repeated government failures, made initiatives to move toward a 
totally different direction for its policies and strategies. A lofty vision of national 
development - industrialization and modernization - was projected. Economic policies 
regarding the market economy and based on free trade and investment were introduced. An 
outward-looking development strategy which valued openness and comparative advantage 
was adopted instead of inward-looking approaches on which the nation relied for a long 
time. The leadership, which was firmly committed to the cause of the nation's 
development, marshaled limited resources for investment to the strategically chosen 
priority projects and programs to force growth. Creativities of the people and the spirit of 
the entrepreneurs were encouraged by emphasizing education and human resources 
development (HRD). 
    
1.4.2.3. Having no other options than development assistance from the international 
community, consecutive actions to induce resources and technology from abroad were 
taken by the nation's leaders rather aggressively. International donors and development 
agencies were persuaded by the incredible but visionary and ambitious development plan 
which reflected insight, strategic consideration, local ownership and accountability of the 
recipient in a longer-term perspective. All the cases of development assistance shown 
previously were prepared and implemented through clear vision and long-term perspective.  
    
1.4.2.4. Most of all, experience shows, that wise and strong leadership constitutes the very 
basis of good governance.     
 
1.4.3. Policy View - Policy Dialogue, Preferences and Concentration  
 
1.4.3.1. Donor initiatives led to the launching of development assistance programs in the 
early years of the nation's independence and during the reconstruction period in the 1950s. 
However, programs offered and funds donated were pooled and coordinated under the 
unified umbrella of aid implementation headed by the United Nations. At the end of the 
War, UNKRA (United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency) conducted a comprehensive 
study on the war damage and economic conditions of Korea and prepared the relief and 
reconstruction program. In 1954, one year after the armistice, a Combined Economic 
Board was formed by way of an agreement signed between the Unified Command of the 
United Nations and the Government of the Republic of Korea.  
    
1.4.3.2. Through the Decades of Development, policy dialogues and aid consultations were 
made by the Korean Government. Except for population, Korea needed everything from 
the international community; capital, technology and managerial skills as well as 
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significant portions of food, energy and daily necessities. The government knew that the 
scant altruism based on humanitarian considerations could not meet the huge demand for 
development investment in the future. Special missions included the head of the nation 
knocking on the doors of every donor and international development agency to request the 
required assistance for the realization of the ambitious plan for national development.  
    
1.4.3.3. Persuaded by the Korean lead, the IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development) organized an ad hoc consultative group meeting for Korea, the IECOK, and 
the International Economic Consultative Organization for Korea in 1966. Since the first 
IECOK meeting was convened in London, the meetings in which the major donors and 
international development agencies took part were held annually or biannually. At the 
meetings the development plans and strategies were presented by the Korean government 
and policy advice and recommendations were given by the donors. Based on the deepened 
understanding and confirmed priority of the investment projects, bilateral and multilateral 
programs for development assistance were pledged and coordinated.  
     
1.4.3.4. In response to donor contributions, Korea took responsibility for mobilizing internal 
resources. In order to maximize the utilization of scarce funds for investment Korea 
selected priority programs and projects which reflected the nation's strength and 
comparative advantages.  
 
1.4.4. Technical View - Importance of Soft Elements such as Human Capital, Tech-
nology, Policies and Systems  
 
1.4.4.1. It has been increasingly recognized that human resources play an important role. The 
World Bank (1993, 1994) sees it as the single most important contributor to growth. Of all 
endowments, human capital surely does the most to fuel long-term economic growth and 
sustainable development.   
    
1.4.4.2. Among the various research studies on Korea's remarkable economic development 
many point out the importance of human factors which propelled the rate of economic 
growth and explained correlations between human resources and sustained development. A 
research paper by the UNDP disclosed that the human capital was more critical to 
sustaining high economic growth than many economists had previously conceived.120  
    
1.4.4.3. Starting with high levels of literacy and educational provision, Korea was apt to 
absorb the techniques and technology of the developed economies. In addition, it was 
possible for the nation to accelerate the formation of human capital by adopting outward-
looking development strategies and pursuing equitable income policies which in turn 
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enabled expanded investment in education and human resources development and thereby 
contributed to high economic performance. 
    
1.4.4.4. Experience shows that assistance projects with higher portions of soft components 
including human and technological factors were highly successful. Most of the projects 
conducted under the patronage of the UNDP contained soft elements more than hard ones 
such as equipment, facilities and materials. Emphasis was placed on the provision of 
consultancy, education and training, system development, and institution building.  
 
1.4.5. Socio-cultural View - Social Behavior and Cultural Values in Development 
 
1.4.5.1. The inward looking traditions of Korea’s forefathers gave way to a highly open and 
progressive way of thinking due to the consistent adherence to an outward looking strategy 
for socio-economic development. The tight authoritarian cultural atmosphere based on 
Confucian tradition has diminished greatly. Political freedom has expanded to its full 
extent, while western values have prevailed over traditional ones. 
 
1.4.5.2. The rapid industrialization and massive development of the nation caused the 
opening of Korea’s indigenous society to the outside world. The flow of foreign capital 
and technology were the conduit and ignition for the drastic transformation of social 
behavior and cultural values. The projects of development assistance themselves were the 
real transformer of the static and closed Korean society.  
   
1.4.5.3. Counting socio-cultural aspects into the development assistance process is an issue of 
controversy. Until very recently, debates on socio-cultural factors in development 
assistance seemed taboo. However, recently some rigorous discussions on this issue are 
under way and are being studied with fresh perspective. The conclusions being made are 
that the social behavior of the people matters and the cultural values of the recipient count 
in the performance of development activities.  
    
1.4.5.4. A group of economists who gathered to discuss the subject of social behavior and 
cultural values in development analyzed what cultures valued more than anything. They 
looked at the cases of Ghana and Korea, as both were at similar stages of development in 
the 1960s. Yet, after decades of development work, each country looked very much 
different from each other regarding performance. The Korean people who valued thrift, 
investment, hard work, education, organization, and discipline produced extra-ordinary 
performance in contrast with the case of Ghana, who valued them not so much.121 
    
                                            
121
 Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington, Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human 
Progress, Basic Books, 2002 
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1.4.5.5. A micro analysis on some development assistance projects shows us that social and 
cultural factors in the base of a society are either powerful enough to leave footprints of 
culture or resistant enough to deny those footprints.  
    
1.4.5.6. Forty years after the transfer of the Korea Medical Center from the Scandinavian 
Commission to the Korean government was made, we could not find any foreign remnants 
of assistance on the site. Renovated buildings and newly installed medical facilities no 
longer remind us of the work of foreigners made many years ago. However, in one corner 
of the hospital compound there is still a restaurant offering northern European style food in 
operation; the first buffet restaurant in Korea. Though not a core element of the project, a 
supplementary component survived and presents the distinctive cultural features to us even 
long after the name of the Center changed. 
  
1.4.5.7. In contrast, the case regarding the introduction of the German Meister System teaches 
us that even if the system or the institution was ideal and desirable, the strong opposition 
and resistance which could not be tolerant because of its prevailing social values or 
behaviors hindered the full adoption of the excellent system of technical education and 
vocational training. The deep-rooted propensity for preference to literary arts and values 
over pragmatic reality and usefulness didn't allow a smooth application of the Meister 
System. 
      
1.4.6. Institutional View - Authoritarian Governance and Centralized Administration  
 
1.4.6.1. One of the most conspicuous features of Korea's development paradigm is the system 
of governance and administration. Even with the visionary and articulate development 
plans and strategies led by the powerful leadership, it could not have succeeded without the 
creative and strong stewardship. Every project and program for development assistance 
was implemented under the unified command and streamlined system of a centralized 
administration. All the external contributions were marshaled and incorporated into the 
national investment pool and were subject to redistribution according to strictly assessed 
priorities.    
 
1.4.6.2. Korea was fortunate in at least two ways. Firstly, the strong and wise leadership by 
which a sound economic policy which stressed basic economic principles reflected Korea's 
socio-economic conditions and took advantage of its comparative excellence and strength, 
and set up consecutive development plans successfully due to social stability. The adoption 
of an outward-looking development strategy emphasizing trade and investment based upon 
market mechanisms and free trade enabled the heavily agrarian economy to overcome 
industrial infancy in a considerably short period of time. The renewed vision and decisive 
initiatives made it possible for the nation to take off toward a more advanced stage of 
economic power. Secondly, the authoritative and centralized system of governance and 
public administration executed ambitious strategic plans. A strict authoritarian hierarchy 
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borne from a dynastic regime and colonial rule could be more efficient and effective in 
extending centrally planned policies and programs.  
   
1.4.6.3. No one can predict the results or outcome if the same strong leadership had chosen 
the other strategy of inward-looking import substitution and accelerated decentralization 
which would have allowed for greater autonomy of the local government.   
 
1.4.7. North Korea vs. South Korea - Beyond Their Rivalry and Confrontation  
 
1.4.7.1. Koreans are one ethnic family who speak one language. Koreans are among the 
purest ethnic strains in the world. Before being divided at the end of World War II, for 
more than one thousand years, both North and South Korea were under the reigns of the 
same rulers, shared the same customs, and cultivated the same culture.  
 
1.4.7.2. After the separation of the peninsula, the two entities became more divided than any 
other nation in the world. Everything from the political ideologies, economic system to 
social values and culture became extremely different. It is indeed unbelievable that such 
dramatic divergence and discontinuity could occur in such a short period of time. Beyond 
the power rivalry and ideological confrontation, the alienation seems unbridgeable 
nowadays.  
 
1.4.7.3. Apart from their extremely different political ideologies, their different approaches to 
international development cooperation explain, in part, the reason why such a contrasting 
gap and formidable disparity occurred between the two entities. 
  
1.4.7.4. South Korea made full use of international development assistance in an open and 
outward-looking manner and made remarkable and dynamic progress in its socio-economic 
development. North Korea, also eager to receive foreign aid closed her door to the world 
and looked inward; containing itself into the small domestic arena. The results are the 
backwardness and sluggishness which, even to this day, remains. The foreign assistance 
the North and South received was received due to the competitive delivery of aid by both 
the Cold War superpowers. The experiences of both North and South Korea clearly 
indicates that development assistance can only be effective and fruitful when it is used to 
pursue sound economic policy and for development strategies based on market 
mechanisms and out-ward looking openness.  
 
1.5. Development Issues Reviewed from the Korean Experience  
 
1.5.1. Development Strategy - Outward vs. Inward, Even vs. Un-even  
 
1.5.1.1. Without growth there can be no redistribution. Without equity there can be no 
sustained growth and development. Growth and equity should be placed on a higher 
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echelon of development strategies. The point is how growth and equity can be achieved 
more effectively with a longer perspective and by which development theories and 
strategies: outward-looking vs. inward-looking or even vs. un-even growth approaches.  
 
1.5.1.2. Korea’s experience shows a very plain and peculiar case of extra-ordinary 
performance and sustained growth. This was achieved through the adoption of outward-
looking development and un-even growth strategies. With scarce natural resources and 
abundant labor, Korea had no other option than to break through the grim socio-economic 
conditions of extreme poverty and social deprivation.  
 
1.5.1.3. During every stage of its development, Korea kept an eye on the advantages and 
opportunities of outward-looking perspectives and insights. The repeated trials of the 
nation for upgrading its industrial base and sophisticating its structures from one to another 
were made by concentrating on key sectors in industry and strategic projects and programs.  
 
1.5.1.4. From labor intensive and cheap garments and footwear to technology intensive 
electronics, automobiles, and semiconductors, from light processing and assembly to heavy 
industries such as petrochemical, machinery, and shipbuilding, the core industries targeted 
sectors which had preferred resource allocation and private investment. For the promotion 
of strategic industries, the government provided entrepreneurs and investors with various 
kinds of preferred treatment and incentives in budget, fiscal and tax policy as well as in 
construction of infrastructure. The high growth in these strategic sectors generated the 
overall expansion of the economy in the long run. The leading edge of the key sectors 
inspired the remaining segments of the economy.  
    
1.5.1.5. Always, in the course of the nation's development, international assistance played a 
critical role in filling the capital and technology gap. Without the outside world and the 
favorable support of the international community, even the wise and decisive Korean 
strategy for national development could not have succeeded. International development 
cooperation was one of the two pillars of outward-looking development and un-even 
growth strategy.  
    
1.5.1.6. It is ironic that development cooperation in the later decades took place in the area of 
regional development and structural adjustment. Most of the public loans of the 1980s and 
1990s were multi-sector or structural adjustment loans provided to straighten the disparity 
and the development gap caused by the industries that sprung from the un-even growth 
strategy of the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
1.5.2. Late-Comer's Advantages and Penalties   
 
1.5.2.1. Development was once considered as granted and national independence was 
attained and sovereignty secured. It was also thought that there were advantages to being a 
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latecomer to economic development since late developers could learn from the mistakes of 
early starters and adopt the latest technology and skills. Evidence does not prove this for 
the time being and unfortunately, we have witnessed common mistakes made by the 
political leadership in the developing world. Impatience has often led to bad government 
and bad policies which have resulted in haste, waste, and corruption. The gap between rich 
and poor nations is now so large that it seems almost unbridgeable. The sharp divergence 
in growth rates within the developing world itself is notably conspicuous. 
 
1.5.2.2. Past experience shows that development was not achieved by any revolutionary 
change but by the slow accretion of income over a lengthy period of time. Development 
needs investment in people and infrastructure which are conducive to sustainable growth 
with equity in a longer-term perspective. Political leadership that provides sound economic 
policy and social stability are crucial to motivate development and mobilize national 
resources toward socio-economic development.  
    
1.5.2.3. Globalization and information technology will surely create the opportunity to share 
capital, technology, and knowledge. Remarkable advances in technology and information 
open up new possibilities for a realistic path to economic growth and development with a 
refreshed vision in the new global context of interdependency and reciprocity. This could 
help developing countries take advantage of the global-knowledge-based society. On the 
other hand, the intensified competition and the diverging disparity in knowledge and 
information technology may widen further the development gap between rich and poor 
nations, creating a new dividing line between the "knows" and "don’t knows"; the "digital 
divide".   
 
1.5.3. Foreign Capital, Debt and Dependency  
 
1.5.3.1 There were at least two crises of confidence in debt repayment in Korea. During the 
decades of development, the chronic shortages of capital were usual and there was ever-
increasing demand for foreign capital in spite of the risk of local currency devaluation. 
During these years, most foreign capital flowed through channels of international 
development assistance and cooperation.  
 
1.5.3.2. Due to massive investments made in the public sector and the strategic sectors of 
industry, the volume of foreign debt soared at an unprecedented rate. The oil shock of the 
late 1970s widened the trade deficit and made worse the situation of balance of payment. 
When the economy experienced a serious setback in the early 1980s a grave concern 
regarding foreign debt became the popular and serious subject of national debate. In the 
mid-1980s the debt service ratio (DSR) reached above 15% before liability curved to a 
manageable level.  
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1.5.3.3. The second crisis of debt came when the financial crisis hit Korea in the late 1990s 
and was different from the previous crisis of liability. Excessive investment in the private 
sector through massive foreign borrowing brought about the crisis of financial credibility. 
DSR soared to 25% in 1999 nearly bankrupting Korea. Once again the international 
community assisted Korea and helped it undertake a heavy structural reform and 
adjustment program along with severe austerity measures both in the public and private 
sectors.     
 
1.5.3.4. It was fortunate that Korea overcame those adversities and once again began moving 
toward becoming a highly advanced economy. The road taken by Korea was neither 
smooth nor uniform, but it was dynamic enough to say that the risks taken paid a higher 
return than doing things ‘as usual’. As Korea moved toward becoming a net creditor, the 
debate regarding the dependency theory of under-development and subordination with 
deep-rooted Marxist traditions, could terminate.  
 
1.5.4. The Role of the Government in National Development  
 
1.5.4.1. One of the prominent features of Korea's development is that the drama was led by 
the government. Regardless of political leadership, the government also includes 
governance which in turn includes consistency and coherence in policy, clarity of the 
strategy, sustenance of social stability, rule of law, institution building and capacity 
development, and corruption control.  
 
1.5.4.2. During the early stages of Korea’s economic growth, the government was the sole 
candidate for negotiation and borrowing. Only the government could become the channel 
of capital and technological inflow. Only the state could mobilize substantial sums of 
investment and supply dependable amounts of human resources. 
 
1.5.4.3. Korean entrepreneurs who had the energy and spirit to exploit new opportunities 
could not have played the crucial role in constructing the economy without the strong 
intervention of the government. Numerous incentives for the introduction of foreign capital 
and technologies were given to any competent businessman and some of the international 
investment projects were guaranteed by the government. This strategy was unprecedented. 
 
1.5.4.4. The overly excessive interventions of the government made errors which resulted in 
negative side-effects which caused a distorting of market mechanisms and the industrial 
structure. Chaebeols, Korean conglomerates or giant groups of private businesses, might 
be the natural outcome of the strong interventions of government, but debates on chaebeols 
cannot be easily quelled. Whether the chaebeols played the ever-crucial role of industrial 
development at home and abroad should be understood from the standpoint that it was the 
strategic concentration for the advantage of the economy-at-large, or was the byproduct of 
a strong relationship between politics and business. 
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1.5.4.5. Nevertheless, the Korean government was not so adamant that it controlled 
everything all the time. Over the decades, the government gave way to liberalization and 
decentralization step by step. The target-oriented five year development plans were 
replaced by indicative plans to project the nation’s vision. Active measures and initiatives 
for internationalization and government reform were made from time to time. The age of 
government dominance has since gone.  
 
1.5.5. Economic Development and Poverty Reduction  
 
1.5.5.1 There is a general consensus that poverty alleviation should be the prime target for 
national development and the development efforts of the international community must be 
ushered into combating wide-spread global poverty. Reconfirming the resolution of the 
World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995 and the collective initiative 
for the 21st century taken by the OECD member nations in 1996, the leaders of the world 
and the heads of the governments gathered at the Millennium Summit in 2000, engineered 
the global agenda of the New Millennium for international development and set forth 
MDGs, the Millennium Development Goals in which poverty reduction should be the 
paramount objective to be obtained within the early years of the 21st century. And added 
efforts for reducing poverty are being made more than ever both by developing and 
developed countries. 
  
1.5.5.2. More than four-fifths of the people of the world live in developing countries. 
Although the overall standard of living in the Third World has improved by more than fifty 
percent in the past three decades, a large portion of the people are in abject poverty and 
unfortunately the number of the poor are not lessened as we have expected. With a few 
exceptions in several high-performing developing economies, the development efforts of 
many nations for the last half a century are disappointed and disheartening as well. In spite 
of an encouraging signs in the betterment of the people in absolute poverty, the gap 
between rich and poor nations has widened, not lessened. The sharp divergence in growth 
rates within the Third word itself is notably conspicuous. 
  
1.5.5.3. In this grave situation it is surely natural that the issue of poverty comes first on the 
lists of global agenda to be addressed. Considering that the concept of poverty is not only 
understood as the standard of living in income and basic needs perspective but also means 
the capacity development of the people in securing for human dignity and security, it is 
thought that a greater emphasis of both the nations and the international community should 
be placed on addressing the poverty issue. 
  
1.5.5.4. However, the point of the problem is how we can cut the poverty at least eliminate 
the absolute poverty to which nearly one billion people of the world are subject. For the 
time being the targets of MDGs are clear and intuitive, but concrete ideas and strategies for 
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actions are not elaborated in a realistic vision. In a point of view, the unanimous voice of 
the international community clamoring poverty reduction seems void of its contents and 
realities claiming for sustained growth and development in a longer perspective. In other 
words, poverty alleviation might be urgent and desirable in the short run, but it could not 
give the impetus for generating growth and development at the same time.  
 
1.5.5.5. Korea's development experience shows that not just combating poverty in itself, but 
educating people and growing the economy of the country is the realistic way and means 
of getting out of the poverty. By seedling industries, producing goods and services, and 
exporting manufactured products, the nation could be able to generate income for better 
living and to increase investment for the future. Not by redistribution for equity, but by re-
investment in education and training, human resources development the nation could able 
to accelerate the speed of the growth and to make the pie a bigger one before it was divided 
into pieces for poverty reduction and redistribution.  
 
1.5.6. Development Assistance and Trade  
 
1.5.6.1. Trade and foreign investment and development assistance plays their distinctive roles 
in economic development while the former complements the latter and the latter assists the 
former. The emphasis was shifted from development assistance to trade and foreign 
investment. It is clear that the relationship between development assistance and trade is 
much complementary rather than substitutive.  
 
1.5.6.2. The international efforts for development began through development assistance 
earlier decade of international development in 1960s. A pattern of assistance from the 
North to the South was established and rigorous flows of foreign assistance took place 
through both numerous bilateral and multilateral agencies and institutions. DAG, 
Development Assistance Group of OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development), was reorganized in 1961 as DAC (Development Assistance Committee) 
and various initiatives for promoting development assistance were taken by and among 
donors and recipient countries. 
 
1.5.6.3. However, a brilliant group of international economists conceptualized a new 
paradigm of international cooperation for accelerated development of the Third World. 
Under the patronage of the United Nations Raul Prebish, an Argentine 
economist, disclosed a report on international development titled 'Toward a New Trade 
Policy for Development' and asserted the importance of trade in generating growth and 
development. 'Partners in Development' prepared by the World Bank Commission on 
International Development led by Pearson proposed the consistent promotion of world 
trade as the prime tool for international development. These trend gave birth an 
international forum for grand discussions and collective measures to promote international 
trade and development, UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
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Development). The Resolution on a Generalized System of Preferences, so-called GSP, 
was adopted at the second gathering of UNCTAD and the first and most memorable 
scheme of development support through trade for developing countries began to be 
realized.  
 
1.5.6.4. For the Korean case of international development, it is useless for us to debate on 
what's more important or more helpful in assisting Korea's economic development. Both 
trade and development assistance was necessary and crucial for pursuing the outward-
looking development strategy which put strong emphasis on trade and industrialization. 
However, if we put them in order, the first might be development assistance and the next 
could be trade in the chronological view. In the initial stage of development the provision 
of development assistance was critical in filling the trade gap as well as filling the savings 
gap. In the early years of nation's foundation and reconstruction nearly half of the 
government budget was financed by foreign aid. In 1961 48.4% of the government revenue 
sources were development assistance. During the years of 1953-1961 73.5% of the nation's 
importation was made by foreign assistance. Based on the development assistance 
extended during the earlier decades of development the nation could expand the industrial 
base for international trade and development. And as the Korea's economy grew, the nation 
put much stronger emphasis on trade promotion, liberalization and opening of the market.  
 
1.5.7. Security Burden and Economic Development  
 
1.5.7.1. The concept of total security burden rarely mentioned in political science seems not 
familiar to us. Total security burden signifies the total expenditure of defense spending and 
official development assistance. It is recognized that total security of the free democratic 
western society is defended by the defense against the communist block and through the 
development assistance to allied developing countries. 
  
1.5.7.2. In that sense, Korea, a heavy recipient of development assistance from the 
international community, was and still is a great contributor for international total security. 
Korea, a net beneficiary of development aid for nearly four decades, shared the burden of 
international total security by spending a substantial portion of the nation's annual budget 
reaching 6% of its Gross National Products( GNP) in its highest contributions up to early 
1980s. By 2000 the ratio of defense spending, the share of defense spending in Gross 
National Products was more than 3%.  
 
Table 14: Korea's Total Security Burden 
                                                                               (Unit : Korean Won in billion)  
Classification 1970 1980 1990 2000 
GNP(A) 
Defense Spending(B) 
Net ODA(C) 
2,227 
102 
- 
36,750 
2,308 
- 
178,262 
6,856 
- 
521,959 
15,479 
249 
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Total Security Burden (B+C/A,%) 4.48 6.28 3.85 3.01 
      Source: op. cit.  
 
1.5.7.3. One interesting point to be noted is that a great portion of Korea's defense spending 
in the earlier period of development decades had been supplemented by the foreign 
assistance. Funds raised by the sales of commodities extended by the aid scheme of the 
United States had been appropriated for the military expenses. The so-called 'Counterpart 
Fund' funded by the foreign aid once overwhelmed the total volume of the nation's budget. 
Nearly half of Korea's defense spending in those years was supported by the Fund.  
 
Table 15: Counterpart Fund and Korea's Defense Spending 
                                                                      (Unit : Korean Won in billion)  
Classification 1958 1959 1960 1961 
National Budget(A) 
Counterpart Fund(B) 
(B/A,%) 
Defense Spending(a) 
Support from the Fund(b) 
(b/a,%) 
28.7 
31.9 
(111.1) 
12.4 
5.3 
(42.7) 
30.8 
28.0 
(90.9) 
14.2 
5.3 
(37.3) 
36.6 
26.6 
72.7 
14.9 
5.3 
35.6 
61.4 
29.7 
(48.4) 
16.8 
7.9 
(47.0) 
      Source: op. cit.      
 
 
1.6. Conclusion: Korea’s Experience - A Unique and Valuable Sources of Knowledge and 
Know-how in National Development and International Cooperation 
 
1.6.1. Owing to rapid growth and sustained development, Korea pulled itself out of extreme 
poverty and worked hard to move into the group of advanced nations. Korea’s 
development process and performance are dynamic and almost dramatic. While Korea’s 
development experienced both good and bad, success and failure, it could be highly useful 
for nations to move on a similar path. Korea’s firsthand experiences and past performance 
could make the repository of development learning more rich and abundant. 
 
1.6.2. The case of Korea shows us that development is possible and that international 
development cooperation inspires us to contribute a great deal to the realization of a 
country’s aspirations for sustainable growth. It should also be noted that the process of 
Korea’s economic development was probably on track with Korea’s economic integration 
and commitment to the world market and international community.   
 
1.6.3. Korea's success story carries great significance in the context of global economic 
development. Rapid growth through export oriented industrialization proved superior to 
the communist socialism. In this context, the outcome of development assistance and 
   
 
 
98
cooperation to Korea is viewed as a legitimate success achieved jointly by the international 
community and Koreans themselves.  
    
1.6.4. The legacy Korea created in the field of international development over the past few 
decades should not be underestimated. Korea is still a small country in that it cannot affect 
the outcome of major world events; nevertheless, it is not small enough to afford the luxury 
of irresponsibility. Korea, a long time beneficiary of international development assistance, 
is expected to participate actively to cooperate with international development in 
addressing the global development agenda. 
 
 
2. Korea’s Experience and Tanzania’s National Development Strategy: 
 A Comparative Observation 
  
2.1. Tanzania and Korea’s Development Experiences 
   
2.1.1. Tanzania is one of the fastest growing economies in the African continent. Since 2000, 
Tanzania’s real GDP has grown at an annual rate of more than 6 percent. In recent years 
the growth of manufacturing sector has been encouraging. For the last several years, the 
consecutive growth rate of the sector has exceeded 8 percent annually. The level of poverty 
has steadily decreased during this time. The United Republic of Tanzania has undergone a 
smooth transition to a market oriented economy and achieved substantial progress in 
economic reform and liberalization.  
 
2.1.2. Sustained political and macro-economic stability for more than a decade has made it 
possible to launch further aggressive policies and programs for accelerated economic 
growth and industrial development. The Tanzanian Development Vision 2025 provides the 
nation with a framework for national development in a longer-term perspective. The 
National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA 2006~2010) clearly 
outlines the mid-term development agenda for economic growth and social advancement 
targeting the attainment of MDGs.  
 
2.1.3. However, the Tanzanian economy is still heavily dependent on agriculture. Around one 
fourth of the national product and three fourth of employment are generated from the 
agricultural sector. It means that the Tanzanian economy is vulnerable to external shocks 
and natural disasters. A scant base in manufacturing, weak institutions and the lack of 
human and technological capacity are the main challenges to be overcome for achievement 
of sustainable growth and industrial diversification.  
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2.1.4. Fortunately, Tanzania is gaining impetus and a good reputation for boosting domestic 
investment in the private sector as well as for attracting a considerable amount of foreign 
capital.122 Considering that the volume of external aid consists of more than one third of 
the national budget, equivalent to approximately one tenth of GDP, it is crucial for the 
Tanzanian government to make full use of the external resources in a most effective and 
efficient way with clear strategic objectives. 
 
2.1.5. Many people believe that Korea’s first-hand experience in development and 
international cooperation would help assist follower developing countries. Although 
Korea’s development assistance is modest compared to development assistance from such 
huge donors as the US and Japan, Korea’s development cooperation is unique due to 
Korea’ own recent development experience. Korea’s development cooperation is fresh and 
viable, diverse and dynamic. Korea’s past performance and current achievement, both 
successes and failures could become the very components of her development cooperation 
programs for Tanzania. 
 
2.1.6. It is with such background that Korea’s experience in utilizing its foreign capital and 
expertise at respective development stages for successful development could immensely 
benefit Tanzania. Korea’s experience could be instrumental in guiding Tanzania’s 
designing and implementation of the aid-related projects and programs as well as the 
formulation of the development policy and strategy.  
 
2.2. Korea and Tanzania: A General Overview 
 
2.2.1. The Socio-cultural Background and Endowments 
 
2.2.1.1. The mission of my assignment in PO-PSM in Tanzania is to learn about the socio-
economic endowments and features of the country as well as the people and the cultural 
and historical background of the nation and to produce some tips of advice, a kind of 
consultation for the accelerated development of the United Republic of Tanzania, on 
economic advancement and social progress of the nation in view to the development 
experiences of the Republic of Korea which considered as unique in its policies and 
strategies and are inspiring some other developing countries in their endeavors for socio-
economic development. 
 
2.2.1.2. Therefore, the most of the findings and opinions I made are regarded as derived from 
a viewpoint of my own Korean standard. In this context, they are all astonishingly 
interesting and highly motivational in conducting my job by any standard. Particularly, the 
                                            
122
 The surging of the FDI in Tanzania increased from US$ 522 attracted in 2006 to US$ 600 million 
attained in 2007, according to the 2008 World Investment Report. Tanzania has ranked number 12 
among the major FDI receiver African countries. (The Guardian, September 25, 2008)   
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differences and dissimilarities between the two countries, Tanzania and Korea, are 
striking. The land size of Tanzania is roughly five times bigger than that of the Korean 
Peninsula, South and North Korea combined. Around 40 million people live in Tanzania, 
while approximately 80 million people live in much smaller land of the Korean Peninsula. 
The population of Korea is now reaching around 80 million, 50 million in South Korea and 
30 million less in North Korea.  
 
2.2.1.3. While Korea is divided into two parts of different ideological and political entities, 
Tanzania boasts her national sovereignty as a unified nation since the two countries, 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar, became a united republic in 1964. One of the outstanding 
contrasts is that Korea is comprised of one sole ethnic family speaking one same language, 
while Tanzania is a highly multi-racial society comprised of more than 120 tribes speaking 
a number of indigenous local languages apart from the two official languages, Kiswahili 
and English.  
 
2.2.1.4. Unlike the continental and temperate climate of the Korean Peninsula, the most 1part 
of Tanzania boasts her tropical or semi-tropical climate almost of the year around which 
enables farmers to engage in agricultural activities throughout the whole year. Two or 
three crops are common in Tanzania, but in Korea only crop is possible in a year.   
 
2.2.1.5. More than a third of the Tanzania’s land is arable if properly developed and it means 
that the size of arable land in Tanzania is more than ten times of that in Korea. Tanzania is 
almost self-sufficient in food grains and has an immense potential for further agricultural 
production in large extent, while South Korea imports more than three fourth of the grains 
consumed for staple food and livestock feed grains. In my eyes, it is amazing that only the 
very small part of the probably arable land is under cultivation for farming. Even the farm 
land under utilization seemed not to be ploughed and managed properly. The farming 
techniques seemed very primitive and the rampant weeds were scarcely controlled in most 
of the farming plots. From a country where the supply of the arable land is the single most 
important constraint of agricultural production, I easily felt an envy of the extravagance of 
the land which was not under utilization.  
 
2.2.1.6. In addition to the substantial base of agriculture with relatively low population 
density, Tanzania boast the bounty of natural resources, the varieties of energies and 
minerals, that Korea is lacking. Even the South Korea’s small base of industry and natural 
resources was greatly contracted when the nation was divided by the two political and 
ideological rivalry between North and South in 1948 just three years after the nation’s 
independence. 
 
2.2.1.7. The mindset of the people also seems make a great difference between the two 
countries. Though very few words of Kiswahili have I become familiar with, I’d love to 
speak Kiswahili. Unlike Korean language some of which are somewhat difficult to 
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pronounce even for Korea themselves, Kiswahili has some kind of euphony when they are 
spoken. The most frequently used word in Kiswahili speaking society seems ‘Karibu’ 
which has also a pleasant rhythm of euphoria. Karibu means both ‘Welcome’ and ‘You’re 
welcome’. And this single Kiswahili stands for the hospitality, generosity, and openness of 
the people speak it. When someone knocks on the door, Koreans mostly respond by saying 
‘Who is it?’ There is some reluctance in accepting their visitors. But in Tanzania, whoever 
knocks on the door or says ‘Hodi hodi?’, they welcome their visitors with ‘Karibu!’. They 
are incredibly generous and tolerant. The character they always say Karibu is one of the 
most distinctive and valuable in the Tanzanian society.  
 
2.2.1.8. An old saying in Tanzania manifests an astounding divergence in Tanzanian’s 
mentality from that of the Korean people. “Haraka haraka, haina baraka” in Kiswahili 
versus “ppali ppali” in Korean. Ppali ppali means “quick quick”. Korean people usually 
have a propensity of getting quick in temper. I seldom witnessed the scene of quarrel each 
other or someone getting in temper since I have been in Tanzania. Not a single unpleasant 
shout have I heard for the last two months in Tanzania. However, for Tanzanians an 
inclination for procrastination in their daily living as well as in doing business seems to be 
a rather routine phenomenon.  
 
 2.2.1.9. And one of the most striking differences between the two contemporary societies is 
the stages of their economic development and modernization. South Korea, once a heavily 
agrarian society dependent upon subsistent farming with extremely low income, 
transformed itself into one of the highly industrialized resources much less than those of 
Tanzania, South Korea made a remarkable progress reaching on the threshold of an 
advanced nation. Led by the government with visionary leadership committed to the 
modernization and industrialization, the nation could be able to overcome the stark lack of 
financial resources, the low level of skills and technology, the absence of social overhead 
capitals, and most of all, the weakness of economic, social and political governance. 
 
2.2.2. Context of National Development 
 
2.2.2.1. In spite of the contrasting dissimilarities which make different one another, the two 
nations seemed to shares many things in common when they started the earlier efforts for 
national foundation and socio-economic development in the 1960s.123 Though the two 
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 After independence in 1945 upon the end of the 2nd World War, the Korean Peninsula was 
divided into two parts and subsequently the two nations, the Republic of Korea in the south and 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north, were founded in 1948. Not much later in 
1950, the Korean War broke out and a truce was made in 1953 by which technically the peninsula 
is in a war up to now. The war devastated most of the industries and socio-economic 
infrastructure, and for the next several years both of them were relied on the assistance for 
emergency relief and rehabilitation by the international community. Stricken by abject poverty 
and social upheaval, outsiders observed the prospects of the Korean economy as utterly gloomy 
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nations were much differed in their endowed natural resources, cultural and social 
background, the socio-economic conditions of them were more than similar one another in 
terms of the level of national modernization and industrial development. Even the geo-
political situation was similar in the sense that both were under colonial rule previously 
and thereafter they were subjected to the bipolarized international politics of post-world 
war era.  
 
2.2.2.2. As late as 1961, economic conditions in Korea were similar to those of any resource-
poor, low-income developing country today. Korea, already over-populated, was 
experiencing an annual population growth of nearly 3 per cent, and there was wide-spread 
unemployment and underemployment. Per capita GNP in 1961 was a meager US$82, and 
the level of domestic savings was almost negligible. The nation had no significant exports 
and had run chronic balance of payments deficits ever since its independence in 1948. In 
1961 the country’s total exports amounted to US$43 million, or less than a quarter of its 
imports. In addition, the country had not yet met the most critical requirement for 
development. Throughout the 1950s, the nation’s political leadership failed to provide 
social stability and economic policy direction. Under those conditions, it was not possible 
to mobilize effectively the creative energy of the Korean people.124  
 
2.2.2.3. Heavily dependent on subsistent agriculture in which many of the overwhelming 
majority of small-holders was tenant farmers, Korea was in chronic shortage of its food 
supply. Not like those of other less-developed countries lacking socio-economic 
infrastructure125, investment and technology, the nation’s fairly scant base of industry 
could not afford the basic necessities. But it was better before the Korean War heavily 
fought each other for more than three years destroyed two-thirds of the nation’s industrial 
capacity and claimed 1.5 million lives.  
 
2.2.2.4. It was frequently compared by some economists that the socio-economic conditions 
of South Korea were neither favorable nor advanced more than those of other fellow 
developing countries in the early 1960s. The general conditions and endowments were in 
favor of Tanzania and other. The followings are some quotations of those comparisons.  
                                                                                                                                        
and hopeless before a new government formed by a military coup d’état stepped in 1961 and 
heralded the beginning of Korea’s modern development.   
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 Kim Kihwan, the Korean Economy: Past Performance, Current Reforms, and Future Prospects, 
Korea Development Institute, 1984  
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 The supply of electricity was starkly dismal in the later 1940s and up to the early 1960s. When the 
Korean Peninsula was segregated, most of the electricity dependent on the hydro-power plants in 
the northern Korea was cut off, and the South Korea experienced a serious shortage of power 
supply. For several years since the nation’s foundation, the substantial supply of electricity was 
made through a peculiar form of foreign aid, hosting electricity generation ships. The United 
States sent a number of power generation ships to the major ports in Korea for a emergency 
measure.  
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Contrast the whining of Nyerere with the response of the South Korean government to its 
plight in 1960. The former inherited a considerably solid infrastructure, a growing economy 
and a legacy of reasonably good colonial government, yet twenty years after Tanzania had 
gained independence Nyerere’s response to the debt crisis was to argue that “The situation is a 
neo-colonial one and African economies are not going to change until the neo-colonial 
relationship is changed’(Ayittey 1989, 8). That is meaningless and compares unfavorably with 
the record of South Korea which did not experience reasonably good colonial government. It 
was plundered by Japan for 40 years and then devastated by the Korean War that saw much of 
the country fought over four times within the space of two years, first by North Koreans then 
by the Americans, by the Chinese and lastly by the Americans again. In 1960 South Korea was 
much poorer than Tanganyika; but instead of blaming the colonialism and holding out the 
begging bowl the South Korean government set about reforming agriculture by breaking up 
the great estates into small peasant farms. Nyerere did the opposite. He destroyed the peasant 
farms and drove the occupants into Stalin-style collective farms. The South Korean 
government invested heavily in education especially technological education. Africa 
governments neglected it and failed to divert sufficient funds either into technological 
education or into ordinary secondary education. On-party state presided over by socialist 
dictators systematically destroyed the economies of Ghana, Zambia and Tanganyika.126  
 
In the early 1990s, I happened to come across economic data on Ghana and South Korea in 
the early 1960s, and I was astonished to see how similar their economies were then. These two 
countries had roughly comparable levels of per capita GNP; similar divisions of their economy 
among primary products, manufacturing, and services; and overwhelmingly primary product 
exports, with South Korea producing a few manufactured goods. Also, they were receiving 
comparable levels of economic aid. Thirty years later, South Korea had become an industrial 
giant with the fourteenth largest economy in the world, multinational corporations, major 
exporter of automobiles, electronic equipment, and other sophisticated manufactures, and a per 
capita income approximating that of Greece. Moreover, it was on its way to the consolidation 
of democratic institutions. No such changes had occurred in Ghana, whose per capita GNP 
was now about one-fifteenth that of South Korea’s. How could this extraordinary difference in 
development be explained?127  
 
2.2.2.5. What was remarkably differentiated their state of development was not the physical 
endowments or materialistic assets but the spiritual mindset and development mentality. 
And the latter was such as the development vision, policy and strategies based on 
innovative thinking and creative mind. While the development vision of the one was 
practical and realistic valuing openness, interdependence and dynamism, the other’s was 
purely ideal and lofty but rather illusory obsessed by exclusive self-help and self-reliance. 
The former put high priority in the accumulation of wealth through outward-looking pro-
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growth policy and strategy emphasizing industrial promotion, trade and productive 
investment, while the latter pursued to optimize social well-being through broad-based 
even-growth policy focusing on agricultural development and the principle of equitable 
distribution. Political leadership committed to the national modernization of the former 
took the decisive initiative to maximize comparative advantages, invigorating the 
entrepreneurship of private sector on the one hand and exercising necessary strategic 
interventions in a consistent manner on the other. The leadership of the latter produced a 
arbitrary dictatorship through which totalitarian state control stifled the dynamism of 
private sector and nullified the role of the market. And the latter’s leadership patronizing 
equity and social progress easily became the victim of macroeconomic populism128. 
 
2.2.2.6. Of course, it isn’t the present stories but those of decades ago. Over the past ten years 
Tanzania has undergone fundamental political, social and economic changes. It has moved 
from being a centrally planned and controlled one-party socialist state to being a modern, 
multi-party democratic state with an open economy.129 Revolutionary but gradual and 
smooth transition to democracy and the market-oriented mechanism has been made and 
rigorous reform and development programs are being under implementation.        
 
2.3. Tanzania’s Development Strategy in View to Korea’s Experience 
 
2.3.1. Mindset and Development Leadership  
 
2.3.1.1. Mindset such as quietness, prudence, openness, collectivism, and acceptance of 
hardship could be the features of their minds many of the Tanzanians have in common. 
Among other traits we may identify as some distinctions of ordinary Tanzanians, patience 
and easiness seems to be the most frequently recognized characteristics by foreign 
observers like me, especially from Korea. Safari pamoja na Mungu. In Kiswahili it means 
‘Travel together with the God’. As if reflecting the vastness of the land and the 
prospective for travelling around the countryside, Tanzanians never seems to hurry in 
doing something, in particular, never to blame for the happenings whatever take place on 
travelling. And just like they have such considerable tolerance toward others, they also 
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would encourage individual enterprise. It embraced the following policies: overvalued exchange 
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behave as if their acts are treated as tolerable as they do. This might have developed a 
common trait of generosity and tolerance.       
 
2.3.1.2. The other prominent communal mindset might be the one originated from an 
intrinsically multiple ethnicity and diverse culture: respect for social harmony and equity. 
These traits must have further strengthened during the socialist era under Julius Nyerere 
when national unity and social advancement had become one of the paramount values for 
the nation’s foundation and socio-economic development. These qualities seem to 
constitute the basic foundation of people’s mentality and to influence greatly in fostering 
people’s attitude and behavior toward social change and economic development. And the 
development leadership of the nation seems to be bred from these fundamentals.  
 
2.3.1.3. As we may consider these traits as the national characters of Tanzania, certainly 
there seems to be no such haste in improving and updating the national development 
policy and strategy. Ironically the belief that the nation is endowed rich in natural 
resources and land properties might have helped to develop those no-need-to-hurry 
mentality. What’s the matter with ‘develop now’ or ‘develop later’?  
 
2.3.1.4. The national leadership committed to economic growth and poverty reduction also 
does not detract its spearhead toward rather innovative and strategic approaches away 
from broad-based growth and equity.    
 
2.3.1.5. In this context it is difficult for the people of Tanzania to renew their resolution for 
accelerated and sustained growth and development and to motivate their own fighting can-
do-spirits in realizing the goals and objectives of national development.  
    
2.3.2. National Development Vision  
 
2.3.2.1. Before the new millennium if Tanzania had vision for nation’s development, there 
could be two of them. The one was ‘Uhuru na Kazi’ meaning ‘Independence and Work’, a 
slogan hoisted high up on the mountain top of Kilimanjaro130 upon gaining national 
independence in 1961. The other later one is the ideological vision for realizing socialist 
ideal envisioning socio-economic liberation based on socialism and self-reliance.131 All of 
them were proclaiming the basic ideologies and providing principles of national 
governance and development. They were lofty and high but somewhat abstract and 
ideological. In the long run those visions could not be able to inspire and mobilize 
people’s spirits and capacities for the modernization of the nation and had become a little  
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blurred and illusory in the course of the nation’s transition to a new paradigm of national 
polity and economy.     
 
2.3.2.2. It took more ten years till a new vision for national development in a longer-term and 
fresh perspective had been conceptualized and launched as a nation’s futuristic 
benchmark. Exactly 15 years had been spent for redefining development values and 
restructuring the systems of governance and institutional arrangements. The both union 
government, the Tanzania Mainland and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 
projected their respective national visions on their own capacity.132 The two visions 
launched in the same year 2000 on the outset of the New Millennium seem not to have 
reliable sequence and synthesis between those two visions in terms of their long-term 
development goals and targets as well as in their vision conceptualization context. The 
synergies and dynamism which could be engineered by strategic alliance, reciprocity and 
complementarity were not fully exploited.  
 
2.3.2.3. The Tanzania Development Vision (TDV) 2025 has projected lofty and high goals of 
social and economic aspirations which are considered reasonable, probably attainable, 
however, it seems to be void of practical and feasible policy of concentration and 
preference making full use of comparative advantages and optimizing scarce development 
resources. Though the well-balanced targets of the vision are envisioned : (1) High Quality 
of Livelihood; (2) Good Governance and Rule of Law; (3) A Strong Competitive 
Economy, the vision may need a set of driving forces or promoting engines which leads 
the way and shows the model of success and excellence. The strategic tools and 
institutional apparatuses for realizing the targets are not appropriately clarified in a 
concrete and pragmatic mode of implementation.              
 
2.3.2.4. What is the vision clearly lacking of might be concerned with moral aspiration, the 
renewal of the national pride and the inspiration of people’s spirits and willingness. A 
Tanzanian dream which embodies the Tanzanian’s aspirations for enhancing national 
pride, dignity and identity should have been envisioned and contained in the vision. Also a 
grander perspective for regional and global dimension must have been articulated in the 
vision. With the strong tradition of social integration and national unity and the credible 
leadership extended over the African continent, Tanzania should broaden the horizon of 
regional and global cooperation. As a birth place of mankind and one of the most bountiful 
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police, citizenship, immigration, external borrowing and trade, etc. National development, one of 
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sanctuaries of nature and wilderness, the United Republic of Tanzania could project a 
highly dignified and noble vision of human progress and national advancement. Even the 
bitter history of human trade taken place in the region centuries ago could add an extra 
dimension to the en-lightened human development and reconciliation of the people under 
persecution and suppression.  
 
2.3.3. Development Policy Paradigm 
 
2.3.3.1. Policy Framework  
 
A. Coherence and Integrity 
 
A.1. (Lingering) It was opportune that Tanzania could be able to launch a national develop-
ment vision around when the international community made a consensus on accelerated 
international development focused on poverty reduction and sustainable growth entering 
the New Millennium. Tanzania’s development goals and targets are projected under the 
umbrella of the Tanzania Development Vision 2025 and the Zanzibar Development Vision 
2020 incorporating the targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the 
subsequent strategic plans were designed and implemented. After the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (PRS), the 1st generation strategic plan was executed from 2000 to 2004, the 
MKUKUTA and MKUZA succeeded as medium-term five-year plans from 2005/2006 to 
2009/2010 . During the time several reviews and evaluations in sectors and cross-cutting 
issues were made and a number of sector and thematic policies were prepared under the 
national development vision and the strategic guidance of MKUKUTA and MKUZA. 
However, the mode of sector review and strategic planning was neither uniform nor 
systematic. Many of the policies and programs formulated in prior to the launching of the 
new visions and the strategic plans are effective and under implementation: The National 
Health Policy (1990); Education and Training Policy (1995); The National Science and 
Technology Policy for Tanzania (1996); The Sustainable Industrial Development Policy 
(SIDP) 1996-2020 (1996); The Agriculture and Livestock Policy (1997); The National 
Tourism Policy (1999).  
 
A.2. Though the basic directions of the existing sector policies are not contradictory to those 
of the new national vision and development strategy, they should be realigned and 
adjusted to the change of the situations as well as to the specific goals and targets shown 
by the new strategic plans. Without updating many of the sector plans and strategies are 
lingering to the sector-specific policies and independent plans which are not aligned to the 
latest vision and strategy. Those sector policies, plans and programs are being alienated 
and segregated from the indicative development vision and the coherent development 
framework.       
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A.3. (Staggering) It seems not to be an unusual coincidence that Tanzania’s national 
development visions and the MDGs are launched in the same year 2000 at the threshold of 
the 21st century. It is because the starts of those national and international endeavors were 
also made in the same year 1995. The formulation process of Tanzania’s development 
vision was started by the Planning Commission in 1995. The TDV 2025 finally came out 
in early 2000 after a long and elaborate deliberation. The MDGs133 agreed internationally 
at the Millennium Summit held in September 2000 was the extension of the report134 of 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) adopted at the Thirty-fourth High Level 
Meeting in 1995. The report which set forth the collective views on development 
cooperation of ministers, heads of aid agencies and other senior officials responsible for 
development cooperation made path the road to projecting MDGs in years later.  
 
A.4. Amidst the highly buoyant atmosphere of welcoming the 3rd Millennium, greater 
attention was paid on the global agenda for poverty alleviation and international 
cooperation, especially on the development of the African continent. Most of the least 
developed countries hurriedly projected their own millennium development goals and 
prepared respective poverty reduction strategy papers known as PRSP under the 
frameworks of the United Nations’ MDGs. The countries who implement their MDGs 
plans in an active manner are to be eligible not only to receive more development 
assistance from donors, but also to benefit from debt relief initiatives.135 The policy 
attention was forwarded toward relieving abject poverty focused on social development 
programs.  
 
A.5. Tanzania was no exception to this case. Instead of articulating the subsequent strategy 
and sector policies for the realization of the TDV 2025, two consecutive short-term 
poverty reduction strategies were designed and a following national strategy for growth 
and poverty reduction was introduced. Though poverty reduction is one of the prime goal 
for national development and consists an essential part in attaining the national vision for 
people’s well-being and high quality livelihood, the policy shift, a sudden special 
emphasis on poverty reduction and pro-poor growth strategy disturbed the policy priority 
and hampered the development of holistic and comprehensive approach pursuing 
relatively well-balanced growth with equity strategy. Every two year the Tanzanian 
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government produced the performance review on poverty reduction and MDGs, however, 
not a single evaluation on the progress of the TDV 2025 has been carried out. In the 
course of the procession of the Vision, a review is to be undertaken every five years. 
 
B. Development Ownership and Capacity Building  
 
B.1. In a way, sustainable development can be achieved as the owner of the development 
process could secure the capacity of policy and financial ownership. Without development 
ownership both policy and finance ones, the outcome of the process will prove to be 
illusory. Development capacity may include human capability which leads the policy 
reform and system innovation, technological progress, and institutional development, 
however, capacity development should be built on policy and financial ownership. 
  
B.2. (Policy Ownership) At first glance the policy ownership of Tanzania’s development 
policies and strategies is considered as well fostered and possessed by the nation’s 
authorities and indigenous expertise and know-how. The process of policy making and 
strategy formulation is fairly institutionalized, liberal and open, taking account diverse 
opinions and ideas from various stakeholders. Even though the policy initiative is taken by 
the higher leadership, the procedure for reaching consensus begins bottom-up from the 
level of civil society. That is the reason why an innovative policy alternative comes out 
very seldom to the table for final resolution and once a policy is set up, then it last very 
long with less intervention or adjustment.   
 
B.3. What Tanzania is lacking in owning policy capacity seems to be the weakness in 
knowledge base for innovative thinking and strategic deliberation. Due to the poor 
academic and empirical foundation in development planning, the perspective and insight 
of the policy makers are not extended and progressive enough to renew and innovate their 
policies and strategies into advanced ones. In need for expansion of indigenous knowledge 
and experience, the policy makers of Tanzania tend to rely on the development rationale 
and theories, tools and apparatuses from the western developed countries which are highly 
advanced and less appropriate to the local conditions.      
 
B.4. (Financial Ownership) The lack of the financial resources, weakness in financial 
ownership, appears one of the major constraints in addressing the agenda for poverty 
reduction and economic growth. And that is real in the context of the Tanzanian 
development. Though domestic revenue mobilizations are increasing substantially due to 
the robust growth of the economy and the successive implementation of the fiscal policy 
reform programs over the years, they are far short of the huge needs for public investment 
in various fields and sectors. In 2008/2009 the domestic revenues are expected to increase 
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by 23.9 per cent and the revenue is projected to expand by 22.9 per cent in 2009/2010136. 
It is fairly encouraging that dependency on external financing is expected to fall down to 
34 .4 per cent in FY 2008/09 from 42.0 per cent in 2007/08. However, the domestic 
revenue could only meet the finance for the recurrent expenditures, while the development 
expenditures are to be supplemented by the external assistance. In this context the 
domestic revenue mobilization is paramount in securing the increasing demand for the 
government expenditure and the resources ownership enhancement of the Tanzanian 
government. 
 
B.5. One of the major challenges the Budget Plan for FY 2008/09 identifies is to have the 
nation relieve from the heavy reliance on external financing. An excessive demand for 
MKUKUTA implementation may require substantial contribution of development partners 
both bilateral and multilateral in the years to come, in spite of the increasing share of 
domestic financing.  
 
C. Consistency and Coordination  
 
C.1. Even after the bumpy roads to get the turning point to a market-oriented capitalist 
economy, it was not easy to find out a new policy, the different way for socio-economic 
progress. Fortunately, based on the national unity and social stability, the nation could be 
able to draw out various kinds of restructuring programs and reform plans and to make a 
smooth transition to a new socio-economic system. A promising vision with a set of 
visionary targets and policy directions has been prepared to guide economic and social 
development efforts up to the year 2025.         
 
C.2. In the similar context of policy coherence and integrity, the consistency of Tanzania’s 
development policy emphasis and strategic orientation seemed to be somewhat discarded 
by international interruption and because of lack of confidence in her new policy and 
strategy. This can be traced by the institutional transformation of the Tanzanian 
government regarding the nation’s development policy development and coordination.  
 
C.3. When the new economic regime was introduced in late 1980s, the Ministry of Finance 
and Planning (MoFP) had undertaken various structural and institutional reforms and 
revised the nation’s policies and strategies. In mid 1990s the Planning Commission (PC), 
President’s Office was separated from MoPF, while the Ministry transformed itself into 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The Commission took charge of developing long and 
midterm development policies and strategies. On the onset of economic liberalization and 
privatization in the early 2000, the PC was resolved and the Planning and Privatization, 
                                            
136
 Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, Medium Term Plan Outlook 2008/09-2010/11, June 
2008 
   
 
 
111
President’s Office (POPP) was established in place of the PC. In 2005, the POPP was 
replaced by the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) and a new 
planning authority named the Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment (MPEE) 
was inaugurated. In February 2008, the Ministry of Finance merged the MPPE, creating a 
single unit called the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA). Meanwhile, 
the Planning Commission, President’s Office, was revived as an advisory board of 
economic policy and a national think-tank of socio-economic policy research and 
development.   
 
C.4. In a unique political environment respecting the balance of power among the executive 
branches of the Tanzanian government, the responsibilities for central development 
administration are shared by some of the government authorities. Currently, the Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Affairs is the leading agency in providing policy guidance, 
formulating and implementing development strategies as well. Not only economic and 
fiscal policy and budgetary programs, but also financial and monetary policies programs 
are designed and carried out by this super cabinet ministry. The preparation of medium 
term national development strategy ‘NSGRP’ is in the hand of the Office of Vice 
President. The advisory and R & D function of national development and economic policy 
is in charge of the Planning Commission under the direct control of the President.  
 
2.3.3.2. Policy Goals and Objectives 
 
A. Equity versus Growth 
 
A.1. Without growth there can be no distribution. Without equity growth cannot be sustained. 
Growth with equity could ensure sustainable development.  
 
A.2. Though the added importance of growth in the productive sectors are increasingly 
recognized by many policy makers recently, equity rather than growth, equitable growth 
focusing on poverty reduction takes higher place in the table of Tanzania’s development 
agenda list.137 The TDV 2025 aims ‘High Quality Livelihood’ and emphasizes equity.  
 
Ideally, a nation’s development should be people-centered, based on sustainable and shared 
growth and be free from abject poverty. For Tanzania, this development means that the 
creation of wealth and its distribution in society must be equitable and free from 
inequalities…. All social relations and processes which manifest and breed inequality, in all 
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aspects of the society(i.e., law, politics, employment, education, culture), will have been 
reformed.138  
 
The MKUKUTA also states about fast but equitable growth focusing on poverty 
reduction and reducing inequalities. 
 
The basic tenet is that growth is necessary but not sufficient for poverty reduction. To that 
effect, equity issues need to be taken on board as well. Tanzania needs fast but equitable 
growth, focusing on reducing inequalities, increasing employment and enhancing livelihood 
opportunities for the poor. Equitable growth will entail improving access to and use of 
productive assets by the poor, addressing geographic disparities and ensuring equal and 
universal access to public services.139  
 
B. Social Wellbeing versus National Wealth 
 
B.1. The once and decisive impact of extremely radical socialist policy implemented in 1960s 
through mid-1980s lasts long and profound. Now remained a socialist country according 
to the Constitution, Tanzania still hang around the socialist systems in delivering basic 
social services such as education and health in a great extent. Partly biased by these 
socialist tradition and partly distorted by the internationally agreed development goals 
(IADGs), the top priority of public investment has been placed on the promotion of social-
wellbeing including education and health.  
 
B.2. A strategic and appropriate allocation of the scarce financial resources is forwarded to 
social development. More than 30 per cent of total expenditures in government budget FY 
2008/09 are going to be allocated for education and health sector. Road sector receives 13 
per cent of the total expenditure, agricultural sector only 6.3 per cent portion.140 The 
budget allocation is made based on the Medium Term Expenditure Framework and the 
Annual Development Plan which reflect the mid-term development goals of MKUKUTA 
and Tanzanian MDGs. The structure of public expenditure in Tanzania resembles those of 
highly advanced European welfare states such as Sweden, Norway and Denmark. This is 
clearly differentiated with the experience of South Korea where the resources allocation of 
the government budget forwarded to social development was quite less than that of 
Tanzania in the earlier stage of its development.141   
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B.3. A cautious observation was made by the DP Poverty Monitoring Group regarding the 
appropriateness of public investments focused on social sectors. The Briefing on the 
preliminary results of the 2007 Household Budget Survey (HBS) made on October 6, 2008 
states as follows: 
 
Spending on human capital related services(health and education) increased very rapidly 
between 2001 and 2007, by 200 per cent per capita in real terms. There is little doubt that 
investments in human capital are required to achieve and sustain long-term growth, it is also 
true that their effort on income poverty will only visible after a considerable lag. This calls for 
more discussion on the composition of public spending whether the rapidly expanding public 
programs are having enough impact on poor people in rural areas.   
 
B.4. What is highly discontented in spite of the substantial portion of social expenditure, both 
the quantity and the quality of those services are quite insufficient and low. Inefficiency in 
operation and service delivery as well as graft and corruption are the accomplices of 
failure in providing sustained quality social service. However, the bigger portion of 
government expenditures could not be able to enhance the promotion of social services not 
if the wholly subsidized system of primary health care and primary and secondary 
schooling are reformed toward substantial burden/cost-sharing by the private individuals.      
  
2.3.4. Development Strategy 
 
2.3.4.1. Developmental Approaches 
  
A. Broad-based Even Growth versus Strategic Uneven Growth 
 
A.1. Ensuring sound economic management, MKUKUTA aims at promoting sustainable and 
broad-based growth as the main strategy for attaining the goals of Cluster 1: Growth of the 
economy and reduction in income poverty. The strategy sees that sustainable and broad-
based growth can only be realized through accelerated GDP growth and widening the 
spectrum of actors in the economy, particularly the informal sector, SMEs and the 
cooperatives. And it entails: (1) strengthening the link between agriculture and industry; 
(2) raising contribution of other sectors; (3) preventing the negative impacts on 
environments and on people’s livelihood; (4) promoting technological innovations, 
communication, physical infrastructures such as roads, ports, railway lines and storage 
facilities; and (5) promotional of regional equity in development is another dimension for 
broad-based growth. The more detailed strategic actions include all the varieties of policy 
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measures and supporting programs. It seems that if those actions and measures are 
ensured, certainly sustainable and broad-based high growth could be achieved.  
 
A.2. But what matters is how these broad-ranged, wide varieties of policy actions and 
supporting measures can be materialized at the same time. With quite limited time and 
resources, financial, human, and technological, if we are trying to do almost everything 
good and necessary, then it means that we have to spread them too thinly and widely 
without strategic focus and investment priority. Those can be a list of principles or tools 
for sustainable and broad-based growth rather than practical strategies effective and 
pragmatic.  
 
A.3. It is not clear whether this kind of broad-based growth strategy is originated in the 
context of the socialist tradition which values social equity and fair distribution or is the 
result of a theoretical deliberation which is flawless and perfect in its logical framework. 
On the other hand, what’s apparent is that neither some strategic sectors or key programs 
which receive a special attention are identified nor the concept of comparative advantage 
or excellence is clearly defined or exploited.          
 
 
 
 
B. Inward-looking versus Outward-looking 
 
B.1. It seems not clear whether the mind-setting of the Tanzania’s development strategy is 
forwarded toward the outside world beyond the national boarder or not. The TDV 2025 
envisions a strong and competitive economy which can easily and confidently adapt to the 
changing market and technological conditions in the regional and global economy. The 
MKUKUTA also pays attention to further stimulating a competitive knowledge-based 
economy. Now transformed itself into a market-oriented mixed economy, Tanzania is 
surely liberalizing its market, free and open, and are subject to a fiercely competitive 
economic environments. To face this sort of situation, the country may require a more 
acquisitive approach for a better access to the world market and this also may need a more 
aggressive outward-looking development strategy.  
 
B.2. It is right to say that the Tanzania’s national development strategy is not exposed enough 
to face up to the fierce foreign competition. This might have influenced by the nation’s 
pursuit of Ujamaa and self-reliance since its independence.142 Lost confidence in their 
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capability to win over the foreign competition during those earlier years of self-seclusion, 
Tanzanians may have developed an inertia of looking inward than outward.  
 
C. Development Borrowing vs. Foreign Direct Investment 
 
C.1. Experiences with bitter memories in foreign borrowings which were unexpectedly prone 
to rescheduling and defaults and was finally subject to massive debt relief assistance, 
Tanzanians seems to be highly cautious to initiate development borrowing overseas. 
Instead the Tanzanian government solicits foreign investors to stake their interests in 
various business and development activities and its efforts are bearing fruits by increasing 
both the number and volume of foreign direct investments in recent years.  
 
C.2. The experience of South Korea shows that development borrowing was one of the 
integral pillars of development financing. In the stage of take-off and expansionary public 
investment, external borrowing both concessional and commercial was crucial for 
accommodating the financial, managerial and technological gap unable to be met by 
domestic and indigenous capacity. Various projects and programs were implemented 
under the long-term development lending agreements, and they included some 
components of soft elements such as human resources development, transfer of 
technologies managerial techniques, and institutional development. The whole 
responsibility and the risk of failure were taken by the indigenous borrower, the owner of 
the projects and programs, while the outcomes and performance made were also theirs. 
Those of the FDI projects were fell on the foreign investors, giving less impact on the 
acquisition of technological and managerial capability and business ownership.  
 
C.3. Those attempt for aggressive development borrowing are not going to take place in 
Tanzania.   
 
2.3.4.1. Development Stewardship 
 
A. Leadership of Benevolent Patronage vs. Developmental Dictatorship  
 
A.1. From what do the African leaders build up their leadership? Like others in the African 
continent, Tanzanians, people with multi-racial and cultural background, drove their 
leaders to follow the long tradition of authority with fraternity inherited from the chiefdom 
of clans and tribes which is absolute but merciful. While allowing a ruling sovereignty of 
near absolute executive power143, they depend on the benevolent patronage and advocacy 
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of their leaders seeking egalitarian socialist vision. The Tanzanian leadership is 
characterized by moderation, national accord ‘Muafaka’ and consensus to ensure social 
harmony and equity.  
 
A.2. The Tanzanian leadership took the most of the initiatives to develop stronger regional 
integration based on the nation’s traditional pan-Africanism. The leadership seems to be 
more prone to take the lead for international matters in the region. Instead it takes a 
moderate and compromising stance in domestic and internal matters. This is apparently 
differentiated from the developmental dictatorship exercised by some leaders in the East 
and South East Asian Region: Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, and China.     
  
B. Government-led vs. State Control    
 
B.1. The recent reform in economic policy and development paradigm, politics and 
governance system and public administration made the status and the role of the 
government very much different from those of the previous socialist government. People’s 
belief in the infinity of the capability of government had been changed to disappointment 
and disillusion that the government with neither good nor sound policy could bring them a 
bleak situation through ‘the poisoning of development efforts in the direction of haste, 
waste and corruption’144. Apart from being self-reliant and well-off, the government 
heavily relied on foreign assistance could not afford the delivery of the basic social 
services. The model player-to-be of the society turned into a serious trouble maker who is 
on the brink of bankruptcy. The government did not lead the people and the nation. The 
state reigned over and controlled everything.  
 
B.2. The enforcement of totally strict state control over the economy and the society in the 
past left legacies which are real and counter-responsive. The legacy which is real is 
imprinted in the mind of the people and the system of the economy and the society. People 
still want more than the government can provide. The government still tries in vain to 
produce and deliver some basic social service to the public. The legacy which is counter-
responsive is the disbelief in government intervention. Sometimes even the proper role of 
the government is prone to be rejected by the people. The government developed some 
propensity to delegate its intrinsic role and function to the private or third sector.  
 
B.3. Tanzania needs a better government mission-oriented, efficient and effective. The 
Tanzanian people need a healthy government with insightful and decisive leadership 
which provides a good policy guidance and acts as an ardent development promoter.                  
                                                                                                                                        
parliament members in order to help maintain a comfortable majority by the ruling party. The 
chance of a second presidency of another five years is given in case serious mistakes are not made 
during the tenure of the first term.  
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C. Centralization vs. Decentralization 
 
C.1. Contrary to the propensity of centralization in governance and government admini-
stration in the early stage of socio-economic development, Tanzania boasts its fairly 
decentralized system of politics and government administration. Ministers, the member of 
the cabinet, have to fulfill the eligibility that he/she should be elected as a member of the 
Parliament by the constituencies. The previous paradigm of powerful central planning and 
government control had been dissolved and a much moderate mechanism of indicative 
planning and coordination has been established instead in the central government. Each 
ministries, departments and agencies have their own mandates and responsibilities. Sectors 
or clustered areas of development administration reinforce each other, but plays their 
rather independent role. Owing to the ‘D by D’ policy under implementation in all strata 
of local governments, it is seen that the level of local autonomy and self-determination in 
regional administration and local governance has been greatly improved.  
 
C.2. There can be a debate on whether the centralized system of government administration is 
better performing or efficient in addressing the various agenda of development or it is 
counter-productive. Also there could be an argument on the correlation between the level 
of decentralization of political governance and government administration and the 
performance of development activities.  
 
C.3. It is generally recognized that a decentralized paradigm of decision making and 
government administration would help meet the need of the people in a more consorted 
way. Decentralization could reduce the credibility gap between the higher policy 
authority and the body in the field while the transparency and ownership of the people 
could be enhanced. However, decentralization may bring the procrastination of consensus 
building and decision making because of the rather sophisticated process of progression 
and the   contradictions of interests among stakeholders. And these may produce a 
segregation of the program into small pieces as a result of opportunistic compromise. 
What’s more dangerous is the case in which decentralization in disguise is misused as a 
means of imputation and evasion of responsibility. This can easily happen where the 
resources are poor and the programs for development are scant enough to be negligible.   
 
3. Recommendations for Improving Tanzania’s Development Strategy 
 
3.1. Implications of Korea’s Development Experience 
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3.1.1. (Beyond Change: Korea’s Past 60 Years145) Few countries have undergone a more 
profound transformation than South Korea for the last half a century and more. Engineered 
by the socio-economic development in the early 1960s, not only economy and society but 
also the nation’s politics, culture, and international relations have been altered greatly 
beyond change during the time. The change beyond imagination also brought considerable 
side-effects, some welcome, and some not. However, it is widely recognized as a 
remarkable success story. The figure shows that per capita income increased more than 
200 folds from meager $80 to US$20,045 in 2007. Export increased extra-ordinarily from 
several tens of million dollars to US$371.5 billion last year. During the period, people 
took-off a several steps of human development from agrarian to industrial, post-industrial, 
and knowledge and information society. The standard of living has been improved 
substantially from abject poverty condition to a highly decent level. Followed by sustained 
economic and social progress, political freedom has been expanded in full extent, leading 
the nation to a full-fledged democracy. The tight authoritarian cultural atmosphere based 
upon the Confucian tradition has been greatly diminished, while western values are 
prevailing over the traditional ones. Inward-looking mindset inherited from the forefathers 
of the Hermit Kingdom gave way to an open and progressive way of thinking owing to the 
consistent adherence to the outward-looking paradigm and dynamics of socio-economic 
development. The Korean old saying that ‘mulberry field became blue sea’ has become a 
reality.  
 
3.1.2. (The Secrets of the Success?) Certainly, the success of South Korea’s highlights the 
uniqueness and reality in its making. What are the secrets of the success? And the lessons 
learned? Of course it is not a simple question to answer, and cannot be attributed to one or 
two prominent factors or inputs. It was the result of continued endeavors and dynamics 
internal and external both the leaders and the people of the nation have dedicated and the 
international community has contributed. What is occasionally referred as ‘a miracle’ is 
actually occurred and can be explained and learned from it. And the followings are the 
ingredients of prime importance I count: 
 
• Rediscovery of the nation’s identity and renewal of the people’s pride and confidence;  
• Strong and decisive development leadership committed to the nation’s modernization which is 
visionary and pragmatic; 
• Good policies and strategies drawn up based on creative thinking and innovative mindset by 
which can-do spirits and adventurous entrepreneurship could be manifested and development 
ownership was able to be ensured; 
• Development paradigm the system dynamics and group dynamism could aspire people’s 
expectation and empower people’s potential and synergies; 
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• Development stewardship led by the government in a coherent, integrated and consistent manner 
which enabled the strategic plans and programs to be implemented effectively; 
• Optimum utilization of external assistance and reciprocal complementarity based on outward-
looking mindset.      
 
3.1.3. (Applicability of Korea’s Experience) Each country has specific characteristics, 
historical experiences and endowments of its own which are different from others. The 
global environments and the domestic situations are ever changing and rapidly evolving to 
a more complex and sophisticated state of interaction. However, the history of the 
developed countries built economic power and accumulated national wealth tells us that 
they took a similar step toward the nations’ modernization by adopting policies and 
strategies in which they share some essential ingredients in common and those are just 
South Korea learned and followed.146 Korea’s experience will not give the following 
developing countries a full set of answers, but it should at least inspire and help them ask 
the right questions. Further, the lessons learned from Korea’s experience could be applied 
and practiced in a more positive manner, in a sense that Korea’s experiences are more real 
and the latest ones.  
 
3.1.4. (The Case of Tanzania) Tanzania is now striving for national modernization more than 
ever. Blessed with rich endowments, the nation possesses immense potential for 
accelerated growth and sustainable development. There seems to be no reason for 
Tanzania not to take advantage of the proven paradigm of national development. 
Furthermore, the variety of dissimilarities and differences I found between the two 
countries seems signifies the two points which might be meaningful for the construction of 
prospective cooperative relations between them in the future. The one is a dynamism 
which could be enhanced where some contradictory or heterogeneous elements reinforce 
each other. The differences between the two countries are the kind of distinctiveness and 
characteristic, not of conflict or discord. And the other is reciprocity and complementarity 
by which both parties are able to benefit each other from comparative advantages and 
strengths they have. What the one party lacks could be supplemented by the other. There 
seems to be an immense potential for exploring the promising bilateral cooperation 
programs through which the both countries can maximize the mutual benefit. 
 
3.2. Shifting the Paradigm of Growth and Development  
 
3.2.1. Importance of the Productive Sector Development 
 
3.2.1.1. It is my understanding that most of the analyses and reviews on economic policy and 
development strategy are focused on specific sector policies and strategies assuming that 
the aggregated growth and development of the sectors of the economy which performs 
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well will accelerate the overall economic growth and this will lead to sustained 
development of a nation. Without the clarification of the relationship between social 
development and its contribution to the direct and effective growth of productive sectors, 
too much emphasis was given to poverty reduction and the development of social services. 
Adhered to attaining the specific development goals and objectives results- and demand-
driven in a static and micro manner, the grand circle of growth and development has been 
disregarded losing the macro perspective on the dynamic cycle of socio-economic 
development in which productive sector development generates industrial production and 
national incomes, then create the demand of social services and this exponential 
circulation produces a virtuous circle of accelerated economic growth and sustained 
development. 
 
3.2.1.2. As have been reiterated several times previously, the policy emphasis of Tanzania’s 
socio-economic development is being placed in broad-based equitable growth with added 
focus on social equity and progress. It was when the first government of Nyerere 
proclaimed the Arusha Declaration and the Ujamaa village program had been 
implemented thereafter. And also now the paradigm of development strategy is rather 
similar because the contemporary strategic plan pursues the immediate goals and 
objectives of Tanzanian MDGs which concentrates on pro-poor poverty reduction and the 
provision of basic social services. This paradigm could fit for a kind of emergency 
measures for eradicating absolute poverty and be put into implementation so far as an 
infinite inflow of financial resources is secured for the ever increasing requirements of 
public spending. But the latter seems not plausible, because neither domestic revenue nor 
external assistance would be able to meet the insurmountable cost of recurrence. The 
attainment of MDGs is one of the necessary conditions of accelerated growth and 
sustainable development, not the sufficient one.   
 
3.2.2. Virtuous Circle of Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development   
 
3.2.2.1. It could be an argument of hen-and-egg. However, Korea’s experience shows a clear 
precedent of the rather different paradigm ‘growth and equity’ from that of Tanzania 
‘equity and growth’. Based on much authoritative leadership an innovative strategy had 
been adopted breaking the conventional wisdom of winning the popularity of the poor 
majorities. ‘Growth-first’ and ‘Make the pie bigger’ then ‘Distribute’ and ‘Share the fruit 
of the growth’. It was true that without equity growth could not be sustained. However, the 
leadership and the people were aware of the preceding condition for growth for equity that 
without growth there can be no distribution. Every efforts and policy measures were 
marshaled to the promotion of productive sector development, especially the 
manufacturing industries in which a bit of comparative advantages could be utilized in the 
infantile stage of development. A succession of small cases of success and excellence 
detonated the industrial production and created a chain of exponential expansion of the 
economy generating incomes, increasing both consumption and savings which led to 
increased investment both in productive and service sectors. The creation of employment 
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contributed to higher income and poverty reduction much more than the social policy of 
redistribution and pro-poor spending in health and education.  
 
3.2.2.2. The Tanzanian leadership should make an extensive and intensive review on the 
paradigm of the current development policy and strategy both in historical and 
international context. It is strongly advised to reorient its policy direction toward growth-
priority from social equity. This shift of policy paradigm does not mean the withdrawal of 
support for poverty reduction and social development. It means the adjustment of 
investment priority in terms of igniting the virtuous circle of growth and development 
away from the consumptive repetition of investment focused on public social services. A 
bigger proportion of increased financial resources should be allocated to the promotion of 
strategic productive industries including agriculture. While an absolute level of investment 
in social sector are to be maintained in a modest rate of expansion, the investment in the 
productive sectors should be expanded in a considerable extent. Instead of compensating 
the basic needs of the poor, the purchasing power of the poor is to be strengthened by job 
creation and income generation in the productive sectors. The people’s high expectations 
for social welfare and protection spawn by the government should be replaced by the 
aspirations for economic well-being they are creating and achieving by themselves.  
 
Figure 2: Virtuous Circle of Growth and Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Improving National Development Strategy 
 
3.3.1. Renewing National Pride and Empowering People’s Confidence  
 
3.3.1.1. (Rediscovery of National Identity) More diverse and complex than any other African 
countries in its ethnic and cultural background and physical features, Tanzania managed to 
unite itself into a solid state of national unity and social stability. Kiswahili, the official 
language most widely spoken, contributed to consolidate people’s character and social 
values shared in common into what Tanzanians were and are like. Standing out as the 
vanguard of pan-African socialism and regional solidarity, Tanzanians pursued a higher 
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vision for uniting people beyond its national boarder throughout the continent and the non-
aligned Third World. They achieved a lot in bringing the vision into reality. Obsessed by 
the lofty ideal of unity and solidarity, however, it seems that they underscore the 
dynamism created by their diversity and heterogeneity. Not just unity and solidarity, but 
diversity and distinctiveness the numerous people with their different origins and cultures 
are one of the most precious attributes the nation possesses. Unity in diversity, solidarity 
in heterogeneity, could be a national identity the nation should embrace. A real unity of 
the nation could be bred by fostering the genuineness and peculiarity that the people of the 
communities are proud of. Umoja and Ujamaa which intrinsic implicitness is real and 
modest could be promoted as one of the nation’s prestigious characters. 
   
3.3.1.2. (Renewal of National Pride) Tanzania survived by overcoming the earlier human 
atrocities international traders and foreigners had caused, and the nation stood out as 
country of legitimate sovereignty for the last half a century by sustaining peace and 
stability. The resilience and the legitimacy Tanzanians fostered and retained are something 
what they feel really proud of. Faith in people makes great human-being. Mwalimu Julius 
Nyerere, Baba wa Taifa147, is revered as the founding father of the nation and the people 
feel privileged to have this human-being of lofty vision, high moral and humanity. 
Tanzanians have lots more to have pride to be the nationals of the United Republic of 
Tanzania. The wondrous nature of panoramic diversity and authentic wilderness seems the 
largely untapped national treasures which should be shared with other people around the 
world. The beauty and novelty of the nation’s natural environments of which people are 
not fully aware could be further cultivated and preserved to be delighted by our 
forthcoming generations. The Olduvai Gorge in northern Tanzania, an alleged cradle of 
mankind, could make a perfect site of world heritage in harmony with the vast pristine 
savannas stretched all over the place.                   
 
3.3.1.3. (Empowerment of People’s Confidence) Tanzanians work very hard. They walk 
hours to ladle a pot of water. They spend hours for collecting an armful bundle of 
firewood. They are ready to expand their farming if the effective demand reaches their 
farms. Once they are valued and respected as the integral players in the market and the 
society, they will surely take a larger stake in national production and development.     
 
3.3.1.4. (Fostering Tanzanian Culture) Culture is what makes people have a sense of 
belonging and connectivity. Culture is what they feel distinctive and worthy to be human-
beings with decency and dignity. Diverse indigenous cultures of the nation could be 
rapidly demolished in the course of socio-economic development. The sense of 
community could be abraded also by external influence in the same context. The valuable 
authenticity of the Tanzania’s cultural assets tangible and intangible seems not to be 
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properly honored and promoted as much as they are deserved for. Both in central and local 
level, a renewed appreciation of the cultures Tanzanians possess should be enlightened 
and a number of promotional programs for highlighting Tanzanian cultures in a refreshed 
vision.  
 
3.3.2. Engineering Futuristic Development Leadership 
 
3.3.2.1. (Visionary Leadership) Bred in distinctive political and social character of Tanzania, 
the development leadership in Tanzania adheres to the generation of national unity and 
social harmony. Equity and reconciliation are among the prime attributes the leadership is 
forwarding. However, development leadership committed to accelerated growth and 
sustainable development require a stronger and more decisive role toward innovative 
initiatives and strategic orientation of development policies in a longer-term perspective. 
Based on unity and solidarity the leadership consolidated successfully over the years, a 
rather bold approach toward engineering system dynamics and group dynamism beyond 
static subjugation of peace and stability.  
 
3.3.2.2. (Leadership Searching for Excellence) The leadership of excellence is constantly 
searching for excellence the member of his organization could create and produce. It 
inspires people to awaken their enlightened spirits and to realize their human potential in 
full extent. The visionary leader should initiate to start some of the national excellence 
programs by which people’s spirit and confidence is invigorated. Success stories which are 
real and symbolic should be made.       
 
3.3.2.3. (Pragmatic Leadership) Some of the noble and ideal vision the previous leaders 
projected proved illusory beyond reach, bringing unexpected results and causing serious 
social turmoil and economic predicament. Most of all, the identity of economic regime and 
principles is to be clearly identified. The potentials for development in terms of 
comparative advantage are to be carefully evaluated considering both domestic and 
external conditions. Strengths and weaknesses are to be analyzed in the standpoint of 
improving socio-economic system and institutional arrangements. Best practices learned 
from both indigenous and foreign experiences are to be put into operation. 
 
3.3.3. Reorienting Nation’s Development Policy and Strategy 
   
3.3.3.1. Equity and Growth → Growth and Equity 
 
3.3.3.1.1. Though the nation is under the new regime of market-oriented economy transited 
from a socialist economy, the basic logic and immediate goal of national development 
seems equity and social-wellbeing which prevailed over the period of the Tanzanian 
socialism decades ago. Even the internationally agreed development goals which are 
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popular in Tanzania put greater emphasis on equity by aiming the reduction of extreme 
poverty and the promotion of basic social development.  
 
3.3.3.1.2. Growth is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for broader development, 
enlarging the scope for individuals to be productive and creative.148 Sustained growth and 
is essential for things that people care about: poverty reduction, productive employment, 
education, health, and the opportunity to be creative.149 And the experiences show that the 
economies performed high economic growth attained both increased level of income and 
lessening of inequality. The record of the last quarter century demonstrates two points: 
Aggregate economic growth benefits most of the people most of the time; and it is usually 
associated with progress in order, social dimensions of development.150 Sustained growth 
leads to the virtuous circle of income and savings increase, increased economic and social 
investment, better quality, and further growth. Especially, the case of Korea clearly says 
about it.  
 
3.3.3.1.3. Equity is to be ensured, achieving reasonably fair income and enjoying higher 
standard of living. And it should be leaded by high and sustained growth. Tanzanian 
experience shows that just the high level of social investment and development does not 
guarantee sustained economic growth.151 The fundamentals of the Tanzanian economy 
should be reoriented to growth-first, growth with equity from equity-preferred equity and 
growth.     
 
3.3.3.2. Broad-based Even Growth → Un-even Strategic Growth 
 
3.3.3.2.1. Broad-based even growth is an ideal paradigm of development and ultimately the 
sustainable development should be leaded by broad-based even growth. However, what 
does not make this paradigm possible to be realistic is that quite limited resources for 
development do not allow investing enough to make difference. Thinly-spread 
miscellaneous investments over the sectors mean the loss of focus or less prioritization and 
dispersed efforts.   
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3.3.3.2.2. An economist explains that uneven strategy in technological change as well as in 
economic development.152 In historical context of economic development of the advanced 
nations, the two theories are counter-argumentative: The German tradition of economices 
and Anglo-Saxon economics. The former has always encompassed the necessary elements 
of a theory of uneven growth, while the latter has produced theories of growth and trade 
which imply even growth. German economic theory of uneven growth has been the basis 
of the economic policies of the ‘laggards’, including England when it was one. Anglo-
Saxon economics of even growth has been the theory of the ‘leaders’, the theory embarked 
upon when German theory has brought a nation into international leadership. For this 
reason, all rich countries have attempted to export Anglo-Saxon ideas, whereas they 
themselves have stuck to German ideas. Today’s managed free trade is an attempt to 
achieve the same thing.  
 
3.3.3.2.3. Adopting a historical approach, an economist with a fresh voice, finds that the 
economic evolution of now-developed countries differed dramatically from the procedures 
that they now recommend to poorer nations.153 He shows intriguing and provocative 
findings that most of the developed countries including the East Asian NICs followed a 
kind of uneven protectionist policy of economic development, not the free trade and 
laissez-faire industrial policy. He argues that almost every successful country used infant 
industry protection and other activist industrial, trade and technological(ITT) policies 
when they were ‘catching-up’ economies. He concludes that developed countries are 
attempting to ‘kick away the ladder’ by which they have climbed to the top, thereby 
preventing developing countries from adopting policies and institutions that they 
themselves used. Under the guise of recommending ‘good’ policies and institutions, he 
goes even farther, the developed countries are actually making it difficult for the 
developing countries to use policies and institutions which they themselves had used in 
order to develop economically in earlier times. 
 
3.3.3.2.4. Broad-based growth is appealing and the end in itself should result in broad-based 
sustainable growth, balanced and equitable. But the constraints of financial, technological 
and human resources Tanzania could mobilize and utilize leave a rather narrow margin for 
broad-based comprehensive drive for growth. A number of strategic industries and sectors 
where to devote the government’s energies and resources are to be prioritized and a 
consistent and integrated development policy should be designed and rendered by which 
system dynamics and group dynamism are invigorated. In order to maximize the utilization 
of scarce funds for investment, priority programs and projects which reflected the nation's 
strength and comparative advantages are to be vigorously identified and tabled on the 
nation’s strategic investment. The uneven growth strategy should be selective and 
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preferably concentrative on some core economic activities, however, the policy should be a 
broad but coherent one, reinforcing each other by incorporating interrelated policies such 
as trade, investment, manpower, research and development, information and 
communications technology, and institutional arrangement. The uneven high growth in 
these strategic sectors generated the overall expansion of the economy in the long run. The 
uneven advances of the strategic frontier will inspire the remaining segments of the 
economy.  
    
3.3.3.3. Inward-looking Inertia → Outward-looking Mindset 
 
3.3.3.3.1. Because of its poor natural resource endowment and small domestic market, Korea 
had had no other option for alternative approaches to economic development. It meant 
economic liberalization, a gradual opening of the domestic market and free trade in 
parallel with building its own industrial base and strengthening competitiveness. For a 
nation with a long inward-looking tradition, the adoption of the outward-looking strategy 
was indeed very remarkable, and it is truly to the credit of the political leadership at that 
time that such a strategy was adopted.154 One of the most important lessons one can draw 
from Korean experience has to do with the merits of outward-looking development 
strategy. Without the adoption of such strategy in the early 1960s, Korea’s economic 
progress to date would have been possible.155   
 
3.3.3.3.2. Some economies have looked inward, competing with imports in the home market, 
rather than competing for foreign custom in the world market. These strategies have 
occasionally succeeded in spurring investments, increasing the size and efficiency of 
domestic producers. They also avoid the risks and dislocations of opening up to foreign 
competition too abruptly. Nevertheless, growth strategies that rely exclusively on domestic 
demand eventually reach their limits. 156  Although an outward-looking strategy is 
vulnerable to external shocks, it is still a better option than an inward-looking orientation. 
In general, an open economy has greater adaptability to external shocks than a closed 
economy for the simple reason that entrepreneurs in the open economy are more capable 
of exploiting new opportunities arising from changes in the external environment than 
businessmen and bureaucrats in the closed economy.157   
 
3.3.3.3.3. The performance of Korea started from this outward-looking approach. Korea with 
outward-oriented strategy has grown faster than those favoring production for domestic 
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markets.158 The Korean preoccupation with exporting is seen as the prime motivator of 
government policy.159  
 
3.3.3.3.4. A rather receptive open-mindedness and hospitality of Tanzanians will not refuse a 
gradual exposure of their economy and society to the outside world. The process of 
outward-looking mind-setting could be gradual, but it should be inclusive and come from 
the very bottom of the heart. The first step toward outward-looking orientation could be 
practiced and learned from the nation’s accelerated engagement to the regional 
cooperation apparatus such as the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), and the African Union (AU). 
 
3.3.3.4. Public Social Welfare → Privatization and Economic Well-being 
 
3.3.3.4.1. Pertained by the principle of socialism emphasizing public social welfare, the 
public sector which produces social services including education and health accounts 
substantial proportion of national domestic production. The system and networking for the 
delivery of social services is huge and well organized. However, this sector is heavily 
dependent on the finance of the government budget. It is estimated that more than 90 per 
cent of major social services are being subsidized through public spending. The level of 
government expenditure for social services is as high as those of the advanced countries, 
accounting around 40 per cent.  
 
3.3.3.4.2. Burdened by heavy social spending, public investment for the productive sectors is 
greatly constrained as always. Scarce allocations of public fund for economic well-being 
means far less investment than needed for economic infrastructure and industrial 
development, perpetuating the vicious circle of low income, low savings and low 
investment. This fundamentally weak structure of investment procrastinates the kindling 
of growth dynamics and the emergence of viable private sector. 
 
3.3.3.4.3. A policy shift toward greater emphasis on productive sector investment and the 
promotion of the private sector should be projected in both perspectives of privatization 
and public sector reform. In parallel with the rationalization and privatization of the 
productive social sector, a vigorous investment program for developing productive sectors 
should be initiated. The shift does not mean that the public spending and private 
investment in social sector decreases in the years to come. Instead, while the government 
expenditure in this sector will increase in a moderate rate than that in productive sector, 
private investment will be encouraged in a great extent.                   
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3.3.3.5. Decentralization by Devolution → Government-led 
 
3.3.3.5.1. The experiences of Tanzanians in extremely strict state control and its total failure 
made people to develop a deep-rooted mistrust in government intervention and seek an 
alternative way of governance from centrally planned top-down to grass root bottom-up. 
In line with public sector reform, the policy of decentralization by devolution (D by D) 
based on the principle of subsidiarity is under implementation and making considerable 
progress. Authoritative governance and central bureaucracy has been largely dismantled, 
while local autonomy and ownership have been greatly enhanced.  
 
3.3.3.5.2. Korea’s experience shows that the process of decentralization and local autonomy 
took place in the later stage of its socio-economic development. Many people believe that 
even the visionary and articulate development plans and strategies could not have 
succeeded without the strong and systematic stewardship led by the government. Every 
project and program for development was implemented under the unified command and 
streamlined system of a centralized administration. 
 
3.3.3.5.3. Since the noticeable progress made in decentralization and local autonomy, it’s the 
timing for restoring the credit of central governance. The role of the central government 
and development administration should be strengthened toward supportive and indicative 
policy planning and unified and systematic implementation. The central government 
should take the lead and empower the development dynamics and group dynamism by 
expanding its selective strategic interventions. And the government should exercise a 
stronger catalytic role as inspirer, strategic thinker planner, promoter, and facilitator in 
realizing the nation’s development vision. 
 
3.3.4. Development Ownership and Stewardship 
 
3.3.4.1. Policy Ownership 
 
3.3.4.1.1. (Policy Identity) Policy ownership is one of the most popular topics in discussing 
development of the developing economies.160 The nominal meaning of policy ownership 
is to have an effective strategic plan which ensures the priority of investment framed in 
government budgeting. However, what is more important is the identity of the policy and 
strategy: Whether the plan and strategy reflects the reality of country’s socio-economic 
conditions and whether the visionary but pragmatic goals and targets are well aligned or 
not? In this sense of policy identity, Tanzania’s policy and strategy are to be fairly 
reoriented the policy value and development targets toward a greater emphasis on 
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accelerated growth and productive sector development. Considering the rich endowments 
and potentials, a more progressive approach forwarding strategic intervention led by the 
government is to be pursued. Relieving abject poverty and diseases, on top of Tanzania’s 
development agenda, an added importance on productive investment and growth should be 
rendered.   
 
3.3.4.1.2.(Policy Coherence and Consistency) Disturbed by the international intervention and 
disarrayed in the course of socio-economic transition, the integrity of Tanzania’s 
development policy and strategy seemed to be somewhat blurred. The vertical linkages of 
policies and strategies connecting the long-term vision, mid-term development plans and 
sector policies are not satisfactory. Horizontal linkages and integrity are also weak because 
mechanism for strategic planning and effective coordination is not properly specialized. 
Policy coherence and consistency could be enhanced by strengthening policy research and 
development as well as institutional capacity. Particularly, institutional consistency in 
policy formulation and implementation should be ensured by entrusting a superlative 
government organization with an extra-ordinary authority of policy development, strategic 
planning, integrated coordination and unified implementation.         
 
3.3.4.1.3. (Policy Research and Development) Policy ownership, coherence and consistency 
could be secured by building capacity for policy research and development in national 
development issues and agenda. A center or institute of excellence in policy research and 
development equipped with highly talented manpower and creative working environment 
is to be established as an independent organization under the auspices of the superlative 
planning authority.  
 
3.3.4.2. Resources and Technological Ownership 
 
3.3.4.2.1. (Savings and Financial Mobilization) Practical ownership of development shall be 
achieved by overcoming reliance on external financing and foreign technologies. Even in 
low income countries, a set of effective policies and programs for promoting savings can 
greatly contribute to the mobilization of domestic financial resources. The robust economy 
will expand the base of domestic revenues. Not only tax reform in its system and 
administration aiming at enhancing both efficiency and transparency, but also the 
normalization of the informal economic activities is to be pursued in a consistent and 
comprehensive manner. One of the greatest hidden sources of resources mobilization 
could be the second generation privatization program. Since the most of the state 
enterprises and parastatal agencies have been privatized, the next grand programs for 
privatization could be processed in the following two areas: The first one is the land 
properties the nation is retaining most of them. The other is the privatization of education 
and health services heavily dependent on the public sector. Those initiatives for the second 
generation privatization drive will help greatly not only increase domestic government 
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earnings, directly and indirectly, but also empower the development dynamics of private 
sector.  
 
3.3.4.2.2. (Human Resources Development) Growth strategy needs skilled manpower and 
human capital formation. The World Bank sees it as the single most important contributor 
to growth. Of all endowments, human capital probably does most to fuel long-term 
growth. It is the very basics of building capacity and good governance as well as 
institutional development. The emphasis on education and training is not only good 
economics but also good social policy, because government investment in education and 
technical manpower training, coupled with a policy providing for continued expansion of 
employment opportunities, serves as the most effective structural basis for an equitable 
distribution of income. 161  In case of Korea where a considerable of educational 
expenditures were borne by the beneficiaries, high aspirations for education motivated 
people to enforce personal savings.162 Even without these fringe benefits of development 
dynamics education provide, human resources development should receive due attention 
so as to strengthen the human capacity every economic activities need avidly. The 
programs for human resources development should be prepared in the context of 
integrated development policies focusing on ‘universal high quality primary education and 
basic secondary education inducing the development of cognitive skills of the labor force, 
with the demand for higher education being left largely to the private sector’. 163It means 
that a structural adjustment of the educational sector toward shedding the burden of the 
public sector is to be implemented while some strategic educational programs are 
vigorously carried out. Newly introduced loan program for university students is a good 
start for those shedding and incentive measures to be expanded.  
 
3.3.4.2.3. (Innovation and Technological Progress) Much more than any other domains, the 
logic of uneven pro-growth policy and strategy applies to innovation and technological 
progress. The merit of uneven growth may be explained more visually in the process of 
technological change than that of economic growth. 164  The historical pattern of 
technological changes looks more likely scatter diagram than an orderly frontier. 
Technical changes happen very fast in some areas, dragging with them others, but in some 
areas the ‘frontier’ hardly moves at all for centuries.165 In parallel with promotion of 
education and basic sciences, some national projects of excellence in science and 
technology should be identified. In the same context of integrated pro-growth 
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development strategy, the most promising programs for igniting innovation and 
technological progress should be treated with preference and concentrated support.  
 
3.3.5. Development Policy and Strategy of Major Sectors 
 
3.3.5.1 Agriculture 
 
3.3.5.1.1. On outset of the Korea’s socio-economic development in the early 1960s, 
agriculture accounted for more than one third of its GNP and more than half of the total 
employment. Small-scale subsistent farming of which average land size was less than one 
hectare could neither produce enough staple food grains nor compete with foreign 
agricultural production. Largely neglected in the early years of development, the farmers 
both tenants and own tillers suffered from the low grain price policy with poor agricultural 
infrastructure. The rural poverty was extreme and rampant, and the big gap domestic food 
production could not suffice was filled with food assistance from overseas. It was after the 
industrial take-off began to generate some resources for trickling-down to other poor-
performing sectors including agriculture that some effective programs for agricultural 
development could be able to be launched. By adopting the dual price policy and the 
government purchase scheme for the staple food grains, rice and barley, the government 
promoted agricultural production and supported the farm incomes. A subsidy program for 
farm inputs, mainly chemical fertilizers, encouraged farmers to intensify their farming 
methods. The rapidly increasing demand for staple food grains due to the increased 
income widened the food deficit. Worried over the diverging gap of income and living 
conditions between the rural and the urban, the government paid particular attention for 
accelerated development both in the agricultural and rural sector. In parallel with the 
intensive program of green revolution, agricultural extension and infrastructure 
development, the ‘Saemaeul Undong’, a comprehensive rural community development 
movement, was launched in the early 1970s. However, all these promoting programs of 
agricultural and rural development were possible because the high-performing productive 
sectors could accumulate the extra resources for investment and price support in 
agricultural sector. The rapid expansion of industrial sector was able to absorb the ample 
underemployed in the agricultural sector. Liberalization policy lowered down the 
protective barriers in recent years, Korea’s agriculture has been highly protected during 
the time largely at the benevolence of other sectors.  
 
3.3.5.1.2. Agriculture in Tanzania is being neglected in double. In terms of public investment 
the agricultural and rural sector does not receive due priority deserving its importance. 
And the other productive sectors are not strong enough to trickle-down the surplus 
resources to the agricultural and rural sector. In spite of great potential of agricultural 
production, the lack of effective demand at home and abroad, investment, farm techniques, 
and infrastructures hinders the expansion of agricultural production. With scarce resources 
and poor policy capacity, the portfolios of agricultural investment are too widely and 
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thinly spread all over the activities and the agricultural development stewardship is mostly 
delegated to the local authorities by D by D policy.  
 
3.3.5.1.3. The role of agricultural sector should not be underestimated. This sector is to be 
entitled to the top priority of development policy as well as resources allocation. The 
social welfare and the economic wellbeing of the rural poor should be promoted by 
agricultural development programs. All the policy measures and schemes are to be aligned 
to the increased investment in agriculture development of some strategic crops and 
commodities. While effective demand for agricultural products is to be created on the one 
hand, some incentives for increased production are to be introduced. Stressed intervention 
of the government on certain strategic crops and commodities is to be exercised and some 
integrated supportive measures are to be taken in a consistent manner: from seed 
improvement and distribution; farm techniques and extension services; farm inputs and 
mechanization, agro-processing and marketing together with strengthening infrastructure 
including agricultural land development and irrigation. Agriculture should become one of 
the productive sectors igniting the virtuous circle of growth and development.  
 
3.3.5.2. Industry 
 
3.3.5.2.1. Industry is what has made the Korean economy stood out remarkable and extra-
ordinary climbing out of poverty and joining the ranks of developed countries. Political 
leader166 taken the power in the early 1960s took a bold initiative for the nation’s 
modernization and industrialization. Adopting the outward-looking development strategy, 
the leadership chose the industry as the engine of economic growth, driving force of the 
national development, and concentrated on the promotion of manufacturing sector, 
especially export industries. Taking full comparative advantages of low wages and the 
favorable world market, an extensive intervention of the government was made for the 
support of the selective strategic industries with integrated policy measures. Under a 
strong leadership an innovative institutionalization for comprehensive policy planning and 
strategy formulation was realized and the strategic plan for developing industrial sector 
was implemented in a consistent and integrated manner.  
 
3.3.4.2.2. The approach of industrial development was innovative and creative, however, the 
process was gradual and practical step by step. In the initial stage 1961-1962, the state 
combined the aggressive promotion of exports with classic protection of the domestic 
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market. In 1973, Korea launched an attempt at industrial diversification and upgrading, 
through the Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI) drive. Six strategic industries were 
identified and supported through a combination of tax incentives, subsidized credit and 
import protection. Beginning in 1979, there was a sharp reversal in policy. As the 
economy stalled, deficits increased and excess capacity appeared in HCI, the government 
withdrew from selective intervention in strategic sectors. Policy favored functional 
incentives, which did not distinguish between sectors.167 Since 1983, Korea’s industrial 
policy shifted away from sector-oriented support such as HCI drive toward function-
oriented support for R&D.168 Though the policy direction evolved toward general support, 
the government provided indicative guidance for futuristic investment of priority. 
Government support of R&D expenditures was concentrated on the IT industry during the 
1990s. Since 1998, the government has emphasized building a knowledge-based society 
and has chosen six promising next-generation technologies to promote, including IT and 
biotechnology, among others.169 The integration of numerous factors made an outstanding 
success story of industrial development from scratch: insightful development leadership; 
good policy and strategy; practical approach; and appropriate institutional building.  
 
3.3.4.2.4. Tanzania is in the earlier stage of industrial development. The share of industry in 
GDP accounts a meager 7.8 per cent in 2007. With its advantage in strategic location in 
the region and plenty of human and natural resources, the nation is going to engineer the 
acceleration of the industrial development. However, as other productive sectors in 
Tanzania, the industrial sector is facing a daunting situation. While the role of the private 
sector at its infantile stage is overly emphasized considering the contemporary capacity, 
the policy focus as well as invest priority regarding industrial promotion are not clearly 
identified. The sector is suffering from lack of qualified manpower, lack of infrastructure, 
and lack of finance and technology. Furthermore, as the nation walked out of the 8+2 year 
transition period of WTO’s S&D (Special and Differential) treatment for LDCs by 2005, 
Tanzania has little room for exercising the effective tools for selective and preferred 
strategic industrial and trade promotion. But there seems to be some other policy measures 
and supporting schemes for the nation to utilize.  
 
3.3.4.2.5. Though the basic paradigm of government support for promoting industrial 
competitiveness development should be shifted from direct to indirect intervention 
providing general, non-discriminatory assistance, some policy measures could be designed 
to enhance industry-wide competitiveness and to facilitate the growth of new 
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enterprises.170 As the engine of the economy and the driving forces of economic growth, 
the strategic industries for consistent support through the manner of general and non-
discriminatory assistance should be identified. Developing countries with sound financial 
situation may develop and provide export insurance and duty drawback schemes as well as 
subsidies satisfying objective criteria such as those provided to the SMEs, which are 
regarded as the non-prohibited subsidies in the WTO.171 A number of areas where the 
government as a facilitator can play an important role could be categorized. In terms of 
economic policy, these can be divided into five areas, namely investment policy, trade and 
competition policy, policy for start-ups and venture business, and SMEs development 
policy.172       
 
3.3.5.3. Education  
 
3.3.5.3.1. The rapid expansion of education in Korea is considered to be one of the most 
important factors behind its rapid economic growth. The key point for the successful 
linking of education to economic development in Korea lies in the choice of educational 
policy relevant to its stage of industrialization. The policy of sequential educational 
expansion by the school level which enables basic education to be universalized early and 
rapidly were very efficient in supplying manpower unskilled but qualified manual workers 
in the early and middle stages of labor-intensive industrialization (in 1960s).173 And the 
expansion of education has proceeded sequentially from the primary education level to the 
secondary education level, and finally to the higher education level. Although universal 
primary schooling was accomplished relatively early, the government has been slow to 
extend universal education to the middle school level and passive in its provision of places 
in high school and post-secondary institutions.  
 
3.3.5.4.2. When rapid industrialization was initiated by the government, there was virtually 
no systematic supply channel for a skilled and semi-skilled labor force. During the 1970s, 
the government attempted to consolidate vocational and technical education at the high 
school level. The expansion of secondary, particularly vocational high schools, contributed 
to satisfying the industrial demand for semi-skilled labor and craftsmen required in the 
heavy and chemical industries. The state’s intervention by linking the educational sector to 
the larger industrialization policy is expressed most apparently in the higher education 
enrollment quota policy. The government selectively expanded the enrollment quota 
centered around the fields of engineering, natural science, business and commerce and 
                                            
170
 Chuk Kyo Kim, Industrial Development Strategy for Indonesia: Lessons from Korean Experience, 
Korea Development Institute(KDI), March 2004, p.19 
171
 Jai S. Mah, p.88 
172
 Chuk Kyo Kim, p. 20  
173
 Young-Hwa Kim, Current Development Education Policy and Industrialization Strategies in 
Korea (1945~1995): a historical perspective, Journal of Education and Work, Vol. 13, No. 1, 
Korean Educational Development Institute(KEDI), 2000, p. 95    
   
 
 
135
foreign language. What is noteworthy is that the field of electronics expanded most rapidly 
among the fields of higher education. From 1965 to 1985 the enrollment in the field of 
electronics increased by 94.7 times for colleges and universities and by 4424.8 times for 
graduate schools. The increase of the total higher educational enrollment amounted to 8.4 
times during the same period. Consequently, the expansion of higher education, especially 
the field of electronics, seems to have promoted highly sophisticated technology-intensive 
industries including electronics and information and telecommunication technologies since 
1980s.  
 
3.3.5.4.3. The data shows that the educational investment priority in Korea was given to 
primary education. Contrary to many other developing countries in Latin America and 
Africa which tend to have invested a much higher proportion of the educational budget in 
post-primary education, Korea concentrated on primary education. Between 1965 and 
1975 the Korean government invested about 65 per cent of the total educational budget in 
primary education, 20~25 per cent in secondary education, and less than 10 per cent in 
higher education.  
 
3.3.5.4.4. The Korea’s public investments in education have not been highly compared to 
those of many developing countries, not to mention those of developed countries. While 
many countries have maintained public educational expenditures at the level of 5 per cent 
of GNP during the past three decades, Korea tended to be much lower as low as 1.8 per 
cent in 1965, which was the 81st place among 90 countries, and still remained low at 3.5 
per cent in 1990 and 4.1 per cent in 1994. By contrast, it reached 5.3 per cent in 1990 and 
6.2 per cent in 1993 in African countries. In FY 2008/09 budget plan of Tanzania, 
educational sector expenditures are equivalent to 5.58 per cent of its GDP. However, 
Korea’s fast educational growth is largely attributed to the active participation of the 
private sector investment by both the private schools and the beneficiaries. As public 
education has experienced a shortage of financial resources caused by an increasing 
number of students, the government has induced the private sector to establish private 
schools by providing a coherent set of financial incentives such as tax exemption and 
public subsidies. The government subsidy is determined in accordance with the size of the 
individual school’s own revenue. Owing to the government incentive measures, the 
number of private educational institutions rapidly increased and they constitute a very high 
share of educational institutions. The proportion of the enrollment in private institutions 
was 77.8 per cent for kindergartens, 60.0 per cent for high schools and 81.9 per cent for 
colleges and universities in 1995.  
 
3.3.5.4.5. Another factor which has contributed to Korea’s fast educational growth is the 
state’s educational investment policy which imposed much of the financial burden on 
beneficiaries, parents and students. Total expenditures for education are estimated to 
amount to 11.8 per cent of the GNP in 1994. The expenditure for public (formal) 
education took up 5.79 per cent: 3.72 per cent is borne by the government and school 
   
 
 
136
bodies; and the remaining 2.07 per cent by parents and students in the form of tuition and 
fees. Expenditures for private education, which are defined as all kinds of expenses paid 
by parents and students themselves except tuition and fees, were assessed at 6.03 per cent 
of the GNP in 1994, more than the expenditure for public education. It means that of the 
total 11.8 per cent portion of educational expenditure in GNP, the burden borne by the 
beneficiaries was 8.10 per cent compared to 3.72 per cent burden by the government.  
 
3.3.5.4.6. It is widely recognized that education contributed a lot to the accelerated economic 
growth and social advancement. But it seems extraordinary that the contribution of the 
Korean government in educational investment was rather marginal and the most of it was 
generated by the private investment owing to the people’s aspirations for learning and 
their capacity to pay for the educational service. The government provided the 
stakeholders with the indicative policy guidance while allocated quite limited public 
resources in compliance with the priorities of the nation’s educational development. 
Instead of bearing the direct burden of public spending in educational investment, the 
government encouraged the private investment by making and enabling environment of 
private education. The government put emphasis on creating job opportunities which well 
educated people coveted for their decent income and the manifestation of their 
workmanship.  
 
3.3.5.4.7. In Tanzania education is considered as an imperative for the people’s social welfare 
as well as the very basic foundation of economic and human development. That’s the 
reason why educational development appears on the top priority of national development 
agenda and the government is expanding the role both as an avid educational promoter and 
the main service provider of education. The nation is now entering the stage of expansion 
of secondary and higher education as primary education is about to be universalized. The 
usefulness of post-primary education is to be reviewed in accordance with the demand of 
the skilled labor force and highly educated manpower. The education policy and programs 
should be well linked to the nation’s socio-economic development strategy, especially to 
the nation’s human resources development (HRD) plan. The gradual expansion of post-
primary education is needed because it is desirable for the economy and the society to 
keep the balance between the demand and the supply of the manpower in higher level. 
And it is also advisable in the stand point of financial feasibility ensuring the quantity and 
the quality of advanced education.  
 
3.3.5.4.8. There should be a comprehensive review and evaluation on educational policies 
and programs especially in view to their usefulness and financial feasibility under the 
broader context and framework of national development. Considering the limitations of 
financial and human resources, it seems too luxurious for the government to expand public 
education by itself at every level at an unprecedented rate. Through an aggressive 
initiative for cost-sharing and private participation in education the role of the private 
sector should be activated and expanded in a great extent. In this context, the role of the 
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government is to be redefined as the facilitator and promoter, not as the principal provider 
of educational services. 
 
 
3.3.5.4. Health  
 
3.3.5.4.1. The health sector of Korea is recognized as one of the striking cases of social 
development: Started late, but performed well. For a considerable period of time in her 
development path, the government kept a low profile in this sector. The growth-first policy 
put social development, especially health care and medical service, aside away from the 
priority investment portfolio of the government. It was after the termination of the third 
five-year socio-economic development plan in 1976 that a serious attention was paid on 
social development issues such as health care medical insurance. Though there was a 
medical insurance scheme introduced in the early 1960s, it was not more than a nominal 
one because the scheme was designed based on a voluntary participation but the enabling 
environment was not mature enough to be sustained.  
 
3.3.5.4.2. In 1977 both the schemes of health insurance and medical protection were launched 
in accordance with the two important legal arrangements of the Health Insurance Law and 
the Medical Protection Law enacted in 1976. The schemes which are basically inclusive 
and compulsory extended in a gradual manner. From big companies to medium-sized 
enterprises, from private sector to public sector, and then to the self-employed in the local 
region, the systems has been expanded. A principle of equal premium charge between 
employee and the employed was adopted. The beneficiary of the medical insurance should 
pay a certain portion of the medical cost incurred. All citizens were entitled to the benefits 
of the medical insurance scheme by 1989 when the regional medical insurance scheme 
encompassed all the residents in the local region. During the time the government 
strengthened the system of medical service delivery and promoted the public health 
programs. While some of the big business conglomerates built the grand-scale medical 
facilities for the sake of social philanthropy, the private hospitals both western and 
traditional medicine began to flourished to meet the explosive demand for medical 
services.174  
 
3.3.5.4.3. There were some exceptions of the low-profiled health policy. Early in the 1960s a 
scheme for industrial disaster compensation has been introduced in line with the emphasis 
on rapid industrialization. An intensive program for family planning had been pushed 
throughout the nation. The high rate of population increase reaching 3 per cent per annum 
should be lowered down to the affordable level.  
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 Kim Jung Ryum, From a Least Developed Country to the Threshold of an Advanced Nation: The 
30-year History of Korea’s Economic Policy(in Korean), Random House Joongang, August 2006, 
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3.3.5.4.4. Health is an important ingredient of basic human needs (BHN) and is considered as 
one of the basic human rights. Health together with education consists of the two pillars of 
social welfare by which the livelihood of the people is improved. Even though a 
considerable sum of government expenditures in Tanzania is being allocated to the health 
sector, however, an ever-increasing demand for health care and medical service is highly 
surpassing the slowly expanding supply. The results of the recent household budget survey 
(HBS) shows that both the quantity and quality of health service were not improved for the 
last several years as have been expected. The rising expectations escalated by the 
internationally agreed development goals and the rosy manifestos are even further creating 
the needs of health care services more rapid than the government-dominant health care 
services are being provided.  
 
3.3.5.4.5. The solution for insufficiency of health care services should be sought not solely in 
the sector’s development itself, but also in the wider virtuous circle of growth and 
development. In parallel with the strenuous efforts for improving primary health care and 
sanitation through the public health care programs, the enabling environment of self-
perpetuating health system should be fostered by creating the effective demand for 
qualified health care as well as developing market oriented system of medical services. It 
means that prior to the increasing spending for the public medicare schemes, the programs 
for productive sectors development should be further promoted so as to raise the people’s 
purchasing power for medical services by generating the incomes of the employed in those 
sectors. The expansion of the public medicare schemes and the financial support for those 
schemes should be fairly gradual in compliance with the government’s financial capability. 
While the public private partnership (PPP) approaches in health development are to be 
improved and implemented in a detailed and practical manner, the buyer and beneficiary-
pay principle is to be strictly applied to the inclusive extension of medicare schemes and 
programs.      
 
3.3.5.4.6. The high growth of population offsets substantially the robust rate of economic 
growth. The proliferation of HIV/AIDS occurrence poses a serious threat to the economic 
and social development, physically as well as morally. The family planning program is to 
be strengthened in close collaboration of the program of reproductive health promotion 
and HIV/AIDS eradication.  
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IV. International Development Cooperation 
 
1. The Context of International Development Cooperation 
 
1.1. Historical Perspective of Development Cooperation 
 
1.1.1. (Independence and Self-Reliance) As much as many of Tanzanians believe that the 
spirits and ideologies of the Arusha Declaration are pure and theoretically correct per se, 
they may seem to be reluctant to open to ‘getting money from external sources’. The 
Declaration of 1967 on socialism and self-reliance instructed that ‘independence meant 
self-reliance and it could not be real if a Nation depends upon gifts and loans from another 
for its development’. Citing an English proverb “He who pays the piper calls the tune”, the 
declaration concludes that ‘we cannot get enough money for our development and even if 
we could get it such complete dependence on outside help would have endangered our 
independence and the other policies of our country’.     
 
1.1.2. (External Finance) It certainly be painful to acknowledge that Tanzania has remained 
one of the major recipients of foreign assistance for the most of the time since 
independence. And it is ironical that in spite of the adamant adherence to the policy of 
self-reliance and economic independence the nation was not able to be free from external 
financing. Now external finance (EF) plays an important role in the socio economic 
development of Tanzania. Due to limited capacity to generate adequate domestic 
resources, EF is encouraged to complement country’s own resources in financing socio-
economic expenditures in the country. It has played and will continue to play significant 
role in the growth, development, poverty reduction process in Tanzania, particularly in the 
implementation of the MKUKUTA and the MKUZA. EF constitutes around 80 per cent of 
development budget.175   
 
1.1.3. (Reform and Adjustment) Tanzania has been carrying out aid management reforms as 
part of the broader economic reforms undertaken since the mid 1990s. They have been 
part of its efforts to make aid more effective for achieving development and poverty 
reduction and supportive of country systems, structures and processes. On the one hand, 
the Tanzanian government reconciled the role and contribution of external finance as an 
integral component of development process filling the gap of capital and technology. By 
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endorsing the structural adjustment program proposed by the international development 
organization, Tanzania instituted a series of policy reforms toward a market-oriented 
economy utilizing foreign and international development cooperation. And the 
international community responded to Tanzania’s development efforts by increasing the 
flows of external assistance and relieving the debt burden through multilateral relief 
measures. On the other hand, the government took the initiatives for the enhancement of 
aid effectiveness by realigning the paradigm of aid management and strengthening the 
institutional framework of national development.            
 
1.2. National Development and International Cooperation 
 
1.2.1. (National Development Needs) The strategic plan and investment programs of 
Tanzania’s national development are implemented under the government budgeting 
mechanism called the Medium Term Expenditure Framework(MTEF), a three-year rolling 
fiscal indicative projection. Based on an extensive overview of macroeconomic 
performance and projections as well as the availability of financial resources accounting 
both domestic revenues and external finance, the MTEF and an annual government budget 
estimate are made. And a specific budget paper is prepared and it is subject to the review 
of the cabinet and the subsequent approval by the parliament. The modality of government 
planning and budgeting is intrinsically conservative and rather constrained by the 
contemporary endowments which fall short of its requirements. Therefore, the government 
budget does not afford the desired level of public expenditures required for the investment 
needs to attain the development goals and targets. In this planning and budgeting context, 
even a tentative quantitative need of national development in terms of aggregate 
investment could not be able to be identified. Tanzania’s planning authorities seems not to 
operate a macroeconomic forecast and simulation model by which a set of aggregate 
development indicators are projected such as savings and investment, growth and output,  
employment, trade and external transactions. However, it is apparent that the national 
development needs are huge beyond the government budget estimate. Apart from the 
surmounting public investment needs in the social sector, the public and private 
investment needs in the productive sectors are even greater, considering the gap between 
the recent economic performance and the projected development objectives. In order to 
achieve the medium-term growth targets and development goals of the MKUKUTA and 
MKUZA, a huge development needs are to be met, highly surpassing the current level of 
public investment.                
 
1.2.2. (Indigenous Development Capacity) Owing to the robust economic growth and 
increased investment since 2000, the indigenous development capacity of Tanzania has 
been strengthened significantly over the years. The ratio of investment to GDP increased 
from 17.6 per cent to 24.3 per cent in 2007. Domestic revenues increased substantially 
from 12.2 per cent of GDP in 2000/01 to 16.8 per cent in 2007/08, while the total 
government expenditure expanded from 20.6 per cent of GDP to 28.8 per cent during the 
   
 
 
141
same period. However, the existing expenditure gap between the domestic revenues and 
the total government expenditures is filled by foreign savings mainly through external 
assistance. The indigenous financial capacity should be further strengthened in order to 
mobilize the resources for increased investment and secure the financial ownership in the 
development process. The shortage of skilled labor force and competent manpower 
appears as one of the serious bottleneck of accelerated growth and industrial productivity 
enhancement as well as social services delivery. The lack of infrastructure and industrial 
technology needs an enormous investment in transport, energy and electricity, ICT, water 
facilities, research and development, and science and technology.  
 
1.2.3. (Requirements for External Finance) External Finance (EF) has an important role to 
play in the socio-development in Tanzania. Due to limited capacity to generate adequate 
domestic resources, EF is encouraged to complement the country’s own resources in 
financing socio-economic development expenditures in the country. It has played and will 
continue to play significant role in the growth, development and poverty reduction 
process in Tanzania, particularly in implementation of the MKUKUTA and MKUZA. 
Currently Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Tanzania stands at 33.7 per cent of 
the total government budget estimates FY 2008/09, with the development budget 
consisting of external finance in the form of grants, concessional loans and debt relief. EF 
constitutes around 80 per cent of the development budget.  
 
Table 16: Budget Frame FY 2007/08 and 2008/09 
(Unit: Tsh. Billion, %) 
 
FY 2007/08(Projection) FY 2008/09(Budget) 
Volume Comp. Volume Comp. 
1. Revenue 6,038 100.0 7,216 100.0 
  Domestic Revenue¹ 3,599 59.6 4,786 66.3 
  Foreign Loan and Grant 2,439 40.4 2,430 33.7 
    Programme Loans and Grants  956 15.8 812 11.3 
Basket Support Loans and Grants  245 4.1 419 5.8 
Project Loans and Grants 1,189 19.7 1,064 14.7 
Others²  49 0.8 135 1.9 
2. Expenditure 6,038 100.0 7,216 100.0 
Recurrent Expenditure 3,866 64.0 4,727 65.5 
  Development Expenditure 2,172 36.0 2,489 34.5 
    Local Resources³  739 12.2 938 13.0 
    Foreign Resources 1,433 23.8 1,551 21.5 
As a percentage of GDP(%) 26.9 - 28.2 - 
  Domestic Revenue  16.0 - 18.2 - 
  External Finance 10.9 - 10.0 - 
  Recurrent Expenditure 17.2 - 18.5 - 
  Development Expenditure 9.7 - 9.7 - 
    Note 1 Includes the revenue from the Privatization Funds 
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        2 Includes MDRI of IMF, MCA of USA and technical data adjustment  
        3 Constitutes General Budget Support, the sale of government NMB shares and the surplus 
from domestic revenues 
   Source: Budget Speech for the FY 2008/09, Minister for Finance and Economic Affairs, June 12, 
2008, p.54 
 
1.2.4. The requirements for EF in terms of needed investment to attain the targets and 
objectives of national development envisioned in the development vision and the medium 
term development strategies seem to be much higher than those appeared in the budget 
estimates. The MTRF, an apparatus of three-year rolling indicative budget frame-working, 
estimates the budget demand based on the possible availability of financial resources both 
domestic and foreign. This does not reflect the aggregate demand for expected investment 
needs in most of the sectors. The major sector programmes such as ASDP, MMAM, 
PEDP, and SEDP have a certain form of programme projects costs estimate. The estimated 
ASDP costs amount to Tsh.2,492 billion for the programme period of 2006/07 – 2012/13. 
MMAM requires an amount of Tsh.9.6 trillion investment during the programme period of 
2007 -2017.  
 
1.2.5. However, there seems to be no aggregated estimate or projection for total investment or 
development expenditures for the entire sectors. A cautious opinion of a senior 
government officer on the needed public investment is that currently only half amount of 
the required development resources are mobilized and programmed on the national 
budget, far short of the needed investments. Actually we can see immense requirement of 
development resources both financial and technological and human in most of the sectors: 
education and health, agriculture, industries, water and sanitation, infrastructure, tourism, 
and capacity development. For example, according to a recently presented paper on 
sanitation, Tanzania needs to allocate about Tsh.90 billion every year to cover sanitation 
issues if the country is to meet the eThekwani Declaration.176 It means that for Tanzania 
to meet the internationally agreed development goal the budget allocation needs to come 
up with about Tsh.80 billion. from the current level of Tsh.10 billion.  
 
2. The Apparatus: JAST(Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania) 
 
2.1. Background 
 
2.1.1. Helleiner’s Independent Commission Report and TAS177  
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hygiene programmes.(The Guardian Daily News, November 12, 2008) 
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2.1.1.1. In January 1997, the Tanzanian government and its development partners jointly 
adopted the recommendations of the Report of the Group of independent advisors, led by 
Professor Gerald K. Helleiner, who were commissioned in 1994 to evaluate and come up 
with proposals on how to improve development cooperation in Tanzania. The Group 
among others had recommended that the government formulates clear medium- to long-
term national development priorities and undertakes necessary reforms in public service 
and financial management. Development partners had been urged to take actions to better 
coordinate and harmonize their development assistance including practices and procedures 
as well as to increase the predictability of aid flows.    
 
2.1.1.2. The adoption of the Report’s recommendations in the ‘Agreed Notes’ – an agreement 
between the government and its development partners on 18 actions to be taken to 
improve their relationship – set in motion a process of redefining the relationship between 
the government and its development partners of aid on the basis of principles of national 
ownership, government leadership, harmonization and alignment. This process of 
enhancing partnership relations and aid effectiveness was supported by further 
independent assessments of Tanzania’s development partnership, undertaken by Professor 
Helleiner in 1997, 1999 and 2000 and followed by an institutionalized Independent 
Monitoring Group (IMG) since 2002.  
 
2.1.1.3. One major outcome of the process was the establishment of the Tanzania Assistance 
Strategy(TAS), which was launched in 2002. The TAS served as the medium-term 
framework for development cooperation, aiming at strengthening aid coordination, 
harmonization and alignment as well as national ownership and government leadership of 
the development process. A TAS Action Plan, developed during FY 2002/03, set out 
practical steps for implementing TAS. Actions were grouped in four priority areas, namely 
(1) increasing the predictability of aid flows, (2) integrating external resources into the 
government budget and exchequer system, (3) harmonizing and rationalizing processes, 
(4) improving national capacities for aid coordination and external resource management. 
The implementation of the TAS has contributed to considerable progress in the above 
mentioned areas.  
 
2.1.2. A Call for Enhancing Aid Effectiveness 
 
2.1.2.1. Not only the national request for improving development cooperation, but also the 
international appeal for enhancing aid effectiveness accentuated the reforms in aid strategy 
and management. Dispersed and uncoordinated aid intervention can be detrimental to all 
levels of development promotion; sustainable human development, macro-economic 
growth, national capacity building, and community empowerment. This calls for effective 
dialogue between government and its development partners on how best to coordinate 
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their efforts and make sure that they are consistent with government development process 
and structures.178 
 
2.1.2.2. The JAST has been formulated in the spirit of national and international 
commitments and initiatives on aid effectiveness – most notably the Tanzania Assistance 
Strategy(2002), but also the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development(2002). 
The Rome Declaration on Aid Harmonization (2003), the Marrakech Memorandum on 
Managing Results (2004) and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005). It spans a 
renewable cycle of five years and outlines the main objectives, principles and broad 
arrangements of Tanzania’s development partnership. It is complemented by an Action 
Plan that specifies concrete activities and timeframes for implementing JAST and 
monitoring framework with indicators to measure the government and the development 
partner performance.179    
 
2.2. JAST(Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania) 
 
2.2.1. (Introduction) The JAST, in Kiswahili ‘Mkakati wa Pamoja wa Misaada Tanzania 
(MPAMITA)’, is a national framework for aid coordination that aims to promote the 
effective management of external resources to support Tanzania’s development objectives. 
It is a unique strategy, Tanzania being one of the first countries to articulate and 
implement, with her development partners (DPs), for managing external resources in terms 
of increased aid effectiveness. It also outlines the role of non-state actors (NSAs) and other 
stakeholders to the extent that they contribute to the successful implementation of the 
strategy. The JAST is implemented at all levels of the government within the existing 
national, sector and local processes for all aid relations with DPs. DPs adopts the strategy 
as a basis for guiding the management of their development cooperation with the 
government of Tanzania (GoT). Bilateral agreements and country assistance strategies are 
being brought in line with the JAST principles. Nineteen DPs have signed with the GoT a 
memorandum of Understanding (MOU) committing their respective countries and 
agencies to the implementation and principles of JAST.180  
  
2.2.2. (Objectives) The overall objective of the JAST is to contribute to sustainable 
development and poverty reduction in line with the National Vision 2025 and the Zanzibar 
Vision 2020 by consolidating an coordinating government efforts and DPs’ support under 
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 The Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, Strengthening Aid Effectiveness in Tanzania, 
August 2008 
179
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 The Development Partners Group(DPG) was formally established in 2004 and the Terms of 
Reference, Development Partners Group(DPG) Tanzania was revised in January 2007. The 
current membership comprised of twenty six(26) DPs including AfDB, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, EC, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Spain, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United Nations, United States and World Bank.  
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a single Government-led framework to achieve results on the MKUKUTA and the 
MKUZA, as well as other national development and poverty reduction programmes. The 
intermediate objective of the JAST is to build an effective development partnership in line 
with national and international commitments to aid effectiveness by: 
 
   (1) Strengthening national ownership and GoT leadership of the development process, 
   (2) Aligning DP support to GoT priorities, systems, structures and procedures,  
   (3) Harmonizing GoT and DP processes, 
(4) Managing resources for achieving development results, 
(5) Ensuring mutual accountability of the GoT and DPs, and 
(6) Strengthening accountability of the GoT to the citizens of Tanzania. 
 
2.2.3. (National Ownership and Leadership) The government is highly committed to 
sustainable development and poverty reduction. In a broadly participatory process 
involving domestic and international stakeholders, it has formulated a range of long- and 
medium-term goals and strategies that articulate Tanzania’s vision and agenda for national 
development and poverty reduction and for whose implementation the government is 
accountable to its citizens. Under the leadership of the government domestic stakeholders 
participates more fully in the development management process. The government aligns 
all national and sector policies, strategies and programmes as well as plans of MDAs, 
Regions and LGAs with the MKUKUTA/MKUZA and harmonize them around the 
national budget process. Development partners fully align their support with the 
MKUKUTA/MKUZA and other national sector strategies, policies, programmes, and 
local government plans. In terms of aid modality, the provision of General Budget Support 
(GBS) and the Basket Funds (BFs) plays a significant role in aligning development 
assistance with national, sector and local strategies and priorities. The government 
allocates the GBS and BFs according to these priorities which are subjected to the same 
degree of contestability as domestic resources within the budget process, both at sector 
and national level, so that they fully align with the national and sector strategies.  
 
2.2.4. (Aid Modalities and General Budget Support) The government receives aid under three 
modalities: General Budget Support (GBS); Basket Funds, and direct Project Funds, with 
the GBS being the most preferred mode since it is consistent with the government’s legal 
framework and processes. In the 2006/2007 Financial Year, approximately US$700 
million or 55 per cent of the total foreign aid to Tanzania was provided under the GBS 
modality, thus demonstrating advantages over other aid modalities.  
 
   • General Budget Support is the government’s preferred modality. It is consistent with the 
government’s legal framework, and has been associated with greater ownership, 
harmonization, alignment, predictability of aid flows, reduction of transaction costs, 
managing for results, as well as mutual and domestic accountability. It increases the 
proportion of external resources subjected to the national budget process, thereby 
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increasing national ownership of the development process by emphasizing the national 
budget as the framework for identifying priorities and programming resource use. Apart 
from quarterly meeting of the PRBS group, the government and GBS partners convene 
annually for annual GBS review and GBS partners make their commitment. 
 
• Basket Funds play a big role in financing core public reform programmes and 
development activities at the sector level. Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAPs) and 
Program-Based Approaches( PBAs) are now put in place in various sectors and sub-
sectors, including education, health, water, agriculture, HIV/AIDS, and core reform 
programmes. The basket fund modality contributes to strengthening national 
ownership, securing increased resources, enhancing the quality of dialogue and 
improving coordination of projects and programmes in a wide perspective by replacing 
fragmented and loosely coordinated projects and programmes previously.  
 
• Direct Project Funds are being utilized for large-scale infrastructure investment, for 
piloting where particular service delivery innovations or policies need to be tested 
before being mainstreamed in the normal government system, and for emergency aid 
where quick and localized service delivery is needed. Off-budget project financing 
arrangements has provided many government agencies with continued access to 
financing channels that largely bypass and therefore undermine the national budget 
process.  
 
Table 17: Official Development Assistance by Funding Modalities 
(Unit: Million USD) 
Type of Modality 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 
General Budget Support 279 459 393 501 699 
Basket Funds 168 81 321 254 137 
Project Funds 386 269 605 422 527 
Total 833 809 1,319 1,177 1,363 
      Sources: The Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, Strengthening Aid Effectiveness in 
Tanzania, 2008   
   
2.2.5. (Division of Labor and Coordination) Within the broadly identified roles in the 
implementation of the JAST, the government works towards a more effective division of 
labor, cooperation and coordination among and between MDAs, Regions and LGAs in 
order to avoid overlaps and gaps in carrying out necessary tasks. The JAST follows the 
principle of subsidiarity embodied in the policy of Decentralization by Devolution (D by 
D) and defines each government agency’s role and responsibilities, in particular in the 
MKUKUTA /MKUZA and other existing frameworks and processes such as Public 
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Expenditure Review (PER)181 and General Budget Support(GBS). On the other hand, 
dialogue and coordination among development partners is facilitated by the Development 
Partners Group (DPG). Now the 26 bilateral and multilateral members are organized under 
the DPG umbrella where monthly meetings at the overall level addressing policy issues is 
supplemented with more technical dialogue at sector and thematic areas with relevant 
sector ministries. Within and across sectors and thematic areas, development partners 
harmonize their activities, funding decisions, requirements, analytic work, meetings, 
missions, reviews and other processes. As part of division of labor arrangements, terms of 
reference including a code of conduct for delegated cooperation and harmonization 
arrangements specify the roles and responsibilities of ‘lead’, ‘active’, and ‘delegating’ 
partners. In each sector/thematic area, relevant MDAs in consultation with LGAs and in 
agreement with development partners decide which development partners will actively 
engage in the area and who will assume the role of the lead partner. Through the 
implementation of the JAST, the government and development partners continues to 
jointly reassess the adequacy of existing division of labor arrangements, taking into 
account and adjusting to possible changes in development partners’ comparative and 
competitive advantages or other selection criteria and changing government needs.       
 
2.2.6. Apart from DPG, DPs supporting the he national growth and poverty reduction efforts 
through the General Budget Support (GBS) have reorganized themselves into a Poverty 
Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) group. The group consists of 14 bilateral and 
multilateral DPs, and has a Troika Plus System of organization co-chaired by the PRBS 
group chair, the outgoing and incoming chair and the World Bank. The Troika Plus meets 
quarterly and when needs arise with the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Affairs.182 
 
2.2.7. (Technical Assistance and Capacity Development) Capacity development is the 
process of unleashing, creating, strengthening, adapting and maintaining the capacity of 
individuals, organizations, institutions and society as a whole. And development partners 
provide technical assistance as a means to facilitate sustainable capacity development. 
Technical assistance (TA) which is demand-driven and responds to government’s capacity 
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 The Public Expenditure Review (PER) has been an ongoing process since fiscal year 1998/99 and 
includes stakeholders from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, Planning Commission, 
Public Service Management and Regional Administration and Local Government, sector 
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traditional PER function focused on the budget process in terms of management, control and 
accountability. The underlying objective is to evaluate budget performance against approved 
targets and procedures or processes and identify shortcomings and corrective measures. Thus PER 
provides such inputs as updated sector Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs) for key 
sectors and donor commitments in support of the government’s expenditure strategy and budget 
estimates both for the upcoming financial years as well as for the medium term.  
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 Balandya Elikana, Evaluation of KOICA Assistance to Tanzania(A Seminar Presentation Paper), 
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, September 2008, p.4 
   
 
 
148
development needs is identified and also increasingly untied from the source of financial 
sources and procured in a fair, non-discriminatory, competitive, transparent and 
accountable manner under the leadership of the government. The government and 
development partners work toward providing a conducing incentive structure for TA 
personnel to effectively share their expertise and for local counterparts to adapts and retain 
skills and knowledge from them. The government furthermore works closely with 
development partners and other stakeholders to formulate a national TA policy that 
outlines TA objectives, priorities and concrete guidelines for selecting, managing, 
monitoring and evaluating TA.  
 
2.2.8. More than 90 per cent of the government’s development expenditure is financed by the 
external assistance coming from development partners. It means that most of the public 
expenditure programs and projects themselves are the development assistance programs 
and projects per se. The combined sum of external assistance channeled to the government 
as foreign loans and grants is allocated to each expenditure programs and projects in 
accordance with the investment priorities of the government through the national 
budgeting process. Therefore, the composition of the development expenditure itself 
shows the aggregate portfolio of development assistance contributed by the development 
partners. The FY 2008/09 budget plan discloses that the six priority sectors including 
education, road transport, health, agriculture, water and irrigation, and energy receive 
nearly two third of total development expenditure as specified in the table below.  
 
Table 18: The Structure of Development Expenditure FY 2008/09 
(Unit: Tsh. Billion, %)                                                           
 
FY 2007/08 FY 2008/09 
Budget Composition Budget Composition 
Education 1,086.0 17.9 1,430.4 19.8 
Infrastructure(Road) 777.2 12.8 973.3 13.5 
Health¹ 697.6 11.5 910.8 12.6 
Agriculture 379.0 6.3 460.0 6.4 
Water and irrigation 309.1 5.1 230.6 3.2 
Energy and Minerals 354.0 5.8 383.4 5.3 
(Above 6 areas total)  (3,602.9) (59.4) (4,388.5) (60.8) 
Other sectors 2,463.9 40.6 2,827.6 39.2 
Total expenditure 6,066.8 100.0 7,216.1 100.0 
     Note 1 Includes HIV/AIDS 
Source: Budget Speech for the FY 2008/09, Minister for Finance and Economic Affairs, June 12, 
2008, p.55          
    
3. Major Programs and Projects  
 
3.1. Introduction 
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3.1.1. More than half of the external finance forwarded to Tanzania comes in the form of 
GBS directly to the government treasury as a general budget component of local 
expenditure sources. It means that a substantial portion of the external assistance is 
automatically aligned to the nation’s policies, development priorities and the process of 
development planning and budgeting which ensures the ownership and leadership of 
Tanzania. The basket funds programmes based on sector-wide or program-based 
approaches account for a certain portion of external finance in major sectors and thematic 
areas. A number of development partners rather than a sole donor take part in the common 
process of sector review and evaluation, formulation of development policy and strategy, 
identification of priority programs, and funding of the programs in a collaborative and 
integrated manner. 
 
3.1.2. Of course, every development partners have their own area of preferred intervention as 
well as their mode of development assistance. DFID (Department for International 
Development), one of the leading development partners in Tanzania, is fully aligned with 
the Tanzania’s development policy extending most of its development assistance for the 
scheme of general budget support. Around 80 per cent of the total resources are channeled 
to the GBS pool of the Tanzanian government resultantly focusing on poverty reduction 
programs, especially for educational development. DfID also concentrates on private 
sector development while taking part actively in the working of CAR (Capacity 
Accountability Response) Team. The new JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) 
which is under the process of modality improvement upon the merger with the JBIC 
(Japan Bank of International Cooperation) recently is expanding its activities in the areas 
of agriculture, infrastructure and governance plus health and education. With the 
commitments made in the TICAD183 meeting in Yokohama last May, JICA plans to 
double its ODA disbursement to Tanzania under a newly modified country assistance 
strategy. Japan take parts in the GBS scheme and extends around 20 per cent of her 
assistance through the GBS modality. BTC(Belgium Technical Cooperation) assists 
various kinds of development programs by taking part in the Basket Fund support 
activities on the one hand and by executing a number bilateral programs. Around half of 
the BTC’s development budget supports the Basket Fund programs, particularly for 
elementary education and public service reform. And the other half goes to specific areas 
such as swamp conservation, railway construction, community-managed water 
development, bee-keeping and scholarship provision for local and overseas academic 
studies.  
 
3.1.3. Committed more than US$20 billion for 23 programs in Tanzania, the World Bank 
boasts the most intensive intervention in a wide horizon from industrial promotion and 
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 Tokyo International Conference on African Development. The fourth latest meeting was held in 
Yokohama on May 28-30, 2008. 
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poverty reduction to infrastructure development. While nearly one third of its development 
budget is channeled to the GBS scheme amounting US$150-200 annually184, a bulk of its 
assistance goes to infrastructure development including power generation, transportation, 
telecommunication, urban development as well as education, health and HIV/AIDS. Under 
one roof of aid coordination among the development agencies of the United Nations as 
well as the development partners group (DPG), the United Nations Tanzania contributes 
mainly to the multilateral efforts for capacity development and institutional building. 17 
UN agencies extend variety of development programs under the framework of ‘Delivery 
As One’ and cooperate with other development partners and the Tanzanian government as 
the Secretariat of the DPG. The United Nations Tanzania does not participate in the GBS 
process, however, is increasing the volume of assistance in recent years.            
 
3.2. Division of Labor and Coordination by Development Partner  
 
3.2.1. The major role and responsibility of each development partner in certain sector or 
thematic area are assumed by the division of labor and coordination based on each one’s 
comparative and competitive advantages. A sector or thematic area constitutes a thematic 
entity on the basis of which policies, strategies and plans are formulated and implemented 
and dialogue is organized. Despite the cluster-based approach of the MKUKUTA, sectors and 
sector (and thematic area) dialogue within the Government and between the Government, 
DPs and other stakeholders still play an important role. Under the guidance for identifying 
sectors and thematic areas, ten(10) sectors and eleven(11) thematic areas are identified. Each 
sector and thematic area have one lead MDA and one deputy lead, which are responsible for 
the coordination of activities and dialogue within the sector/thematic area.185  
 
  < Sectors >  
1. Agriculture (including Livestock) 
2. Industry and Trade (including Private Sector Development) 
3. Water (incl. Sanitation) 
4. Energy and Minerals 
5. Natural Resources and Tourism 
6. Infrastructure (including ICT and Transportation) 
7. Health  
8. Education 
9. Legal (including Public Safety and Home Affairs, Humanitarian Assistance & Refugees) 
10. Lands and Human Settlements Development 
 
< Thematic Areas (incl. Cross-cutting Areas) > 
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 The World Bank keeps the balance between the General Budget Support and the support for the 
programmed development activities by extending around 30 per cent its resources to the GBS 
scheme globally.  
185
 For more details, refer to the Sectors and thematic areas under MKUKUTA - PER Cluster 
Working Groups (CWG) and MDA membership and leadership in sectors and thematic areas 
defined by the Tanzanian government  
   
 
 
151
1. Governance (incl. Public Service Reform Programme and Local Government Reform  
Programme, domestic accountability, anti-corruption) 
2. Macroeconomic Management  
3. Public Financial Management 
4. Environment 
5. Gender 
6. Employment 
7. HIV/AIDS 
8. Social protection  
9. MKUKUTA Monitoring System 
10. Culture 
11. Innovations and Technology 
 
3.2.2. According to the intensity of involvement as well as the each other’s comparative 
advantages the role of the development partner is divided into three categories: (1) lead; 
(2) active; and (3) delegating. Another approach toward a coordinated intervention in the 
targeting sector or thematic area is the Delivering as One Initiative taken by the UN 
Resident Coordinator in Tanzania. The DPG Secretariat compiled the list of labor division 
among the development partners. The Tanzanian government modified it in accordance 
with the sectors and thematic areas identified and now the process of finalization is under 
progress. And the major programs and projects will be planned, consulted, implemented, 
monitored and reviewed under this framework of division of labor and coordination.  
 
4. Review and Recommendations 
 
4.1. Strategic Policy Dialogue 
 
4.1.1. Under the framework of the JAST, all the programs and development activities are 
consulted, coordinated, implemented, monitored, and evaluated through the well organized 
schemes within the government and among development partners. The Development 
Partners Group (DPG) meetings are convened monthly. The consultation meetings of the 
GBS group are being held quarterly for the Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) 
under the chair of Troika Plus System. And an annual meeting for GBS commitment is 
made on October every year. All the activities are fairly well inter-linked and cooperative 
in a rather routine manner concentrating on specific subjects or programs on the executive 
and field office level.  
 
4.1.2. However, it seems that there is no occasion for intensive high-ranking policy dialogue 
deliberating macroeconomic issues and strategic agenda in a wide and longer-term 
perspective. It is recommended that an annual or biannual opportunity for comprehensive 
review on development performance and renewing strong commitment to development in 
which the nation’s political leaders and other high-profiled representatives of the major 
development partners are taking part.   
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4.2. Importance of Public Capacity Development 
 
4.2.1. The recent development in strengthening the policy ownership and the role of the 
recipient in aid programming and implementation made the development process depend 
on the capacity of the Tanzanian government much more than before. Major portion of 
external finance are being channeled to the funds for government budgeting through the 
GBS and the sector or thematic basket fund schemes. The responsibility and 
accountability of the government are increasingly becoming important in development 
planning and implementation. Development partners are in the position of supportive 
role, participating in collective advisory, monitoring and reviewing activities. 
 
4.2.2. The rapidly changing environment of public service and aid management requires 
appropriate competence and ability of the public sector in all levels of administrative 
strata. The capacity of government officials, researchers and field workers, ministries and 
public organizations, development policy and strategy formulation and management 
should be upgraded so as to address the challenges the public sector encounters in a 
rapidly changing environment. The development of public capacity needs to be not only 
technical and professional in its expertise, but also ethical and moral in its psychology to 
meet the standard of good governance. Without the building capacity of the government 
sector the reform process of aid management cannot produce the expected outcomes. In 
parallel with aid reform efforts toward enhancing ownership and public accountability, 
technical assistance for public capacity development should be equally strengthened.  
 
4.3. Stewardship of Development Cooperation  
 
4.3.1. More than 90 per cent of development activities in the public sector are supported by 
external finance. It means that as much government stewardship toward international 
development cooperation is to be exercised in a consistent and integrated manner. It means 
the administrative capacity related with development cooperation should be activated as 
urgent as the capacity building of educational and health sector is needed. Even the bulk of 
the assistance programs are incorporated into the government budgetary framework, still 
the learning from and sharing with foreign sources are highly indispensable. 
 
4.3.2. The monitoring and evaluation activities are activated in recent years, however, the data 
and information related to development and international cooperation are neither easy nor 
convenient to access and share with. The public relations both with national stakeholders 
and development partners regarding the development activities are to be promoted to 
ensure the reliable and appropriate data and information are provided. To operate a unit or 
an exclusive team for development data and information management inter-connecting 
planning division and monitoring and evaluation division is advisable.        
 
4.4. Donor Ownership – Comparative/Competitive Advantages 
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4.4.1. The process of aid coordination and harmonization is taking place on the ground that 
the development partners possess their own comparative and competitive advantages in 
certain themes or areas. As important as the policy and development ownership is, the 
donor ownership is also important in terms of shared responsibility and mutual 
accountability for the results and outcomes of the development programs. The progress of 
development and the success of development programs depend on catching up the 
development path of the partners by learning and utilizing their comparative and 
competitive advantages as well as the best practices.   
 
4.4.2. In this sense donor ownership is respected and promoted through the active exploration 
of each development partner’s comparative and competitive advantages by the recipient. 
A program for exploring the comparative and competitive advantages of each 
development partner could be projected as part of the capacity development activities. 
Under the program a systematic research and study activities could be underwent 
including group study tour and joint research and study, and the program could be 
supported through a technical assistance program. The process is to be propelled by the 
Tanzanian side rather than by the development partners in line with securing the 
ownership of the recipient.  
 
4.5. Resources Ownership – Mobilization of Domestic Revenues and Development 
Borrowing  
 
4.5.1. To secure the resources ownership – independence of development finance – is to 
really achieve the ownership of development. Considering the resources structure of 
development finance, Tanzania possesses only less than 10 per cent of her financial 
ownership.  
 
4.5.2. Apart from the strategy of domestic resources mobilization through acceleration of 
public and private savings, a strategy for enhancing ownership and responsibility on 
external finance should be formulated and vigorously implemented. Development 
borrowing for expanded public investment in the productive sectors such as agriculture, 
manufacturing, tourism and socio-economic infrastructure supporting the productive 
sector development is an option for enhancing the ownership of external finance. By 
generating the growth and the domestic revenues in the targeted areas of production, the 
development borrowing subject to public accountability could change the way of doing 
public investment from a passive and donor-driven manner to an active and demand-
driven mode.  
 
5. Korean Engagement and Contributions 
 
5.1. Overview 
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5.1.1. Since the two countries – the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the 
Government of the Republic of Korea- established the diplomatic relationship in 1992, the 
Korean government began to take part in the process of Tanzania’s socio-economic 
development together with other development partners. For the most of the time, Korea’s 
contribution to Tanzania’s development efforts has been minimal in its intervention. It is 
the recent phenomenon that Korea as one of the emerging donors renewed the willingness 
and commitment to international development cooperation through which Korea could 
share the development experiences and expand the volume and area of assistance 
programs. In particular, since the Korean government launched ‘Korea’s Initiative for 
Africa’s Development’ in 2006 which projected to triple Korea’s aid to Africa by 2008, 
the cooperative relationship between the two countries has been strengthened.  
 
5.1.2. Tanzania is one of the core development partners of Korea’s international cooperation. 
Tanzania is one of the five priority countries in Africa the Korea International Cooperation 
Agency(KOICA), an arm of the Korean government which is responsible for the extension 
of grant aid and technical cooperation program, plans to expand the cooperative programs 
in the future.186  The Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), the other 
development apparatus of the Korean government operated by the Korea Export-Import 
Bank (KOEXIM), identified Tanzania as one of the core development partners.187 The 
Representative Office of EDCF started its operation in Dar se Salaam in early 2008 as the 
first resident office in the African continent.188  
 
5.1.3. Development assistance from the Korean government comes to Tanzania through two 
channels of development cooperation: KOICA and EDCF. The volume of Korea’s 
development cooperation with Tanzania is modest for the time being, it has been expanded 
in some extent for the last couple of years. Several grant aids projects of few million 
dollars are under implementations and a couple of multi-million dollars development loan 
programs are in progress. The sectors and areas of focus have been in agriculture, human 
resources development capacity development, health, water and sanitation, and 
infrastructure. Aid delivery modality has been direct to project and technical cooperation 
which are carried out of the regular budget process. Both the number and volume of the 
projects and programs are expected to be implemented in the years to come in line with 
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 The five priority countries are Ethiopia, Tanzania, Ghana, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo.(The Draft Mid-term Strategic Plan of Foreign Grant Assistance 2007-2009, KOICA, 
November 2006) 
187
 The Korea Institute for Development Strategy (KDS) recommended the four countries including 
Madagascar, Mozambique, Senegal, and Tanzania as development partners of top priority. 
(Regional Development Strategy: Africa in Korean, Korea Institute for Development Strategy, 
August 2008) 
188
 KOICA opened its resident representative office in Dar es Salaam in 2002.  
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the Official Development Assistance (ODA) rationale and expansion policy of the Korean 
government as well as the development ownership of the Tanzanian government .  
 
5.1.4. Regarding the rationale of Korea’s development cooperation, however, it is noteworthy 
that the motivations and vision for Korea’s development assistance may be quite similar to 
those of traditional donors, but its origins are somewhat different from theirs.189 It is the 
result of a gradual accretion to awareness of and learning about development based upon 
reciprocity and mutual benefit between Korea and the international community. It is 
neither the moral responsibility nor any predestined obligation that are supposed to be 
borne by the former imperialist countries. Instead, Korean people believe that the 
assistance program is to repay the debt and goodwill they owed to the people of friendly 
nations of the world decades ago. Modest though the programs of Korea’s development 
cooperation may be, they are unique in the sense that most of them are derived from her 
first-hand development experience which is practical and inspiring.  
 
5.2. Korea’s Development Cooperation Program 
 
5.2.1. Grant Aid Technical Cooperation  
 
5.2.1.1. KOICA extends a several kinds of free-standing technical cooperation programs 
which include project programs, invitation of trainees, dispatch of experts and volunteers, 
and support to the Korean NGOs in Tanzania. The priority areas of KOICA’s engagement 
are education and human resources development, health and sanitation, governance, 
agriculture and information and communications technology all of which are in line with 
Tanzania’s growth and poverty reduction strategies. Assistance for these five sectors 
accounts for more than 75 per cent of KOICA’s programs for Tanzania.190 The sectors or 
area of focus of KOICA assistance The support being received is acknowledged and 
appreciated by the beneficiaries, particularly in human resources development (training 
provisions), and dispatching experts and volunteers in the health and other social sectors. 
The projects being implemented in the water and agricultural sectors are considered as 
very important in improving the quality of life and well being of the targeted people.191    
                                            
189
 The member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), OECD adopted a 
statement which sets forth the collective views on development cooperation for the first part of the 
21st century in 1996. The three vital interests the DAC envisioned as prime reasons for 
development cooperation are as follows: (1) humanitarian consideration, which is considered most 
fundamental; (2) enlightened self-interest, which means that development benefits people not only 
in poor countries, but also in donor countries; and (3) solidarity for all people, which enables 
peoples are from all nations work together to address common problems and pursue shared 
aspirations.  
190
 Young Ho Park, The KOICA’s Grant Aid to Tanzania, Korea Institute for International Economic 
Policy(KIEP), September 2008  
191
 Balandya Elikana, p.1 
   
 
 
156
 
5.2.1.2. All the projects and programs are consulted with the stakeholders both in planning 
and implementation authorities, however, the processes are being taken place off the 
regular budget procedures. The major projects completed and under implementations are 
as fallows: the Project for the development of ground water in Dodoma and Shinyanga 
regions; the Project for effective ICT education at the College of Engineering and 
Technology, University of Dar es Salaam; Project for rehabilitation of the irrigation 
facilities and modernization of agriculture in Morogoro and Zanzibar; Project for 
Upgrading Agro-processing Capacity in Morogoro, Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar; and 
Capacity Building for Diagnostic Service Improvement of Health Centers in Dar es 
Salaam. The Trainee Invitation Program and the Experts and Volunteers Program are 
carried out on a yearly planning basis. In 2008, 94 Tanzanian nationals are planned to be 
invited to numerous training programs in Korea. Currently 62 Korea overseas volunteers 
(KOVs) are working in various fields.  
 
 
 
 
5.2.2. Concessional Development Loan Program 
 
5.2.2.1. Concessional development loans have taken a special place in the course of Korea’s 
socio-economic development. Though criticized by some leftists and ultra nationalists for 
a certain periods of the time, this type of development facilities offered by multilateral and 
bilateral development partners contributed a lot to lessening the capital gap domestic 
resources could not had afforded and worked as the main conduits of industrial 
technologies and managerial techniques inducement as well. The concessional loan 
projects and programs had been implemented under the responsibilities and ownership of 
the recipients/the borrowers proved successful, economically profitable and financially 
viable. During the most of the development decades in 1970s and 1980s the induction of 
development loan prevailed over the grant ODA and the foreign direct investment.192 
EDCF provides two types of loans: (1) loans to foreign governments, government agencies 
or other organizations supporting the socio-economic development of developing 
countries; and (2) loans to Korean firms for overseas investment projects which contribute 
both to the benefits of the investors and the host countries. EDCF provides ‘compact loan’ 
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 Korea induced public loans amounting US$36,723.1 million(disbursement base) through 1960s to 
1990s much greater than the grant ODA received US$6,977.5(Lee Kyong Koo, Development 
Assistance and Cooperation to Korea in Korean, KOICA, March 2004, p.73 & 80). The volume 
of FDI from 1959 to 1971 was US$173.9 million compared with foreign loans amounted to 
US$2,571.4 million.(Economic Planning Board, Economic Policy of the Development Decades in 
Korean, December 1982, p.90)  
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for smaller scale programs with more preferential conditions and simplified procedures.193 
The focus of the development loans to foreign governments in the African region is placed 
on socio-economic infrastructure such as education and vocational training, road and 
railway, and ICT.194   
 
5.2.2.2. Loan assistance program to Tanzania is being rendered under the mutually agreed 
mid-term framework 2005-2008 between the two countries. Under the contemporary 
framework two EDCF projects are being implemented: Vocational Training Centres 
Establishment Project in Pwani, Lindi, Manyara, Kigoma and Dar es Salaam (US$18 
million); and Malagarsi Bridge and Associated Roads Construction Project(US$25 
million). The current framework will be extended through the establishment of a new 
framework agreement 2009-2012 which is in the stage of final consultation. The new 
framework will help streamline the process of loan procedures and construct a predictable 
commitment amounting to US$ 200 million for the next five years.195 The EDCF loan 
provides Tanzania with a preferential treatment applicable to the less developed countries 
(LDCs).196 With the new lower terms and conditions for the EDCF loans to Tanzania 
(0.01% p/a for tied and 0.1% p/a for untied), the EDCF expects to enhance the cooperation 
with the Tanzanian government in the priority sectors of energy, infrastructure, health, 
education, ICT, and agriculture as well as other sectors relevant to development strategies 
in Tanzania . The EDCF and the MOFEA is now under the discussion of providing a loan 
for Kiyungi and Njiro part of TEDAP in association with the World Bank. The EDCF 
plans to approve at least more than one project by year to meet our commitment to 
Tanzania. It means that the infrastructure investment which financial rate of return (FRR) 
is relatively low and cycled in long-term period could be eligible for the extension of 
EDCF loan.197  
 
5.3. Review: Potential and Constraints 
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 The projects of less than US$2 million are eligible for the compact loan and can bear the preferred 
terms and conditions of the interest rate of 0.1% per annum and the repayment period of 40 years 
including the grace period up to 15 years.  
194
 http://www.exim.go.kr/kr/file/etc/statistics_2006.pdf 
195
 The EDCF aims to provide a total loan commitment of U$1.5billion to Africa from 2008 to 2012 
to promote economic cooperation with the Continent. In order to reach this target, the EDCF 
selected four African countries – Angola, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Tanzania as our Priority 
Countries, which will take a lion share of EDCF commitment to Africa. In the 2008 KOAFEC 
Ministerial Conference, the EDCF will sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with these 
four priority countries. 
196
 Grant Element indicates the level of concessionality which is calculated according to the 
preferential repayment conditions compared with those of the commercial financial market. In 
terms of grant element (G.E.) of the loan, the concessionality level of the loans extended to 
Tanzania is near to the same as grant assistance. The interest rate of 0.5 % per annum with the 
period of 30 year amortization including 10 years’ grace considered having around 80 per cent 
G.E. 
197
 EDCF Tanzania Country Office, EDCF Projects in Tanzania, November 2008 
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5.3.1. For the time being the Korea’s commitment to Tanzanian development efforts is quite 
limited in its volume and areas of intervention. KOICA’s engagement is rather meager. 
The volume of aid provided by KOICA is very small when compared with other DPs; for 
example, in 2007 KOICA’s support is about 1%, 2%, 4%, and 25% of the World Bank, 
DfID, SIDA and UNDP support respectively.198 Furthermore, in comparison with its 
assistance volume, the areas of support are wide-spread from capacity building and human 
resources development to agriculture, water and sanitation, agro-processing, and ICT as 
well as health. With dispersion of the program focus and concentration, it is not expected 
that added tangible impact on strategic areas of intervention be achieved, while each of the 
project and program is incurring transaction costs.  
 
5.3.2. Though accounting the contribution of EDCF loan disbursement the volume of Korea’s 
development assistance is less significant compared with other DPs and then the areas of 
engagement are even more broad-based. While some are critical on dispersing the focus of 
Korea’s development assistance in some extent in comparison with the scale, others are 
generous on this point on the ground that all the projects and programs are in line with 
Tanzania’s development agenda. There are also controversies over the aid modalities and 
administration regarding aid effectiveness. Unlike other DPs who signed a MOU with the 
Tanzanian government committing their respective countries and agencies to the JAST 
objectives and principles, Korea is not among the JAST DPs signatories. It is generally 
recognized that effective, high quality and regular dialogue within the government and 
between the government, DPs and domestic stakeholders is crucial for successful 
cooperation towards achieving national growth, development, and poverty reduction goals. 
In this regard, the government and DPs are having a dialogue structure in the framework 
of MKUKUTA-PER process. The structure integrates all major national and sector 
processes in order to have single process on all national issues and to reduce overlaps and 
transaction costs. Korea is not part of these aid coordination processes.199  
 
5.3.3. Though it might be excused for Korea not to join the GBS process considering the 
scale of its contributions, many observers are rather critical about Korea’s reluctance to 
take part in the DPG activities. That is because that in the context of Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness of 2005 and the JUST, the DPG has re-affirmed its relevance as an apex 
coordination body of the DPs in Tanzania, and as the forum to enhance effectiveness of 
dialogue and quality of aid and to further strengthen development cooperation 
management. Most of the DPs joined the DPG process, but Korea is not a member of the 
DPG. Not only better effective aid harmonization among the DPs, but also between the 
two aid agencies of Korea, KOICA and EDCF, could be of point of interest. Since the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) integrated the JBIC, the development 
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lending agency, making a single authority of Japan’s international development, the 
duality of Korea’s aid planning and delivery could be a matter of concerns for structural  
reform and aid efficiency.  
 
5.3.4. There are some opinions on the issue of untying of the aid. KOICA’s support is partly 
untied.200 It is also acknowledged that the tendency of tying of support reduces the ability 
of the recipient to utilize the support provided effectively and efficiently. Aid tied is prone 
to criticism in terms of hampering aid alignment to the government procurement policy, 
but it is needed that the issue of untying aid could be reviewed in the standpoint of donor’s 
ownership in a different perspective from aid effectiveness or procurement efficiency.   
 
5.3.5. The constraints identified are mostly about the volume and the modalities of aid, not 
about the performance or quality of aid delivered. The Korean government plans to 
expand the volume of external aid substantially by upgrading the ration of ODA to GNI to 
0.15 per cent by 2015 from 0.06 per cent in 2006.201 It is expected that the volume of 
Korea’s external assistance would go up to US$ 3.0 billion from US$ 0.5 million in 2006. 
In the course of the Korea’s development aid expansion the bilateral assistance to 
Tanzania, one of Korea’s priority development partners will be further expanded. 
 
5.3.6. Apart from its quantitative volume of assistance, the example and experience of Korea 
as one of the massive aid recipients could provide many lessons and implications to fellow 
countries currently on the path of development including Tanzania. Because what really 
matters are not the financial resources, but the willingness to develop and overcome 
whatever the hindrance or difficulties are like lack of resource mobilization, low level of 
human capacity, and deficiency of technological capability. Almost all of the strengths and 
comparative advantages Korea has showed and the expertise and experience Korean 
people has accumulated could be utilized in supporting the endeavors for high growth and 
sustainable development of Tanzanians.     
   
5.3.7. For the time being the Korea’s commitment to Tanzanian development efforts is quite 
limited in its volume and areas of intervention. But the potential for future engagement 
and intervention is unlimited considering the huge demand for development investment in 
all the spheres and the applicability of Korea’s development experience and know-how 
into Tanzania’s development policies, strategies and programs in various fields. In the 
course of facts finding visits and discussions, a plenty of development activities and areas 
or themes of focus have been proposed and discussed. It depends on the Tanzania’s 
willingness to diversify the sources of development experience and expertise into 
                                            
200
 Ibid, p.5 
201
 As a way to enhance its ODA, Korea plans to join the OECD Development Assistance Committee 
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unfamiliar but real and fresh development cases, breaking the nation’s conventional 
wisdom of growth and development. 
 
5.4. Proposal for Korea’s Future Engagements  
 
5.4.1. Enhancement of Korea’s ODA System to Tanzania 
 
5.4.1.1. Though Korea’s assistance is in line with Tanzania’s development policy and growth 
strategy, and being appreciated by the targeted population, the volume is very small to be 
widely acknowledged and to bring major impact on growth and poverty reduction. There 
is need for Korea to increase the volume of support and concentrate her intervention in 
some strategic areas or themes which she has comparative advantages and competitive 
edges. The reason and rationale why Korea should expand the development activities in 
Tanzania are simple in the sense that Tanzania is one of the core priority countries in the 
African continent. The reciprocity and mutual benefits to be derived from strengthening 
the cooperative relations are expected overwhelming in most of the sectors including 
agriculture, manufacturing, ICT, and socio-economic infrastructure.  
 
5.4.1.2. Walking out of her infancy in development assistance activity, Korea is advised to 
comply with all the internationally recognized principles and guidelines of development 
cooperation including the Rome and Paris declaration on aid harmonization and 
effectiveness as well as Tanzania’s Joint Assistance Strategy. In recognition of 
development endeavors as not only the mobilization of investment resources, but also the 
sharing and learning process of knowledge and experience, Korea should take part in the 
DPG process. It seems to be premature for Korea to join the GBS scheme in terms of 
assistance volume. In the sense that the Korea’s unique experience and expertise are 
extended through the development programs, it is advisable for Korea to maintain the 
existing aid modality of free-standing technical cooperation. In case the programs and 
projects are identified in a manner which reflects the priority of the recipient and the 
comparative advantages of the donor, no longer the issue of untying aid would be of 
serious constraint.  
 
5.4.1.3. A reform planning for streamlining the dual entities of aid planning and delivery 
channel should be immediately started. It is known that the only nation having the dual 
system of external assistance, KfW and GTZ, is taking the step to merge the two 
organizations into one. Even before the structural reform process is proceeding at the 
government level, it is advised that the operations of the both field offices, the KOICA 
Tanzania Office and the EDCF Office in Tanzania, are combined into a single working 
unit as one office and one program.  
 
5.4.2. On Future Development Cooperation between Tanzania and Korea 
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5.4.2.1. Over the facts finding visits and discussions many of the MDAs expressed their 
interests on future engagement and contribution from Korea. Though they are not for 
identifying specific program or project, some priority sub-sectors or preferred programs 
and projects are mentioned and suggested for further discussions. The followings are the 
summary.   
 
• President’s Office - Planning Commission 
(1) Agriculture: Modernization of the sector through modern equipments  
(2) ICT: Human capacity building, ICT infrastructure and e-government 
(3) Shipping and fisheries: Assistance in the shipping and fishing industry 
(4) A Joint Committee between Tanzania and Korea to be formed to look into more specific 
areas of cooperation  
 
• President Office – Public Service Management 
(1) Project for Establishment of a Management and Leadership Centre 
(2) Executive development training programs for senior and middle-level government officials    
(3) Training Programs in overall areas: Regular training programs; Country specific programs; 
In-Country Leadership Development Programs in partnership with some Tanzanian 
institutions; Introduction of In-country masters program 
 
• Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives 
(1) Support for the establishment of Tanzania Institute for Agricultural Engineering and Post  
Harvest Technology 
(2) Korean investors to invest in the production and supply of agricultural machinery  
(3) Training of agricultural experts: rice cultivation and research; post-harvest processing; 
 irrigation and drainage; agro-mechanization; and other regular programs 
(4) Development of irrigation schemes and water management 
(5) Private sector development in horticultural production and processing 
(6) Research and development in area of bio-safety and management of GMO products 
(7) ICT development: Creation of an internet connecting remote sites of 7 Research Zones and 
12 Training Institutes; creation of a searchable agricultural database; training of experts in IT 
 skills, etc. 
(8) Study tour to Korea to learn practical experience 
 
• Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 
(1) Expanding technical and vocational training especially for science laboratories technicians 
(2) Modernization of training facilities in TVET (Tanzania Vocational Education Training) 
 institutions  
(3) Research, monitoring and evaluation  
(4) International exchanges in education  
  
• VETA (Vocational Education and Training Authority) 
(1) Provision of re-training for vocational training instructors 
(2) Support for establishment of e-learning and e-commerce training program  
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• PMO-RALG (Prime Minister’s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government) 
(1) Support on capacity building and regional infrastructure development 
(2) Financing the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) Phase 2 
   
• Ministry of Communications, Science and Technology 
(1) Capacity building program on IT: Provision of training at different levels of IT personnel; 
 Support for communication capacity building between Dar es Salaam and Dodoma 
(2) Investments in multi-purpose community tele-centres or community information centres, and 
Interface connectivity of the national ICT backbone 
(3) Support to implementation of a new addressing and postcode project.  
(4) Study tour program for policy officers in science, technology and innovation 
(5) Capacity building of officers in charge of formulation and management of policies in STI, 
 S&T education programs, and R&D activities  
(6) Joint research in identified priority areas in STI and R&D institutions and other programs 
 
• Ministry of Energy and Minerals 
(1) Capacity building of policy and technical staff 
(2) Support for the project of power distribution system improvement 
(3) Support for construction of coal, gas and hydro-power generation plant   
 
• Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development 
(1) Project Program for Capacity Building: Trainings on land administration for managers, 
policy formulation and analysis and strategic planning skills, skills in the surveys and 
mapping, strategic skills of town planning, geographic information system, etc  
(2) Project for improving training environment and capacity building for Ardhi Institute in 
Morogoro and Tabora 
(3) EDCF loan project to finance detailed design of Songe River Basin Development 
Programme 
 
• Export Processing Zones Authority (EPZA) 
(1) Project for the provision of basic export processing zone (EPZ) infrastructure at Arusha EPZ  
site  
 
• Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar 
(1) Zanzibar Livestock Sub-sector Development Programme   
(2) Project for Installation of Park Security Protection Fire Power  
(3) Water Resources Researches and Development Program 
(4) Financial support on aquaculture training 
(5) Land Management and Development of Irrigation Schemes Support 
(6) Project Program for Zanzibar Indian House Crow Eradication 
(7) Sustainable Rain-fed Rice Cultivation Scheme Support   
 
5.4.2.2. Most of the MDAs visited considered Korea as a prominent source of development 
experiences from which Tanzania could benefit and recognized a great potential for 
promising future development cooperation. Among plenty of proposals for future 
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programs and further possibility of new program development, there are needs to align the 
programs proposed and to be developed to the interests of both parties, Tanzania and 
Korea, and to prioritize them accounting for the development goal and objectives, 
financial capacity and other technical considerations.  
 
5.4.2.3. Of course, the programs and projects to be proposed are to be in line with the 
development goals and objectives of the Tanzanian government which are conducive to 
economic growth and poverty reduction. The areas or themes of focused intervention 
should be in which Korea has comparative and competitive advantages based on her 
accumulated development experiences and contemporary competence, and the elements of 
advantages should be those which could be utilized in full extent. Considering the greatest 
advantages of Korea are the human and soft elements of the development process, not the 
hard elements such as natural resources, financial capital, and endowed infrastructure, of 
course, the promising plan for future programs will come out of the former development 
elements. And also the future programs for development cooperation should produce the 
results and outcomes from which the both countries could mutually benefit.  
 
5.4.2.4. Most of all, the new programs to be implemented could be most fruitful in case they 
are consulted and identified in the context of Tanzania’s paradigm shift and reorientation 
of her development policy and strategy toward productive sector promotion. The future 
plan for development cooperation between Tanzania and Korea could be grouped into a 
number of categories for programming them in an integrated and consistent way.  
 
(1) Program for Development Mind-setting and Motivation 
• Renewing national pride and empowering people’s confidence  
• Engineering futuristic development leadership 
• Enhancing development ownership and stewardship 
 
(2) Development Policy, Growth Strategy and Capacity Development 
• Policy development and strategic planning 
• Human resources development (HRD) of the public sector 
• Promotion of research and development (R&D) institute   
• Public service and government administration reform 
• Anti-corruption and good governance 
 
(3) Accelerated Growth of Productive Sectors  
• Agriculture, fisheries and forestry development  
• Small and medium industries and manufacturing promotion 
• Investment and trade promotion  
• Exploration and utilization of energy and mineral resources  
• Tourism Development 
• Promotion of ICT industry 
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• Promotion of science and technology 
• Economic liberalization and privatization   
 
(4) Socio-economic Infrastructure Development 
• Development of water resources and irrigation 
• Construction of road and transport facilities 
• Electric power generation and development of alternative power sources 
• ICT infrastructure development 
• Construction of sewage and environmental facilities  
 
(5) Social Development 
• Education  
• Health and medical service 
• Family planning  
• HIV/AIDS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. A Conclusion: Develop Now or Later? 
 
 
1. Not more than 50 years of its modern history, Tanzania has undergone a miraculous path 
of national independence and foundation. The nation experienced one of the most 
outstanding socio-political integrations in the world by consolidating the numerous tribes 
and clans into one entity and achieved a national unification under a single polity. And 
more recently the nation has gone through a profound transition of national identity from a 
extremely experimental socialist country to a market-oriented capitalist economy.  
 
2. No other single country in the African continent has achieved so much progress in 
strengthening the social solidarity and projecting the national identity than the Unified 
Republic of Tanzania since her independence in early 1960s. Tanzania built a sound and 
strong foundation for further accelerated advancement of social progress and economic 
development. Particularly the nation’s leadership succeeded in providing the socio-
political stability and national confidence through the promotion of human rights, freedom 
and democracy.  
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3. Tanzania is now striving for national modernization more than ever. Blessed with rich 
endowments, the nation possesses immense potential for accelerated growth and 
sustainable development. There seems to be no reason for Tanzania not to take advantage 
of the proven paradigm of national development most of the developed countries took. 
Tanzania is a country of lacking nothing. If there is something Tanzania is lacking, it 
might be the willingness of the people to develop and the policy and strategy by which the 
resources are mobilized and the elements of development are utilized in a more effective 
way.  
 
4. The case of Korea’s development brings to Tanzania with a first-hand experiences and 
unique know-how which could be applied to the process of Tanzania’s national 
development. Based on the inborn characters of Tanzanians and the endowments the 
nation inherited more than abundant, the nation could build a nation of lofty pride and 
highly advanced economy in case Tanzania adopts a new policy and strategy toward a 
productive and competitive nation with a new development paradigm of virtuous circle of 
growth and development. Overhauling the current policies and strategies, an intensive 
process of review and appraisal, strategic planning should be taken place as soon as 
possible. Another step for profound transformation of the society and economy is to be 
taken by the initiative of the nation’s leadership.  
 
5. With the reorientation of the existing policies and strategies accompanied by the renewal 
of the nation’s pride and cultural identity, Tanzania could be a nation of dignity and 
affluence escaping from the plight of poverty and laggardness. The nation’s leadership and 
the people’s willingness will sure to make it. ‘Penda Tanza!’ Mr. Luvanda and I used to 
shout together whenever we toast our glasses. ‘(We/I) Love Tanzania!’ ‘(We/I) like 
Tanzania!’ And why don’t Tanzanians make a special and authentic name for their 
national flag symbolizing the nation’s soul and spirit? Not mini-tiger because there is no 
tigers in the African continent. Tanzania should become a lion, the king of the world.        
  
6. At home I used to get on the subway train to work, and on the way to and from the train 
crosses the Han River which bisects Seoul, the capital city of South Korea, into two parts, 
the River North and the River South. The Han River with her neighboring mountains and 
high rising buildings along the river side makes a totally different scene from that of Dar 
es Salaam. People borrow the name of the river when they talk about the extra-ordinary 
performance and the uniqueness of South Korea’s socio-economic development. They 
explain the accomplishment the Korean people made as ‘the Miracle of the Han River’.  
 
7. Now I am wondering how Tanzanians could be able to engineer the dynamism of 
accelerated national development and make an advanced nation. And what could we call 
the miracle Tanzanians accomplished in this wonderful country named Tanzania which 
lacks of nothing in realizing the vision.                                     
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8. Penye nia pana njia. Where there is a will, there is a way. It is certainly real if Tanzanians 
have the willingness to do it now not later. Why Tanzanians can’t do what other peoples 
do? It depends on the hand of Tanzanians.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
AfDB and OECD, Tanzania – African Economic Outlook 2008, May 2008 
Balandya Elikana, Evaluation of KOICA Assistance to Tanzania(A Seminar Presentation 
Paper), the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, September 2008 
Chronic Poverty Research Centre, The Chronic Poverty Report 2008-09: Escaping Poverty 
Traps, 2008 
Chuk Kyo Kim, Industrial Development Strategy for Indonesia: Lessons from Korean 
Experience, Korea Development Institute(KDI), March 2004 
Commission on Growth and Development, The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained 
Growth and Inclusive Development, The World Bank, 2008 
Corporate Tanzania, The Business, Trade and Investment Guide 2007/2008) 
DAC/OECD, Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation, May 
1996 
Danny M. Leipziger(Editor), Lessons from East Asia, The University of Michigan Press, 
1997    
   
 
 
167
Derek H. Aldcroft and Ross E. Catterall(Editors), Rich Nations – Poor Nations: The Long-
Run Perspective, Edgar Elgar Publishing Limited, 1996 
 Derek H. Aldcroft, the Penalty of Lateness 
Erik S. Reinert, The Role of Technology in the Creation of Rich and Poor Nations: Under-
employment in a Schumpeterian System 
Economic and Social Research Foundation(ESRF), Tanzania Quarterly Economic Review, 
Vol. 8 Issue 4, October-December 2005 
EDCF Tanzania Country Office, EDCF Projects in Tanzania, November 2008 
Graham R. Mitchell, Korea’s Strategy for Leadership in Research and Development, Office 
of Technology Policy, U.S. Department of Commerce, June 1997  
Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, 
2003 
Harry Campbell, What Happened to Tanganyika?, Portico Books, 2007 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruth_Benedict 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture_shock 
http://www.exim.go.kr/kr/file/etc/statistics_2006.pdf 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtlm 
Institute for African Studies of Russian Academy of Sciences, Julius Nyerere: Humanist,  
Politician, Thinker, 2005, Mkuki na Nyota Publishers 
Jai S. Mah, Industrial Policy and Economic Development: Korea’s Experience, Journal of 
Economic Issues Vol.ⅩLⅠ No. 1, March 2003 
JICA and others, Effective Technical Cooperation for Capacity Development (Synthesis 
Report), July 2008 
Jong-Wha Lee, Economic Growth and Human Development in the Republic of Korea 
1945~1992 – Occasional Paper 24, the United Nations Development Programme 
Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities of Our Time, 2005, Penguin 
Books 
Joshua Mushauri, Assessment of Assistance Needed to Develop and Institute a System for 
Planning for Human Resources in the Health and Education Sector(A Working Paper), 
PO-PSM, Sept. 2008 
Kihwan Kim & Danny M. Leipziger, The Lessons of East Asia: Korea – A Case of 
Government-Led Development, The World Bank, 1993 
Kim Kihwan, the Korean Economy: Past Performance, Current Reforms, and Future 
Prospects, Korea Development Institute, 1984 
Kim Jung Ryum, From a Least Developed Country to the Threshold of an Advanced Nation: 
The 30-year History of Korea’s Economic Policy(in Korean), Random House Joongang, 
October 1990 
Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) 
 The Draft Mid-term Strategic Plan of Foreign Grant Assistance 2007-2009, November 
2006 
 Mid to Long-term Bilateral Aid Policy of Korea, Korea Institute for Development Strategy 
(KDS), March 2006  
   
 
 
168
Korea Institute for Development Strategy (KDS), Regional Development Strategy: Africa in 
Korean, August 2008 
Larry E. Westphal, Industrial Policy in an Export-Propelled Economy: Lessons from South 
Korea’s Experience, Journal of Economic Perspectives – Vol. 4, Number 3, Summer 1990 
Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington, Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human 
Progress, Basic Books, 2002 
Lee Kyong Koo, Development Assistance and Cooperation to Korea(In Korean), The Korea 
International Cooperation Agency, 2004 
Lois Lobo, They Came to Africa: 200 Years of the Asian Presence in Tanzania, 2000,  
Sustainable Village 
Maliyamkono and Mason, The Promise, January 2006, TEMA Publishers Company Ltd 
Martin Meredith, The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence, 2005, The 
Free Press 
Michael Pollan, Second Nature: A Gardener’s Education, Dell Publishing, 1991 
Ministry of Communication and Transport, National Telecommunication Policy, October 
1997 
Ministry of Culture and Youth, Cultural Revolution in Tanzania, The United Republic of 
Tanzania  
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 
 Medium Term Plan Outlook 2008/09-1010/11, June 2008 
Macro Policy 2008-2009 and Mid-term Outlook 2008/09-2010/11, July 2008  
 Strengthening Aid Effectiveness in Tanzania, August 2008 
The Economic Survey 2007, June 2008 
The Estimates of Government Revenue and Expenditure for the Fiscal Year 2008/09 
(Speech to the National Assembly), June 12, 2008  
Ministry of Industry and Trade, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Policy, April 
2003 
Ministry of Industry and Trade 
  National Trade Policy, February 2003 
 National Trade Policy Background Papers, February 2003 
Small and Medium Enterprise Development Policy, April 2003 
Ministry of Energy and Minerals, The National Energy Policy, February 2003 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Joint External Evaluation of the Health Sector in 
Tanzania, 1999-2006, October 2007 
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
  Annual Health Statistical Abstract, April 2006 
Health Sector Strategic Plan Ⅲ July 2009 – June 2015(Draft Version), 11 August 2008 
Primary Health Services Development Programme – MMAM 2007-2017, May 2007 
Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements Development, National Land Policy(Second 
Edition), 1997  
Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 
   
 
 
169
The National Tourism Policy, September 1999 
The Wildlife Policy of Tanzania (Revised), March 2007 
Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment 
  Managing for Development Tesults-MKUKUTA Annual Implementation Report 2006/07, 
November 2007 
 The Economic Survey 2006, June 2007 
Poverty and Human Development Report 2007, December 2007 
View of the People 2007, December 2007  
Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education 
Science and Technology sub-Master Plan 2003-2018, October 2003 
The National Science and Technology Policy for Tanzania, April 1996 
Ministry of Water, Water Sector Development Programme 2006-2025(Concept Document), 
November 2006 
Ministry of Water and Livestock Development, National Water Policy, July 2002 
Ministry of Works, Construction Industry Policy, 2003 
National Bureau of Statics, Household Budget Survey 2006-07, October 2008 
Oh Won Chul, Building the Korean-style Economy - Series 7(in Korean), the Research 
Institute of Korean Style Economic Policy, October 1999 
Planning Commission  
 The Tanzania Development Vision 2020, The United Republic of Tanzania, 1999 
Composite Development Goal for the Tanzania Development Vision 2025, February 2000 
PMO-LARG, Local Government Reform Programme Ⅱ(Decentralization by Devolution ), 
July 2008-June 2013 
President’s Office – Public Service Management (PO-PSM), Medium Term Strategy 
2007/08-2011/12, Public Service Reform Programme Phase Ⅱ, August 2007 
Prime Minister’s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG) 
 The Status of Implementation of Decentralization by Devolution in Mainland Tanzania & 
The Way Forward, June 2008 
 Local Government Reform Programme-Policy Paper on Local Government Reform, 
October 1998 
Robert Calderisi, The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn’t Working, 2006, Palglave 
Macmillan 
Society for International Society(SID), East Africa Scenarios Project, 2007 
Stuart Jones, Macroeconomic Populism and Economic Failure in Africa, Rich Nations – Poor 
Nations: The Long-Run Perspective, 1996 
Tanzania Investment Centre, Tanzania Investors’ Guide 2007 and Beyond Industrial Sector 
Performance in Tanzania, Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment, August 
2007 
The DP Poverty Monitoring Group, The preliminary Results of the 2007 Household Budget 
Survey(HBS), October 6, 2008 
The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar  
Zanzibar’s Growth Strategy(2006-2015), February 2007 
   
 
 
170
Zanzibar Small and Medium Enterprises(SMEs) Development Policy, October 2006  
Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty(ZNSGRP), January 2007 
Zanzibar Trade Policy, January 2006 
Zanzibar Vision 2020, 2000  
The South Commission, The Challenge to the South, Oxford University Press, 1990 
The United Republic of Tanzania 
The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 
The Arusha Declaration and TANU’s Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance, 1967 
 Tanzanian Mini -Tiger Plan 2020, December 2004 
Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania, December 2006  
Agricultural Sector Development Programme(ASDP), 25th May, 2006 
The World Bank, World Development Report 1991 
Trade and Integration Development Programme, Technical Proposal Project for the Board of 
External Trade: The Way Forward, University of Dar es Salaam, January 2007 
Vice President’s Office, National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty(NSGRP), 
June 2005 
Won-Young Lee, S&T Development: Experience of South Korea (Presentation Material), 
Technology and Management Graduate Program, Seoul National University, November 
2004 
Young-Hwa Kim, Current Development Education Policy and Industrialization Strategies in 
Korea (1945~1995): a historical perspective, Journal of Education and Work, Vol. 13, No. 
1, Korean Educational Development Institute(KEDI), 2000 
Young Ho Park, The KOICA’s Grant Aid to Tanzania, Korea Institute for International 
Economic Policy(KIEP), September 2008 
 
 
